Mira Magdalena Sickinger

In this paper I investigate whether verbal humour can serve as a subversive tool for feminist aims. I examine standard theories by Raskin and Attardo that regard opposing scripts as the essential property of verbal humour. Challenging script opposition and shifting the focus on conceptual re-evaluation, I refer to an alternative theory, proposed by Bing and Scheibman. Their model of blended spaces builds on the cognitivist theory of conceptual blending, where frames from established domains are combined to yield hybrid frames. By laying emphasis on the generation of new meaning in humorous communication, this model proves to be suitable for a purposeful investigation of subversive humour. I critically address the question how fictional narratives of verbal humour may have an impact on real social circumstances and argue that the politically relevant aspect of verbal humour lies the oscillation between conceptual play and linguistic efficacy. Though not all subversive humour is feminist or politically productive, the conclusion shows that joking, as a practice of re-signification, allows women* and other marginalised groups, who are typically excluded from active participation in the language game of joking, to playfully challenge the status quo. Possibly initiating changes in the shared understanding of our concepts.

This paper investigates the question whether jokes and joking demand cooperative communication; where jokes refer to fictional narratives and joking refers to the performative situation in which these are told. The investigation first offers an evaluation of the distinct properties inherent to the narrative joke’s form and its performance. This includes an analysis of Austin’s conception of the performative utterance. While Austin deliberately excludes joking from his theory, I show that a significant characteristic of joking is the convergence of the illocutionary and perlocutionary act. The investigation assesses further prerequisites for successful joke performances and proceeds with the examination whether Grice’s cooperative principle applies to joking, or whether these maxims are being violated within joking; and critically engages with Attardo’s and Raskin’s responses to this question, who claim the latter. I provide an important corrective to Attardo’s and Raskin’s positions by proposing an account that stresses pragmatic distinctions between jokes and joking and argues for the possibility of cooperative humorous communication.

In this paper I draw attention to the grammatical “deep joke”. Wittgenstein refers to this type of joke in PI §111, comparing its depth to the depth of philosophy. I start with a brief review of Wittgenstein’s notions of “grammar” and “depth”. Building on these ideas, I first offer some general considerations regarding jokes and then present descriptive remarks about deep jokes. I evaluate possible examples of deep jokes, including primary examples provided by Wittgenstein, which appear in preliminary versions (1936-46) of the Philosophical Investigations but were cut later. I attempt to capture the distinctive qualities of deep jokes and seek to elucidate their philosophical potential. The results of the investigation of deep jokes provide an original reflection on our (mis-)understanding of linguistic practices.

Our private perception of listening to an individualized playlist during a jog is very different from the interaction we might experience at a live concert. We do realize that music is not necessarily a performing art, such as dancing or theater, while our demands regarding musical performances are conflicting: We expect perfect sound quality and the thrill of the immediate. We want the artist to overwhelm us with her virtuosity and we want her to struggle, just like a human. We want to engage with the musical expression and rely on visual and physical cues. Considering that the ears of today's listeners are used to technologically mediated music, in this paper I explore the unique qualities of musical live performances and examine if our conception allows for new mechatronic inventions, in particular robotic musicians, to participate in this art form. Some of Godlovitch's main thoughts expounded in his work on "musical performance" [11] serve as a reference and starting point for this investigation. His concept of `personalism', which deprives computer-/program-based musical performances from expressive potential and creative accomplishment is an issue that I want to challenge by pointing out new approaches arising from a reective discourse on technology, embodiment and expression. The enquiry conducted illustrates, how in reasoning about machine performers and algorithmic realization of music, we also examine the perceptual, physical and social aspects of human musicianship, reconceptualizing our understanding of a musical live performance.