Mikhail Minakov

Kyiv-Mohyla Seminar on the History of Philosophy was established by the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy’s Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies in 2003. In this yearly seminar, the Department’s members as well as the historians of philosophy from other academic institutions regularly take part. Since 2003, 16 meetings of the seminar took place. They were focused on such topics as “Historiography of Philosophy in Ukraine: Current State and Perspectives”, “Actual Problems of the Source Studies in the Historiography of Philosophy”, “The Problem of Text Interpretation in the Historiography of Philosophy”, “Dmytro Chyzhevskyi as a Historian of Philosophy”, “Historiography of Philosophy in Ukraine: Current State and Perspectives”, “The Problem of Method in the Historiography of Philosophy”, “Oleksii Losiev: Personality and Heritage ”, “Methodology of the Historiography of Philosophy: Actual Strategies”, “Wilhelm Windelband as a Philosopher and Historian of Philosophy ”, “Hegel’s Heritage in the Mirror of Interpretations”, “The Studies on the History of Philosophy: New Generation”, “Kant’s Criticism from the perspective of Wolf’s dogmatism”, “The Reception of Indian Philosophy in Ukraine: 1840s–1930s”, “Did Kant Answer the Question on What a Man Is?”. The proceedings of the early three meetings were published in a special volume. The current issue of “NaUKMA Research Papers in Philosophy and Religious Studies” contains the proceedings of the sixteenth meeting of Kyiv-Mohyla Seminar on the History of Philosophy, which took place at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy on February 1, 2017. The main speaker was Dr. Taras Lyuty, while the co-speakers included Dr. Mykhailo Minakov and Dr. Vakhtang Kebuladze. The meeting was conducted by Prof. Vadym Menzhulin. The audio recording of the meeting was deciphered by a PhD-student Taras Fostiak.

The author argues that Quine’s criticism of Kantian analytical/synthetic distinction, as well as transcendentalist reductionism, is not entirely adequate. Furthermore, the author states that Kant’s and Quine’s theories of experience and cognition (transcendentalist and holistic) are based on a common dogma, the one of consistency. Taking into account their uncritical ac-ceptance of experience as a system that is able to adjust new and old elements to each other, both philosophers have much more in common than Quine and his followers might have ex- pected.

The author examines the epistemological project of analytic philosophy, which went through stages of transformation marked by the influence of Frege and Russell. The article emphasizes the main points of the first stage of analytic philosophy, during which the sphere of experience merged with language. The next stage defines a new subject - Wittgenstein's "language subject". According to the author, this subject of speech makes decisions about the sense or absurdity of sentences based on logical form and belongs to the transcendental subject of speech in general. But in the end, the epistemological project of analytic philosophy moved to new directions in which questions about experience lost their relevance.