Mircea Dumitru

This book is the first edited volume on the philosophy of one of the most seminal and profound contemporary philosophers. The volume is intended for philosophers, linguists, and cognitive scientists interested in metaphysics, language, and philosophical logic. The readers will benefit from the debates over Kit Fine’s novel theories on meaning and representation, arbitrary objects, essence, ontological realism, metaphysics of modality, and constitution of things. The work contains original essays which evaluate both the philosophical and some of the formal seminal contributions of Kit Fine to contemporary metaphysics, ontology, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic. The chapters in the work also advance new ideas and arguments which help in developing the debates on concepts of interests not only for philosophers but also for linguists and cognitive scientists who are interested in the foundations of their own fields. The work gives Kit Fine’s current views on the topics that he has helped to renew in today’s metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic. The work contributes to the furthering of the debates in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of language, focusing on brand new theories in the forefront of analytic philosophy. More generally, the hope is that a thorough discussion of the work of a very innovative and profound author such as Kit Fine can contribute to a better understanding of what is at stake within contemporary analytic philosophy.

In this paper I present and assess, firstly independently from one another, and then comparatively, the strengths and the weaknesses of three views on semantics: model-theoretic, truth-conditional, and proof-theoretic. The whole philosophical perspective from which I explore these three approaches is motivated by the investigation of the connection between truth and meaning, as well as by the understanding of the role and place of meaning within a physicalist outlook of the world. I also hint at how one can combine and coordinate the three approaches depending on the philosophical issues which those systems seek to model. In the process, I present the philosophical rich and nuanced positions of Donald Davidson who pioneered the Tarski-type truth-conditional semantics for natural languages, and of Wilfrid Sellars who made an essential contribution to the understanding of both semantic and pragmatic aspects of the relations between truth and meaning from an inferentialist (proof) based perspective. I offer a sketch of how certain problems within the Davidsonian framework can be fixed by using the Sellarsian framework. The paper ends with some critical points and challenges that I raise against the proof-theoretic (inferentialist) approach questioning its power to give a complete account of the issue concerning the relationship between truth, meanings, and rules.

Propositional modal logic is usually viewed as a generalization and extension of propositional classical logic. The main argument of this paper is that a good case can be made that modal logic should be construed as a restricted form of second order classical logic. The paper examines one aspect of this second order connection having to do with an incompleteness phenomenon. The leading concept is that modal incompleteness is to be explained in terms of the incompleteness of standard second order logic, since modal language is basically a second order language.

Principia Mathematica, 100 Years after. An Expository Essay. The paper is an expository essay in which I discuss the main goals, concepts, problems, and results of Whitehead’s and Russell’s Principia Mathematica (1910–1913) at its centennial anniversary. The great work by Whitehead and Russell may not be the birth certificate of modern logic, but it is nevertheless the legitimacy and consecration certificate of modern mathematical logic and of the logicist program into contemporary philosophy of mathematics. The emphasis is laid upon the presentation of sentential and predicate logic, identity, singular definite descriptions, set-theoretic and semantic paradoxes, and type theory.

The paper discusses an original and ingenious puzzle about time and thought due to Saul Kripke. Its connections with related issues and puzzles such as Russell’s paradox and Kaplan’s puzzle are addressed and explored. The problems raised by the puzzle are dealt with briefly, emphasizing the comparative worth of Kripke’s findings in terms of simplicity and modesty of its assumptions. Then the attempted solutions are analyzed and explored, the most important and promising avenue for future work being the extension of the apparatus developed by Kripke in his groundbreaking paper on truth to intensional logic.

