Miloš Kovačević

In Considerations on Representative Government Mill argues that representative democracy is the best form of the state organisation for societies which fulfil necessary conditions for maintaining it. In favour of his thesis, Mill offers two arguments. One of them shows that rights and interests of citizens are best guaranteed when they are protected by citizens themselves. He uses the other (educational) argument to show that representative democracy is the best state organisation, since it offers greatest opportunities for citizen education. In this paper, I will defend only the educational argument in favour of (representative) democracy from Arneson`s criticism. Arneson tries to show that the main source of paternalism in Mill`s theory of government lies in the education of citizens as the main criteria for the good government. Arneson argues that non-democratic societies can equally well educate citizens as democratic societies, which shows that the main goal of Mill`s government is paternalistic. Also, Arneson argues that even if non-democratic societies couldn’t educate citizens equally well as democratic one, educating citizens cannot be the main government goal, since it decreases liberties which are guaranteed by harm principle. I will defend Mill`s main goal of government from both lines of Arneson`s argumentation.

In the first part of the paper, I investigate a hierarchical analysis of personal autonomy which is developed through Harry Frankfurt’s theory of free will and Gerald Dworkin’s theory of personal autonomy. Hierarchical analysis of personal autonomy considers per-son autonomous regarding desire A if he has the desire to have desire A. One of the main advantages of hierarchical analysis of autonomy is that it does not require a person to have any specific values to be considered autonomous. In spite of this and other advantages, hierarchical analysis of personal autonomy is facing the problem of manipulation which I will discuss in the second part of the paper. Frankfurt`s theory is purely structural and ahis-toric because it does not take into consideration a way of acquiring second-order desires or desire to desire or not desire A. That allows the possibility of influences on a person that would diminish their autonomy. On another hand, Dworkin apparently avoids the problem of manipulation by introducing a requirement for procedural independence which protects a person from influences that are paradigmatic cases of violating autonomy. However, Dworkin`s contribution is not theoretically satisfying because it is not enough for acceptable analysis of autonomy to just list a few intuitive examples of constraining personal autonomy, but it is necessary to propose a reason why that kind of inluences is considered dangerous for personal autonomy viz to establish some kind of criteria. Such criteria will enable us to evaluate borderline cases about which people have diferent intuitions according to it. That is the reason why the inal goal of this paper is to contribute to the deinition of criteria on which procedural independence will be based, through a systemic approach to the problem of manipulation.

The aim of this paper is to investigate Kant’s ethics regarding his views on non-human animals in order to distinguish whether and in which sense does Kant’s moral principle oblige us to treat animals with dignity. First, we shall provide a review of Kant’s basic moral views in order to consider whether it is justified for non-human animals to be excluded from moral laws. We shall claim that this exclusion is not justified and that it is a consequence of another, inherent problem that makes Kant’s ethics vulnerable to the argument from marginal cases. Christine Korsgaard’s solution to the problem of non-human animal moral status shall be considered and we shall attempt to show that it solves the original inherent problem as well. In conclusion, with a help from Donald VanDeVeer’s distinction, we shall provide a more precise addition to Korsgaard’s solution and formulate a non-speciest criterion for those cases of conflicted interests between humans and those who are traditionally viewed as a means instead of ends-in themselves.

In this paper, I consider Locke’s argument in favor of religious tolerance, which emphasizes the irrationality of the state’s attempts to influence the change of belief because the very character of belief is such that it is not susceptible to the state’s means. In the first part of the paper I will try to show using conceptual analysis that contrary to the common opinion that there is no causal connection between violence and believing, it is not entirely impossible to believe under coercion in the broader sense of the term - as an intervention that bypass the rationality of the agent. In the second part of the paper, the focus shifts from the original argument to its revised version in which the notion of authenticity takes a central place. Instead of a misdirected search for beliefs that are not the outcome of any influence, it is necessary to determine more closely the character of the causal history that generates authentic beliefs. Therefore, I develop Lockean distinction between legitimate and illegitimate influences, which ought to inform contemporary thinking about tolerance.

The research approaches the problem of illegitimate external influences through the hierarchical analysis of personal autonomy and the analysis of theories of personal autonomy that arose as a constructive and critical reaction to it, which contributes to the establishment of criteria for demarcation between legitimate and illegitimate external influences. In addition, the relationship between personal autonomy and political legitimacy in a democratic context is examined, and the preconditions for political decision-making by autonomous citizens are defined. Using conceptual analysis, the critical-evaluative method, and thought experiments, it is shown that personal autonomy cannot completely depend on the subjective assessment of the agent. The criterion of independence ought to have the status of a social convention that implies uniformity in its application to all agents in a relatively similar position. Personal autonomy implies being able to resist the possible arbitrary influence of others. In the political context, this means that respecting the personal autonomy of each citizen requires a participatory deliberative democracy in which the quality of the argument will be the only relevant factor in the formation of a collective decision. The legitimacy of a political decision is based on respect for personal autonomy, not only during the democratic process but also in the period that preceded it. Given that citizens are exposed to the arbitrary use of power that affects the impartiality of their judgment, autonomy-sensitive participatory deliberative democracy should take into account deliberative constraints in order to ensure the legitimacy of political decision-making.

Unlike visible, stigmatized personal characteristics, sexual orientation can be relatively successfully hidden. By staying in the closet, many queer people manage to minimize stigmatization. However, intergroup contact is of key importance for increasing tolerance and liberalising the straight majority. The choice not to disclose one’s sexual orientation thus leads to a collective action problem. Although the social stigmatization of queer people could be more effectively overcome through mass coming out, suboptimal results are achieved owing to the strategic use of the right to privacy in passing as straight. This problem is most conspicuous in countries where the cost of coming out remains significant, while the cost of staying closeted is too low to trigger substantial, progressive change. I discuss the issue of the permissibility of outing through an analysis of both Jean Louise Cohen’s reflexive conception of privacy and Judith Jarvis Thomson’s reductionist conception of privacy. I argue against the understanding of the right to privacy as a right that prevents others from obtaining information about one’s sexual orientation through legal means and from disseminating such information if it is not conditioned on confidentiality.

The focus of this chapter is on defining indoctrination from the stance of political studies so that it could be useful for education. Its novelty lies in proposing an idea of emancipatory education as an inclusion and emphasis of minority views on political matters, exemplified through an analysis of the concept of indoctrination. Commonly, indoctrination is explored as education that promotes a particular type of belief. This sort of definition either completely denies that the method or intentions of teachers are crucial for making an informed distinction between education that violates and one that preserves students’ autonomy, or provides them with a secondary, complementary role in defining indoctrination. I build on two theories of indoctrination to reach my argument. On the one hand, John Wilson argues that space for indoctrination exists only in cases of teaching either unfalsifiable or false beliefs. On the other hand, his intellectual opponent, Anthony Flew, holds that only doctrinal beliefs are susceptible to indoctrination. Through comparison and conceptual analysis of positions of these two philosophers, including the work by Paul Feyerabend, I aim to show that Flew’s view on indoctrination is more similar to Wilson’s than it initially may appear. Since Wilson’s definition of indoctrination does not seem to leave space for political education, I will criticize his solution for addressing prescriptive beliefs in the context of education and argue that the presentation of minority political views should be included and favoured in the context of education.