Miloš Agatonović

The book demonstrates that Nietzsche consistently advocated an ethical standpoint that, under certain conditions, recommends and prescribes the affirmation of life. For Nietzsche, the affirmation of life is closely connected to the “Dionysian.” Agatonović reveals how Nietzsche cites the life and culture of ancient Greeks as an example of affirmation. Building upon the affirmation of life, the author shows how Nietzsche criticises morality and calls for a revaluation of ordinary value judgments. This text adopts an approach that highlights naturalism in interpreting Nietzsche’s philosophy. Contrary to Brian Leiter’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s naturalism, the author argues that Nietzsche’s naturalism is broad, which, in considering different forms of life, involves the use of the everyday concept of causality as it is employed in historical explanations. Agatonović affirms how the concept of causality in Nietzsche depends upon the context that constitutes the totality of life, which can encompass various kinds of conditions, including physical, and psychological, as well as social and cultural phenomena, norms, and values, as causes. The reader is forced to confront how in some contexts, a cause could be composed of different types of conditions and further, how morals and values can be causes since they represent conditions of. One of the fundamental theses of the book is that Nietzsche evaluates values and other norms by assessing the foundation of the whole of life upon which they supervene. The reader finds that Nietzsche evaluates favourably, above all, the life and culture of ancient Greeks in the pre-classical period, as well as individuals of the modern era such as Goethe and Beethoven. This book appeals to students and researches in the field of Nietzsche scholarship.

The present paper explores the realm of indexicals, with a focus on self-locating thoughts, assessing their role in agency. Philosophers have actively discussed the problem of indexicals since the groundbreaking work of David Kaplan and John Perry, and the ongoing debate continues to this day. The paper also discusses an externalist perspective on thought-content while aiming to illustrate the essential role of indexicals in self-locating thoughts, encompassing those found within the self-locating representations of robots. The paper describes a scenario in which Perry the robot, as it is named, becomes disoriented. The robot’s established objective is to navigate through the surroundings while indispensably engaging in self-location. In addition, the paper discusses Paul Teller’s example of robots autonomously following instructions based on third-person representations. Teller’s aim is to present an instance of genuine action devoid of the use of indexicals. In opposition to Teller’s viewpoint, the paper puts forth a form of internalism, termed robot-internalism, asserting that indexical thoughts are internal to individuals, whether human or robot, arguing that indexicals are necessary for the agency of both humans and robots.

The contemporary conceptions of universal basic income, tax havens extraction, and climate emergency are briefly presented in the form of exposition in Massive Attack?s Eutopia EP. These conceptions address the most concerning issues of today?s world, while the concept of eutopia, proposed by Massive Attack?s Robert Del Naja and Mark Donne, represents?a place of well-being, as a practical aspiration,? a realistic utopia in which those issues are resolved. The present paper discusses the conceptions presented in Eutopia, assessing the possibility of the materialisation of eutopia. As suggested by Massive Attack, the ideas of Eutopia can be traced back to More?s Utopia, being rooted in a humanistic endeavour of improving humanity, inspiring engagement and search for a better and just society. Apart from discussing Eutopia, the paper explores Another Now, the political science-fiction novel by Yanis Varoufakis. Varoufakis? critique of capitalism and the alternative he proposes in the novel Another Now argue along the same line as Eutopia, encouraging engagement in today?s world.

The present paper intends to show that computer simulations used in science are akin to fiction. Starting from the problem of defining computer simulation, the paper discusses the uses and disadvantages of simulations in science. Computer simulations have a representational function, but they do not resemble the phenomena that they purport to represent. Computer simulations do not preserve the content of the models, input data, and theories from which they proceed, since the content is modified by computational processes. Because of the complexities of these processes, we cannot control or test the methods used to process the content of computer simulations. Still, simulations may help to explain the behaviour of a possible aspect of the phenomenon under examination. Although their role in doing so may be limited, by conforming to and immersing us in the worldview of science, simulations, thus reinforce the intuitions of the existing body of scientific knowledge, and similarly to the “believable fiction” described by John Woods, provide genuine understanding.

Nick Bostrom’s “simulation argument” purports to show that if it is possible to create and run a vast number of computer simulations indistinguishable from the reality we are living in, then it is highly probable that we are already living in a computer simulation. However, the simulation argument requires a modification to escape the undermining implications of the scepticism it implies, as argued by Birch. The present paper shows that, even if the modified simulation argument is valid, still it is unsound since it relies on the indistinguishability assumption that even in principle cannot be tested. To account for the unsoundness of the simulation argument, the present paper draws on John Woods' theory of fiction, to expose structural similarities between general fiction and the simulation argument. Though the simulation argument is unsound, it seems persuasive, because the argument immerses the reader in a fictive world with the help of tacit assumptions, leveraging just enough common sense to remain compelling while covering over an untestable premise. Simultaneously with the critique of Bostrom’s argument, Chalmers' argument for the matrix hypothesis is assessed on similar criteria. In either case, both arguments rely on an accumulation of assumptions, both implicit and explicit, hiding the premises that are untestable in principle.