Mirja Holst

The Diamond Sutra is one of the earliest and most treasured of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras and had a wide influence on the development of Zen Buddhism. There has been, in recent years, great interest in one particular form of sentences that repeatedly occur in the sutra, sentences of the form “A is not A, therefore it is A”. These sentences display what has been called the “logic of not” or the “logic of affirmation-in-negation”. They are of special interest since they do not only encapsulate one of the central insights of Zen Buddhism, that of nonduality, but at the same time seem to go against one of the most orthodox laws of logic in Western philosophy, the law of identity. This paper discusses the interpretation of these “diamond sentences” by the Vietnamese Zen monk Thich Nhat Hanh. I present Thich Nhat Hanh’s interpretation of the diamond sentences in terms of interbeing and go on to argue that and explain how, on his interpretation, the validity of the law of identity is indeed rejected. Finally, I spell out consequences for formulating a “logic of Zen” and for a related debate about the validity of the law of non-contradiction in Zen.

This paper presents the metaphysics of the Vietnamese Buddhist Zen monk Thich Nhat Hanh. He interprets the Buddhist principle of interdependent arising in terms of interbeing, the idea that everything depends for its existence on everything else. On his view, everything “inter-is” with everything else, or “to be is to inter-be.” His interpretation is particularly interesting in light of the contemporary debate on fundamentality in western metaphysics. By embracing the idea of interbeing, he opposes the view that there are fundamental entities which do not depend for their existence on anything else. I give an outline of Thich Nhat Hanh’s views, answer an objection, and explain his reasons for adopting his standpoint. My aim is not to offer a full defense of his views, but only to show that the often neglected position of metaphysical coherentism, which Thich Nhat Hanh adopts, deserves further consideration.

A challenge for theories of incomplete descriptions is to capture the consistency of ‘Sobel sequences’ and to account for an asymmetry in the acceptability of utterances of Sobel sequences and ‘reverse Sobel sequences’. David Lewis’s theory of incomplete descriptions answers, unlike many other theories, the challenge from Sobel sequences, but it does not answer the challenge from reverse Sobel sequences. This article presents another asymmetry in the availability of anaphoric readings of Sobel sequences and reverse Sobel sequences, and proposes an explanation of the original asymmetry on its grounds. This provides an answer to the challenge for Lewis’s theory