Mikayla Kelley

According to approximate Bayesianism, Bayesian norms are ideal norms worthy of approximation for non-ideal agents. This paper discusses one potential challenge for approximate Bayesianism: in non-transparent learning situations—situations where the agent does not learn what they have or have not learnt—it is unclear that the Bayesian norms are worth satisfying, let alone approximating. I discuss two replies to this challenge and find neither satisfactory. I suggest that what transpires is a general tension between approximate Bayesianism and the possibility of “non-ideal” epistemic situations.

Pure quality of will theories claim that ‘the ultimate object’ of our responsibility responses (i.e., praise and blame) is the quality of our will. Any such theory is false—or so I argue. There is a second dimension of (moral) responsibility, independent of quality of will, that our responsibility responses track and take as their object—namely, how adroitly we are able to translate our will into action; I call this competence of will. I offer a conjectural explanation of the two dimensions of (moral) responsibility: it matters to us that people actually perform adequately well because of how much it matters to us that we are able to live and work together successfully.

Accuracy-first epistemology says that the rational update rule is the rule that maximizes expected accuracy. Externalism says, roughly, that we do not always know what our total evidence is. It’s been argued in recent years that the externalist faces a dilemma: Either deny that Bayesian Conditionalization is the rational update rule, thereby rejecting traditional Bayesian epistemology, or else deny that the rational update rule is the rule that maximizes expected accuracy, thereby rejecting the accuracy-first program. Call this the Bayesian Dilemma. Here is roughly how the argument goes. Schoenfield (2017) has shown that following Metaconditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. But if externalism is true, Metaconditionalization is not Bayesian Conditionalization. Therefore, the externalist must choose between the rule that maximizes expected accuracy (Metaconditionalization) and Bayesian Conditionalization. I am not convinced by this argument; once we make the premises fully explicit, we see that it relies on assumptions that the externalist has every reason to reject. Still, I think that the Bayesian Dilemma is a genuine dilemma. I give a new argument—I call it the continuity argument—that doesn’t make any assumptions the externalist rejects. Roughly, I show that if you're sufficiently confident that you will correctly identify your evidence, then you'll expect adopting a rule that I call Accurate Metaconditionalization to be more accurate than adopting Bayesian Conditionalization.