Miguel Jose Paley

This paper studies Bergson’s notions of utility and affect in light of their relationship to the process of self-constitution as it is developed in Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory as well as how these ideas were taken up in the thought of Levinas and Whitehead. I begin by mentioning three basic critiques of Bergson’s work focusing on the charge that his philosophy is problematically impersonal. In the first part of the paper, I explore how the notion of affect may counter such a charge. Affect, although sparsely treated, plays a fundamental, determining role in Bergson’s notion of self-constitution. I then show how this view might be at odds with Bergson’s determination of nature as utilitarian. In light of this conflict, the paper speaks of two Bergsons, one overly utilitarian and the other with a vague but important focus on affect. Part two then outlines the basic metaphysics of Whitehead and Levinas in order to show that their critiques of utilitarian and vital philosophies share the same focus on affect that was already present in Bergson’s philosophy. Noting this similarity, the paper concludes by arguing that, in the moments when they seem most critical of Bergson, it is possible to read Whitehead and Levinas as being, in fact, distinctly Bergsonian.

This book is a philosophical study of the concept of affect in the thought of Henri Bergson. It provides an account of the place and evolution of the idea throughout Bergson’s works and argues that an understanding of the changing nature of this central concept reveals important ruptures in Bergson’s own philosophical development. As Bergson shows, affectivity plays a central role in philosophical thinking about consciousness. In his early work, Bergson’s describes an embodied, temporal subject whose very subjectivity relies on a productive notion of affectivity. As his thought develops, however, Bergson’s metaphysics take an increasingly utilitarian turn characterized by the minimization of affectivity. Through a series of transformations, disappearances, and displacements, affectivity comes to qualify the way Bergson understands everything from the body, to subjectivity, to life as such. The book concludes by discussing the pivotal role these ideas played in how Bergson was received by 20th Century phenomenology.

This paper studies Bergson’s notions of utility and affect in light of their relationship to the process of self-constitution as it is developed in Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory as well as how these ideas were taken up in the thought of Levinas and Whitehead. I begin by mentioning three basic critiques of Bergson’s work focusing on the charge that his philosophy is problematically impersonal. In the first part of the paper, I explore how the notion of affect may counter such a charge. Affect, although sparsely treated, plays a fundamental, determining role in Bergson’s notion of self-constitution. I then show how this view might be at odds with Bergson’s determination of nature as utilitarian. In light of this conflict, the paper speaks of two Bergsons, one overly utilitarian and the other with a vague but important focus on affect. Part two then outlines the basic metaphysics of Whitehead and Levinas in order to show that their critiques of utilitarian and vital philosophies share the same focus on affect that was already present in Bergson’s philosophy. Noting this similarity, the paper concludes by arguing that, in the moments when they seem most critical of Bergson, it is possible to read Whitehead and Levinas as being, in fact, distinctly Bergsonian.

This paper presents the influence that Bergson’s theory of subjectivity had on Lévinas. We start by examining Bergson’s “centripetal theory of mind.” Considering the relationship between perception and action, Bergson develops an understanding of subjectivity as a process that unifies disparate perceptions. Guided by the body, this unifying principle is deemed affective. This being done, we then present a contradiction in Bergson’s thinking: While humans are described as different in kind from other animals, the framework used to determine the nature of their world remains unchanged. Bergson never fully embraced the centripetal theory. We then turn to Lévinas and compare his critiques of Bergson and Heidegger. Lévinas believes that both instrumentalize desire, and that a philosophy of subjectivity can only escape this problem by radically embracing the affective nature of Bergson’s centripetal theory. The latter accounts for the place of Lévinas’ phenomenology of enjoyment.

This commentary explores the issues of separation and continuity in Marjolein Oele’s E-Co-Affectivity. I begin by providing a summary of what makes the book unique and its important achievements before moving on to a critical discussion of Oele’s concept of temporality. There, I claim that an overemphasis on the continuity between an organic being and the material interfaces that constitute it might be responsible for essential confusions in the understanding of time. My commentary begins by using Bergson’s philosophy to distinguish two common views on time and then argues that in several instances, Oele’s descriptions of temporality are in fact describing space rather than time. As Bergson shows us, affect and emotion must be understood as qualities of experience rather than quantitative forms of presence. I then conclude by arguing that E-Co-Affectivity might benefit from further thinking about separation and auto-affectivity as essential features in the process of affectivity.