„Studiind operele lui Aristotel, pare că eşti condus prin mai multe săli de expoziţie, fiecare ticsită cu probleme şi întrebări: acestea pot fi abordate dintr-un unghi sau din altul, preluate şi examinate, încercând analize diferite şi propunând diverse modalităţi de a le găsi o soluţie… Aristotel caută încă răspunsul–şi ne invită să-l căutăm împreună cu el”(Jonathan Barnes). De aproape 2400 de ani, filosofia lui Aristotel continuă să genereze dezbateri aprinse şi să inspire, în fiecare epocă, interpretări novatoare, într-un dialog neîntrerupt cu tradiţia intelectuală a Greciei antice. Reunind cercetători din toate generaţiile, cu abordări diferite şi variate subiecte de interes, editorii acestui volum speră să fi dovedit, încă o dată, caracterul complex şi inepuizabil al moştenirii aristotelice.

In this paper I shall address an issue in philosophy of mind related to philosophy of mathematics, or more specifically to the nature of mathematical knowledge and reasoning. The issue concerns whether the human mind is fully algorithmic. I shall develop my answer against the background which is created by Kurt Gödel’s celebrated incompleteness theorems. In what follows: (i) I shall first sketch the main programs and responses to the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind; (ii) then, I shall provide an informal overview of the two Gödelian incompleteness theorems; (iii) finally, I shall present and comment upon some of the main views advocated by Gödel about minds and machines, mind and matter, and the contrast between Turing machines and the so-called Gödel minds. In the process, Gödel’s very unorthodox and unfashionable views against computabilism, neuralism, physicalism, psychoneural parallelism, and even against the underlying philosophical presuppositions of the Turing machines will emerge. Shocking as they, understandably, are, as compared to the standard psychological and philosophical orthodoxy underlying the received computabilistic views on mind, Gödel’s own views are worth exploring and they fully deserve our undivided philosophical attention. Gödel is, after all, the founding father and one of the essential inspiring sources for the whole domain and range of topics that I address in my paper.

Traducere de Mircea Dumitru Format iniţial ca matematician, W.V. Quine – considerat astăzi unul dintre cei mai influenţi filosofi ai secolului XX – şi‑a descoperit vocaţia filosofică odată cu lectura faimoasei lucrări Principia Mathematica a lui Russell şi Whitehead. Ţesătura opiniilor, scrisă împreună cu prietenul său J.S. Ullian, care i-a fost student la Harvard, constituie o introducere concisă şi coerentă în studiul convingerilor raţionale ale oamenilor şi un bun punct de plecare pentru familiarizarea cu domenii ale filosofiei precum teoria cunoaşterii, metodologia ştiinţei şi filosofia limbajului. Cartea este totodată un reper esenţial în orice bibliografie a filosofiei şi logicii contemporane, fiind scrisă într‑o manieră accesibilă inclusiv publicului larg.

Format iniţial ca matematician, W.V. Quine – considerat astăzi unul dintre cei mai influenţi filosofi ai secolului XX – şi‑a descoperit vocaţia filosofică odată cu lectura faimoasei lucrări Principia Mathematica a lui Russell şi Whitehead. Ţesătura opiniilor, scrisă împreună cu prietenul său J.S. Ullian, care i-a fost student la Harvard, constituie o introducere concisă şi coerentă în studiul convingerilor raţionale ale oamenilor şi un bun punct de plecare pentru familiarizarea cu domenii ale filosofiei precum teoria cunoaşterii, metodologia ştiinţei şi filosofia limbajului. Cartea este totodată un reper esenţial în orice bibliografie a filosofiei şi logicii contemporane, fiind scrisă într‑o manieră accesibilă inclusiv publicului larg.

From Williamson’s knowledge-first perspective, we are cognitively homeless, and our mental/cognitive states are not luminous. I argue that, in feeling that one understands a logical or mathematical proof, the state of understanding is luminous in that it evinces semantic qualia. I provide three examples: one pedagogical example (teaching natural deduction using arbitrary objects), one example concerning understanding an entire subject matter (the preeminence of Euclidean geometry), and one example regarding the understanding of specific logical results (how modal frame incompleteness can be represented from the standpoint of second-order logic).

