Mike McNamee

This article examines the normative foundation of Paralympic classification, focusing on three interconnected ideals articulated in the International Paralympic Committee’s Classification Code: fairness, meaningful competition, and sporting excellence. We develop a specific fair equality of opportunity principle for Paralympic sport (FEOPps), providing a philosophically grounded ethical framework for evaluating classification systems. The principle requires that inequalities between competitors in sport-specific activity limitations resulting from an eligible impairment be eliminated where pragmatically possible and otherwise minimized. This applies when inequalities significantly and systematically impact performance and remain beyond competitors’ influence and control. Building on Rawlsian contractualism and Loland’s fair play theory, we argue that fairness takes lexical priority over other considerations, establishing deontological constraints within which meaningful competition and sporting excellence can be pursued. Meaningful competition occurs when athletes with evenly matched performance potential engage in fair contests with uncertainty of outcome, thereby enabling the display of authentic sporting excellence achieved through talent and effort. This neo-Aristotelian interpretation connects Paralympic sport to broader ideals of human flourishing through meritocratic practices that cultivate virtue and excellence. Applying our ethical framework to current procedures, we show how FEOPps provides both philosophical justification and practical guidance for Paralympic classification systems while highlighting the need for continued normative reflection on the fundamental nature and purposes of Paralympic sport.

Criticisms of the ethical justification of antidoping legislation are not uncommon in the literatures of medical ethics, sports ethics and sports medicine. Critics of antidoping point to inconsistencies of principle in the application of legislation and the unjustifiability of ethical postures enshrined in the World Anti-Doping Code, a new version of which came into effect in January 2009. This article explores the arguments concerning the apparent legal peculiarities of antidoping legislation and their ethically salient features in terms of: notions of culpability, liability and guilt; aspects of potential duplication of punishments and the limitations of athlete privacy in antidoping practice and policy. It is noted that tensions still exist between legal and ethical principles and norms that require further critical attention.

Vulnerability is a multifaceted concept used across disciplines, yet in the context of sport integrity, it remains underexplored and lacks a clear conceptualisation despite its growing usage and wider application. This paper critically examines how the concept of vulnerability is currently incorporated in different sport integrity contexts and research literature. It proposes a novel understanding of vulnerability informed by the fields of research ethics and bioethics, specifically in relation to established analyses and operationalisations of vulnerability. Drawing on the layered account of vulnerability, we conceptualise vulnerability as relational and dynamic, moving beyond fixed and stereotypical categorisations of vulnerability. Our understanding of vulnerability expands the understanding of this concept from its more common association with doping behaviours and populations and illustrates how the layered approach can be helpful in identifying and analysing vulnerability across different sport integrity contexts. In doing so, this paper demonstrates how a bioethics-informed approach can enhance the conceptual clarity and support a more consistent application of vulnerability within sport integrity field.

Since the manipulation of sport competitions became one of the main threats to sport integrity, both the academy and international organizations have sought to establish a coherent conceptual framework that defines what criteria determine a manipulation and what are the factors that might cause it. Although the literature has shown that the manipulation of sport competition is a multifaceted phenomenon that includes individual, relational, organizational and institutional variables, most of the authors have focused their explanations on individual factors, and institutional prevention campaigns continue to understand match-fixing as a problem of moral failure of on-field sports actors. This work proposes a novel dynamic framework for analysis based on the theoretical roots on Morin’s paradigm of complexity and Archer’s critical realism. In addition to articulating the micro, meso, and macro factors together, the paper defends the idea of three conceptions of integrity, personal, competition and institutional, often operating simultaneously in the same space. Each one of these integrities, operates across individual, organizational and structural levels, acting recursively on the others, generating the gears of the global sports integrity. We then discuss the reasons, structures, opportunities and incentives that each of these integrities creates and fuels. We argue that the errors and ineffectiveness of the fight against the manipulation of sport competitions are largely due to a lack of understanding of, and appreciation for, the different conceptions of integrity and their interactions that require different approaches and differentiated public policies. We conclude with innovative possibilities for more effective policy-making processes in this space.

Classification is one of the distinctive features of Paralympic sport. Despite the existence of classification rules and a well-defined classification process, some Paralympic athletes intentionally misrepresent their abilities to classifiers in order to be allocated to a lower performing competition class, in which they secure an unfair advantage over other athletes. Such deception undermines the integrity of the competition by exploiting a vulnerability in the classification process. Such manipulation is hard to mitigate and harder still to prove that an athlete had; intentionally misrepresented their abilities or; failed for innocent reasons to make maximum efforts during the classification or; had acted under coercive pressure from others in their entourage or environment. These challenges are compounded in the case of Paralympic athletes that have an intellectual impairment or who are accompanied by a parent/guardian who acts as a proxy, rendering evaluations as to responsibility even more complex. This article presents a conceptual analyses of intentional misrepresentation of abilities in Paralympic sport, and the differentiation of responsibility for offence thereupon, as stipulated in the draft of the International Standard for Intentional Misrepresentation, accompanying the new 2025 Athlete Classification Code (IPC, Citation2024). Drawing on philosophical and legal analysis we (i) set out existing shortcomings associated with Paralympic classification; (ii) articulate the range of potential intentional misrepresentational acts with respect to classification manipulation; and (iii) articulate the range of negative effects on the integrity of Paralympic sport.

