According to a Fregean view recently resurgent in higher‐order metaphysics, predicates do not denote objects, construed as any kind of thing a name could denote. Many common routes to that conclusion, however, don't do much to illuminate what it is about names and predicates that should prevent them from both denoting kinds of objects. This paper critically examines arguments that promise to fill this gap and establish the negative Fregean conclusion by reflection on the nature of predication. I…
Read moreAccording to a Fregean view recently resurgent in higher‐order metaphysics, predicates do not denote objects, construed as any kind of thing a name could denote. Many common routes to that conclusion, however, don't do much to illuminate what it is about names and predicates that should prevent them from both denoting kinds of objects. This paper critically examines arguments that promise to fill this gap and establish the negative Fregean conclusion by reflection on the nature of predication. I begin with two such arguments but conclude that, when situated in a general syntactic and semantic framework, they don't succeed. I then develop a third, more promising argument, inspired by Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning. The resulting proposal vindicates key Fregean ideas, while also departing from common views about predication in higher‐order settings. I go on to show that, despite these departures, the proposal can accommodate quantification into predicate position. Ultimately, however, the Fregean victory remains constrained, in that we have little reason to think that natural language predicates in fact function in the proposed manner.