Explorarile logico-filozofice definesc cateva dintre problemele care intereseaza cercetarea contemporana, prezinta principalele variante de solutii din literatura de specialitate si avanseaza sugestii proprii, solid argumentate, ale autorului. Incepand prin a discuta un pasaj obscur dintr-un dialog al lui Platon, Explorarile parcurg un itinerar tematic de o mare diversitate, centrate pe ideile semanticii si instrumentele oferite de logica modala, si sfarsesc prin a discuta controversata problema a existentei unor drepturi naturale ale omului. Exegeza de text, reconstructie rationala a unor momente din istoria stiintei, reluare a unor doctrine influente din logica de azi si din filozofiile de ramura, cartea ne readuce pe taramul ideilor generale, de miza universala, dupa ce ne-a impus aspra recluziune a studiului logic.

This volume explores how understanding relates to conscious experience. In doing so, it builds bridges between different philosophical disciplines and provides a metaphysically robust characterization of understanding, both in and beyond science. The past two decades have witnessed growing interest from epistemologists, philosophers of science, philosophers of mind, and ethicists in the nature and value of intellectual understanding. This volume features original essays on understanding and the phenomenal experiences that underlie it. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. Part 1 provides theoretical characterizations of understanding, including Henk de Regt's defense of a contextual theory of scientific understanding and a debate whether scientific inference and explanatory power are necessary or central features of understanding. Part 2 explores how conscious experience and understanding are related. The chapters articulate a phenomenal theory of understanding and address themes that are connected to understanding, including awareness, transformative experiences, and exemplification. Finally, Part 3 is devoted to domain-specific inquiries about understanding, such as logical proofs, particle physics and moral understanding. Understanding and Conscious Experience will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, and phenomenology.

In this paper I examine some presuppositions of toleration and pluralism. I explore two models, viz. a deontological and a consequentialist model, respectively, which could support the view that rational agents should act in a tolerant way. Against the background which is offered by the first model I give two arguments in favor of the view that people are better off and more rational if they act in a tolerant way. The first argument draws upon a principle of charity which one usually makes use of in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language but which could work equally well with regard to this foundational issue in ethics and philosophyof action. The second argument is built upon the epistemic principle of fallibilism and it is meant to show that from this vantage point acting in a tolerant way is the rational thing to do.

The paper examines some presuppositions of toleration and pluralism and explores two models, a deontological and a consequentialist model, that could support the view that rational agents should act in a tolerant way. Within the first model two arguments are given in favor of the view that people are better off and more rational if they are tolerant. The first argument draws upon a principle of charity that one usually makes use of in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, but which could work equally well with regard to this foundational issue in ethics and philosophy of action. The second argument is built upon the epistemic principle of fallibilism and is meant to show that from this vantage point acting in a tolerant way is the rational thing to do.

Explaining phenomenal consciousness may be the scientific and philosophical problem of our time, the last frontier of knowledge. This is not at all an easy task. For any serious attempt at finding a place for consciousness within the natural world was not successful so far. There is a conceptual tension here which makes this business of coming up with a unified (monist) explanation of mind and physical world one of the most intriguing mystery. The most predominant image of the natural world is one of a physicalist type, whereas the mind, and especially the conscious subjective experience seem not to fit well within that physicalistexplanation. That explanatory failure may require a dualist metaphysical scheme (probably of a neo-Cartesian type). It may seem very well that we are caught in a dilemma, for we either embrace a physicalist explanation, but then it seems that we leave out consciousness from the big picture we are looking for, or else we face the huge task of conceiving a dramatic change of our scientific outlook about the natural world, and we don’t quite see how that would be possible or desirable. But then, should any attempt at understanding consciusness be a dead-end, something doomed to fail from a theoretical and explanatory point of view? In my paper I explore some philosophical underpinnings of contemporary dualism, focussing on the modal facets of the conceivability (neo-Cartesian) arguments. I will asses both the prospects and the moot points of this type of arguments. Of particular interest is the role that two-dimensional semantics plays in nowadays discussions of this topic.