Olympism is said to be a philosophy of life blending sport, education, and culture. It seems that under the philosophy of Olympism, doping, including genetic manipulation, should be sanctioned in order to continue pushing the limits of athletic achievement. Mike McNamee, professor of applied ethics at Swansea University, argues that the concept of limits, informed both by Olympism and human nature, ought to provide a structure within which athletic excellence is admired both technically and ethically and that unfettered pursuit of athletic enhancement should be limited by an appreciation for the nature and value of the "spirit of sport."

In light of the World Anti Doping Agency’s 2013 Code Revision process, we critically explore the applicability of two of three criteria used to determine whether a method or substance should be considered for their Prohibited List, namely its (potential) performance enhancing effects and its (potential) risk to the health of the athlete. To do so, we compare two communities of human guinea pigs: (i) individuals who make a living out of serial participation in Phase 1 pharmacology trials; and (ii) elite athletes who engage in what is effectively ‘unregulated clinical research’ by using untested prohibited or non-prohibited performance enhancing substances and methods, alone or in combination. Our comparison sheds light on norms of research ethics that these practices exacerbate with respect to the concepts of multiplicity, visibility, and consistency. We argue for the need to establish a proper governance framework to increase the accountability of these unregulated research practices in order to protect the human guinea pigs in elite sports contexts, and to establish reasonable grounds for the performance enhancing effects, and the risks to the health of the athlete, of the methods and substances that might justify their inclusion on the Prohibited List.

The?values of sport? is a concept that is often used to justify actions and policies by a range of agents and agencies from coaches and teachers to governing bodies and educational institutions. From a philosophical point of view, these values deserve to be analysed with great care to make sure we understand their nature and reach. The aim of this paper is to critically examine the values carried by the educational conception of sport that Pierre de Coubertin developed and to see how they relate to certain values in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. To be able to understand in depth the moral construct of de Coubertin's system, it is essential to delve into the entire system he builds in order to develop athletic participants closer to his ideal of what a human should be. This in turn rests on his conception of Man, which is comprised of body, spirit and character. An understanding of his structure opens the way to a broader awareness of de Coubertin's educational system, of which sport was only part. We will then see that the values are a consequence of this pedagogical search for the ideal human. It is argued that this ideal of a human is similar to the one described by Nietzsche as the Übermensch. A philosophical case study is conducted, taking as its object the story of the first recipient of the Pierre de Coubertin medal, which rewards fair play among Olympic competitors. Judging the story through Nietzschean eyes allows for his thoughts to be put into practice. His lesser-known texts such as Homer and Competition on the emulation of creative powers shed light on today's sports. Concepts such as guilt, excellence, will to power and effectiveness help us compare these two authors and understand that competition is not necessarily about dominating others, but more about generating human excellence.

Morgan has argued that attitudes to the medicalisation of sports are historically conditioned.While the history of doping offers contested versions of when the sports world turned againstconservative forces, Morgan has argued that these attitudes are out of step with prevailingnorms and that the World Anti Doping Agency's policy needs to be modified to better reflectthis. As an advocate of critical democracies in sports, he argues that anti-doping policy mustacknowledge and reflect these shifts in order to secure their legitimacy. In response, wecritically present the World Anti-Doping Agency's policy that incorporates the Prohibited Listof Substances and Methods for athletes. We evaluate the validity of the therapy-enhancementdistinction in relation to its role in both justifying and sustaining the operation of theProhibited List. In particular, we focus on the case of thyroxine, which has been the subjectof controversy in athletic doping. While thyroxine is not currently banned, critics haveclaimed that its use in the absence of a relevant pathology is tantamount to doping. Wechallenge Morgan's claim that a conventionalist defence of the therapy-enhancementdistinction is the best available, and his conclusion that this properly supports a morepermissive stance towards performance-enhancing drug use. Furthermore, we reject hisconventionalist support for democratic line drawing in relation to doping and in particular thestatus of thyroxine with regard to the prohibited list. We offer a modified defence of the statusquo, a qualified, naturalist account of health and disease, where athletes may be prescribeddrugs that are genuine responses to medical necessity that do not, or do not typically, threatenthe goods of athletic excellence.

