Ming-Jung Chang

This paper examines the debate between Axel Honneth and Stephen Darwall over the normative grounds of recognition. While Honneth locates the normativity of recognition in historically developed social practices and institutions, Darwall insists that recognition must ultimately be grounded in second-person moral reasoning independent of contingent social facts. I argue that this disagreement can be clarified by distinguishing between institutional recognition and intersubjective recognition. Drawing on Ikäheimo’s framework and Honneth’s own examples of the handyman and the secretary, I show that recognition often emerges as contestation within second-person interactions that expose tensions between existing institutions and evolving normative expectations. These cases reveal that institutional recognition, while necessary for social coordination, is insufficient to ground normative legitimacy when institutions themselves are experienced as unjust. I conclude that recognition theory requires a dual foundation: institutional embeddedness must be supplemented by a priori second-person normativity. 本文檢視 Axel Honneth 與 Stephen Darwall 之間關於「承認」之規範性基礎的爭論。Honneth 將承認的規範性奠基於歷史發展而成的社會實踐與制度之中，而 Darwall 則主張，承認最終必須奠基於獨立於偶然社會事實的第二人稱道德推理。本文主張，透過區分「制度性承認」與「主體間承認」，可以更清楚地理解此一分歧。藉由 Ikäheimo 的理論框架以及 Honneth 所提出的案例，本文指出，承認往往以「爭議」的形式出現在第二人稱互動之中，並由此揭露既有制度與新興規範期待之間的張力。這些案例顯示，制度性承認雖然對於社會協調而言不可或缺，但當制度本身被經驗為不正義時，卻不足以奠定其規範正當性。本文最後主張，承認理論需要一種雙重基礎：制度嵌入性必須由先驗的第二人稱規範性加以補充。

In the Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte attempts to deduce the reality of the concept of right by beginning with the act of self-positing. He understands right as a transcendental condition for the possibility of self-consciousness. According to Fichte, the concept of right should not be grounded in moral obligation but should instead be based on the relation between rational beings through mutual recognition. However, this deduction has often been criticized as unconvincing. This thesis seeks to defend Fichte’s position by reconstructing the steps of his argument. It argues that the concept of right, understood as a condition for self-consciousness, can be plausibly justified. To support this claim, the thesis analyzes a central concept in the deduction of right, namely the concept of summons. Through the summons, the subject becomes aware of itself. The thesis argues that the summons must possess both normative and causal dimensions in order to support the justification of the concept of right.