Stockholm University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2001
Stockholm, Stockholms Lan, Sweden
Areas of Specialization
Areas of Interest
  •  26
    Getting a Grasp of the Grasping Involved in Understanding
    Acta Analytica 33 (3): 371-383. 2018.
    This paper investigates some epistemic properties that distinguish understanding from knowledge. In particular, the focus is on how to spell out the notion of grasping the relationships between propositions that constitute objectual understanding: what kind of epistemic access is required for grasping to occur and to what extent is the act of grasping voluntary? A modest form of access is suggested as an answer to the first question and a largely negative answer to the second. The worry that my …Read more
  •  54
    Contextualism and the Structure of Skeptical Arguments
    Dialectica 60 (1): 63-77. 2006.
    In this paper a candidate for a rational reconstruction of skeptical arguments is presented and defended against a competitor called ‘The Argument from Ignorance’. On the basis of this defense, Michael Williams’ claims that foundationalism and epistemological realism serve as presuppositions for skepticism are criticized. It is argued that rejecting these two theses, as his version of contextualism does, is not sufficient for answering the skeptical challenge.
  •  5
    with Claudia Blöser, Hannes Matthiessen, and Marcus Chek
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 87 (1): 75-97. 2013.
  •  28
    Defeater Goes External
    Philosophia 45 (2): 701-715. 2017.
    This paper proposes a new externalist account of defeaters, in terms of reliable indicators, as an integral part of a unified externalist account of warrant and defeat. It is argued that posing externalist conditions on warrant, but internalist conditions on defeat lead to undesirable tensions. The proposal is contrasted to some rival accounts and then tested on some widely discussed cases, like the airport case. Misleading defeaters, where Laurence BonJour’s reliable clairvoyants serve as examp…Read more
  •  38
    Defeasibility in Philosophy: Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law (edited book)
    with Claudia Blöser, Mikae Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen, and Marcus Willaschek
    Editions Rodopi. 2013.
    Defeasibility, most generally speaking, means that given some set of conditions A, something else B will hold, unless or until defeating conditions C apply. While the term was introduced into philosophy by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in 1949, today, the concept of defeasibility is employed in many different areas of philosophy. This volume for the first time brings together contributions on defeasibility from epistemology , legal philosophy and ethics and the philosophy of action . The volume …Read more
  •  112
    Knowledge versus Understanding: The Cost of Avoiding Gettier
    Acta Analytica 27 (2): 183-197. 2012.
    In the current discussion on epistemic value, several philosophers argue that understanding enjoys higher epistemological significance and epistemic value than knowledge—the epistemic state the epistemological tradition has been preoccupied with. By noting a tension between the necessary conditions for understanding in the perhaps most prominent of these philosophers, Jonathan Kvanvig, this paper disputes the higher epistemological relevance of understanding. At the end, on the basis of the resu…Read more
  •  30
    Contextualism in Doubt
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2): 197-217. 2006.
    This paper is a critical examination of epistemological contextualism as a response to the skeptical challenge with focus upon Michael Williams’ version. Unclarities in his response are initially pointed out and various unsatisfactory ways of elaborating upon them discussed. Next, it is argued that Williams’ candidate epistemological realism with the priority thesis at its core does not provide the key to how traditional epistemology becomes exposed to skepticism. The thesis that knowledge-claim…Read more
  •  87
    The value of Lesser goods: The epistemic value of entitlement
    Acta Analytica 24 (4): 263-274. 2009.
    The notion of entitlement plays an important role in some influential epistemologies. Often the epistemological motive for introducing the concept is to accommodate certain externalist intuitions within an internalist framework or, conversely, to incorporate internalist traits into an otherwise externalist position. In this paper two prominent philosophers will be used as examples: Tyler Burge as a representative of the first option and Fred Dretske as one of the second. However, even on the ass…Read more
  •  46
    Empirical Indefeasibility and Nonfactuality
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3): 183-197. 2010.
    Hartry Field has recently presented an original and interesting approach to the a priori. Its main theses are, first, that certain rules are empirically indefeasible and, second, that the reasonableness of these rules are not based on any factual property. After an introduction, Field’s approach is presented in section II. Section III examines his claims concerning empirical indefeasibility. It will be argued that his general argument for empirical indefeasibility fails along with the particular…Read more
  •  4
    with Claudia Blöser, Hannes Ole Matthiessen, and Marcus Willaschek
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 87 (1): 1-8. 2013.
  •  57
    Towards a Default and Challenge Model of A Priori Warrant
    Journal of Philosophical Research 37 135-154. 2012.
    This paper outlines a default and challenge account of a priori warrant by unfolding the three stages of the epistemic dialectic in which such warrant comes to the fore. Among the virtues of this account is that it does not rely on controversial assumptions regarding non-experiential sources of warrant, like intellectual intuition, but instead relies on features of our epistemic practice, more precisely, its default and challenge structure. What distinguishes beliefs to which you are warranted a…Read more
  • Utmaningars kunskapsteori
    Filosofisk Tidskrift 1. 2010.
  •  173
    A common objection raised against naturalism is that a naturalized epistemology cannot account for the essential normative character of epistemology. Following an analysis of different ways in which this charge could be understood, it will be argued that either epistemology is not normative in the relevant sense, or if it is, then in a way which a naturalized epistemology can account for with an instrumental and hypothetical model of normativity. Naturalism is here captured by the two doctrines …Read more
  •  20
    The Challenges of Traveling without Itinerary: The Overrding Case
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 87 (1): 59-73. 2013.
    As an important step towards a comprehensive model of challenges and defeat- ers, it is here argued that securing a previously held epistemic status for a belief in the face of an overriding challenge does not require us to reach a higher epistemic standard than the one the belief originally reached. In the course of the investigation, criteria for when the epistemic status of beliefs are challenged and defeated are suggested. At the end of the paper, these results are then more briefly applied …Read more
  •  71
    Defeaters and rising standards of justification
    Acta Analytica 23 (1): 45-54. 2008.
    The purpose of this paper is to refute the widespread view that challenging a knowledge-claim always raises the original standards of justification–a view often associated with contextualism. To that purpose the distinction between undermining and overriding defeaters will be used. Three kinds of challenges will be considered that differ in their degree of specification. In all three kinds of challenges, the rising standards of justification model fails to capture the dialectic of justification …Read more
  •  161
    Understanding has received growing interest from epistemologists in recent years, but no consensus regarding its epistemic properties has yet been reached. This paper extracts, but also rejects, candidates of epistemic properties for construing an epistemological model of understanding from the writings of epistemologists participating in the current discussion surrounding that state. On the basis of these results, a suggestion is put forward according to which understanding is a non-basic epist…Read more
  • Från holism till naturalism
    Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 2. 2003.
  •  66
    The Experiential Defeasibility and Overdetermination of A Priori Justification
    Journal of Philosophical Research 33 271-278. 2008.
    In a recent and interesting paper “Experientially Defeasible A Priori Justification,” Joshua Thurow argues that many a priori justified beliefs are defeasible by experience. The argument takes the form of an objection against Albert Casullo’s recent book, A Priori Justification, where Casullo, according to Thurow, denies that if a justified belief is non-experientially defeasible, then that belief is also experientially defeasible. This paper critically examines Thurow’s two arguments in the fir…Read more