The influence of neuroscience looms large today. In this introductory essay, we provide some context for the volume by acknowledging the expansion of applied neuroscience to everyday life and the proliferation of neuroscientific disciplines. We also observe that some individuals have sounded cautionary notes in light of perceived overreach of some claims for neuroscience. Then we briefly summarize the articles that comprise this volume. This diverse collection of papers represents the beginning of a conversation focused on the intersection of sport, ethics and neurophilosophy. As such, the essays also represent a new mode of interaction between philosophy and science with sport in the center of the discussion.

Mike McNamee, professor of applied ethics at Swansea University, offers a critique on paralympism in the context of the International Paralympic Charter's four stated values: courage, determination, inspiration, and equality. He discusses two specific cases arising from paralympic sports involving amputation of limbs either to enhance sporting performance or to enable disability sport membership of an otherwise able-bodied person by the use of elective surgery. McNamee argues that disability sports organizations should ban such practices and better articulate their value base in order to preserve the integrity of disability sports.

In this paper, we explore the issue of the elimination of sports, or elements of sports, that present a high risk of brain injury. In particular, we critically examine two elements of Angelo Corlett’s and Pam Sailors’ arguments for the prohibition of football and Nicholas Dixon’s claim for the reformation of boxing to eliminate blows to the head based on the empirical assumption of an essential or causal connection between brain injuries incurred in football and the development of a degenerative brain disease known as chronic traumatic encephalopathy ; and John Stuart Mill’s rejection of consensual domination. We present four arguments to contest the validity of Corlett, Dixon’s and Sailor’s positions. Specifically, we argue that certain autonomy-based arguments undermine paternalist arguments for reform; the nature of the goods people pursue in their lives might justify their foregoing future autonomy; Mill’s argument against consensual domination draws on ambiguous and arbitrary distinctions; the lack of consensus and empirical evidence regarding CTE arising from brain injuries in sport underdetermines calls for reform. We conclude that these proposals for reforming or eliminating sports with high risks of brain injuries are not well founded.

Sports Medicine as an apparent sub-class of medicine has developed apace over the past 30 years. Its recent trajectory has been evidenced by the emergence of specialist international research journals, standard texts, annual conferences, academic appointments and postgraduate courses. Although this field of enquiry and practice lays claim to the title ‘sports medicine’ this paper queries the legitimacy of that claim. Depending upon how ‘sports medicine’ and ‘medicine’ are defined, a plausible-sounding case can be made to show that sports medicine is not in fact a branch of medicine. Rather, it is sometimes closer to practices such as non-therapeutic cosmetic surgery. The argument of the paper is as follows. It begins with a brief statement concerning methodology. We then identify and subscribe to a plausible defining goal of medicine taken from a recognised authority in the field. Then two representative, authoritative, definitions of sports medicine are discussed. It is then shown that acceptance of these definitions of sports medicine generates a problem in that if they are accepted, no necessary commitment to the defining goal of medicine is present within sports medicine. It seems to follow that sports medicine is not medicine. In the final part of the paper a critical response to that conclusion is presented and rebutted. The response is one which rejects the identification of the defining goal of medicine upon which our argument rests

There are few, if any, aspects of contemporary sport that do not raise ethical questions. From on-field relationships between athletes, coaches and officials, to the corporate responsibility of international sports organizations and businesses, ethical considerations permeate sport at every level. This important new collection of articles showcases the very best international scholarship in the field of sports ethics, and offers a comprehensive, one-stop resource for any student, scholar or sportsperson with an interest in this important area. It addresses cutting-edge contemporary themes within sports ethics, such as gene doping, as well as introducing classic ethical debates that define our understanding of sport, sporting conduct and sport in practice. _The Ethics of Sports_ is arranged into seven thematic sections, each of which includes an introduction by the editor that highlights the key themes and places each article in context, and offers suggestions for further reading. _The Ethics of Sports _sheds new light on a wide range of issues within contemporary sports studies including doping, disability, gender and ethnicity; the practice of physical education and sports coaching; sports media; sports business and sports medicine. It is essential reading for all students with an interest in sport or applied ethics

In this article, transhumanism is considered to be a quasi-medical ideology that seeks to promote a variety of therapeutic and human-enhancing aims. Moderate conceptions are distinguished from strong conceptions of transhumanism and the strong conceptions were found to be more problematic than the moderate ones. A particular critique of Boström’s defence of transhumanism is presented. Various forms of slippery slope arguments that may be used for and against transhumanism are discussed and one particular criticism, moral arbitrariness, that undermines both weak and strong transhumanism is highlighted

This chapter discusses the role conflict of the educational researcher who comes upon an unprofessional relationship between teacher and pupil. It is argued that the whistleblowing literature in related professions, with its focus on standard conditions and solutions framed as obligations, is inadequate. Reference is made to the idea of ‘guilty knowledge’: the feelings of guilt that attach when one comes to know of harm visited on innocent others, and has no unqualified sense of which way to act. Distinguishing moral from causal responsibility helps to show how blame need not necessarily attach to the guilt-ridden researcher, whichever option she chooses.