In Reference without Referents, Mark Sainsbury aims to provide an account of reference that honours the common-sense view that sentences containing empty names like "Vulcan" and "Santa Claus" are entirely intelligible, and that many such sentences -"Vulcan doesn't exist", "Many children believe that Santa Claus will give them presents at Christmas", etc.- are literally true. Sainsbury's account endorses the Davidsonian program in the theory of meaning, and combines this with a commitment to Negative Free Logic, which holds that all simple sentences containing empty names are false. In this critical review, we pose a number of problems for this account. In particular, we question the ability of Negative Free Logic to make appropriate sense of the truth of familiar sentences containing empty names, including negative existential claims like "Vulcan doesn't exist". /// En Reference without Referents, Mark Sainsbury se propone ofrecer una explicación de la referencia que respete la idea de sentido común de que las oraciones con nombres vacíos como "Vulcano" y "Santa Claus" son completamente inteligibles, y que muchas de oraciones de este tipo -"Vulcano no existe", "Muchos niños creen que Santa Claus les traerá regalos en Navidad", y demás- son literalmente verdaderas. La propuesta de Sainsbury se inscribe dentro del programa davidsoniano en teoría del significado, y combina éste con un compromiso con la Lógica Libre Negativa, según la cual todas las oraciones simples que contienen nombres vacíos son falsas. En este estudio crítico, presentamos varios problemas de esta explicación. En particular, ponemos en duda la habilidad de la Lógica Libre Negativa de entender de manera apropiada la verdad de oraciones conocidas que contienen nombres vacíos, incluidas negaciones de existencia como "Vulcano no existe".

The dissertation gives a second-order-logic-based explanation of modal incompleteness. The leading concept is that modal incompleteness is to be explained in terms of the incompleteness of standard second-order logic, since modal language is basically a second-order language. The development of Kripke-style semantics for modal logic has been underpinned by the conjecture that all modal systems are characterizable by classes of frames defined by first-order conditions on a binary relation. However, the discovery of certain incomplete modal systems has undermined the all-encompassing feature of Kripke-style approach. There are logics not determined by any class of Kripke frames at all. ;In the dissertation I investigate a normal incomplete sentential modal system due to J. F. A. K. Van Benthem, and I address both the formal and the philosophical facets of modal incompleteness from the vantage point that modal logic is essentially second-order in its nature. Modal systems can be analyzed in terms of structures with a domain of second-order individuals that are assigned under an interpretation to propositional variables within languages of sentential modal logic. Hence, the phenomenon of there being incomplete modal systems can be accounted for through the incompleteness of standard second-order logic. ;Since second-order logic plays a crucial role in the explanation, Quine's animadversions upon second-order logic and in particular his views that second-order logic is 'Set Theory in Sheep's Clothing' are examined. Against Quine's stance I will seek to show that a vindication of second-order logic can be gotten provided a proper due is given to the sharp distinction between the logical notion of set which is the concern of second-order logic and the iterative notion of set which lies within the realm of set theory.

The general slogan in the title of this paper gives a general, but nevertheless accurate, expression of Strawson’s view concerning the nature of formal logic per se in relation to natural language. What is at stake here is the extent to which the formal methods and the formal semantics of contemporary symbolic logic can render the meanings of natural language expressions. Strawson sets up an agenda for logical theory which, although rather dated for a logic text, is what one naturally expects from an introduction to elementary formal logic and a systematic analysis of certain crucial metalogical concepts, most notably entailment. However, my own reading is that Strawson’s approach to logic makes a lasting contribution to understanding the inner workings of natural language through his critical discussion of the limits of the formal renderings of the semantics of natural language expressions via canonical first-order notations. One can recognize in this critical attitude towards the limits of formal methods a consistent generalization of Strawson’s own strategy from his critical response to Russell’s theory of descriptions.In my paper I shall focus on certain examples which illustrate the general slogan that characterizes Strawson’s views on the nature of logic in connection with ordinary language and talk.