Miroslav Novák

This text refutes the conventional wisdom that Duverger’s classification of pluralistic party systems is simplistic because it recognizes only bipartism and multipartism as categories. It indicates that: 1. By 1951, Duverger had already introduced a more sophisticated typology of pluralistic party systems, one which resembled the later one by Sartori; 2. Duverger authored the concept of the «paradox of the centre», that is no less «counter-intuitive» compared to Sartori’s concept; 3. Like Sartori, Duverger puts emphasis on the «functioning» of party systems; Sartori, however, dissociated himself from Duverger and tried to propagate the belief that his approach is fundamentally different from Duverger’s; 4. It is necessary to revise the simplistic understanding of the development of political science and to recognize Duverger’s contribution to the theory of party systems as fundamental.

This book provides a thorough interpretation of Raymond Aron’s political sociology of industrial societies from the perspective of contemporary political science. However, the book is not only aimed at specialists or advanced students of political science, but appeals to a much wider range of cultivated readers. Particular attention is paid to those issues that have been subject to conflicting interpretations, such as his relationship to the so-called convergence theory, or how he understood the end of the ideological age, what his relationship to European integration was, or to what extent he was influenced by Carl Schmitt. More than 40 years have passed since Aron’s death (1983). The author therefore explains the extent to which more recent scholars such as Giovanni Sartori, François Furet, Leszek Kołakowski, Martin Malia and Alain Besançon have contributed to or continued to analyse the issues that Raymond Aron was so concerned with.

In various passages of his Politics, Aristotle gives two diametrically opposed answers to the questions of whether, in the best regime, a good citizen must also be a good man, and of whether the excellence of a good man is single, complete and perfect. In this article, I summarize whatAristotle claims in different places about the relationship between the good citizen and the good man, afterwards relating it to other statements of Aristotle that might complement or illuminate the topic; I then propose a plausible solution to these “contradictions”. My explanation is linked, among other things, to Aristotle’s aporia of the best constitution and, consequently, to the “two paths to excellence”. Are we to consider the “best constitution” to be the absolute best one, or the one that is best “for most cities and most people“? people?” people?”

According to Aristotle, democracy and oligarchy are empirically the most widespread and analytically fundamental ‘constitutions’. I analyse how in different places in his Politics Aristotle ‘positively’ defines and differentiates between democracy and oligarchy. At the same time, I substantiate in detail a new interpretation of Aristotle’s view that significantly differs from the current interpretation. ‘Combining’ the elements, procedures, and principles of democracy and oligarchy gives rise to mixed ‘constitutions’, a special place among which is occupied by the polity or republic, which is the best regime ‘for most states and for most people’. I show the ways in which, according to Aristotle, it is possible to form such a regime. Carl Schmitt and, later somewhat differently, Bernard Manin draw a link between Aristotle’s mixed regime and the representative democracies of today.

This is how the Russian logician and writer Alexander Zinoviev (1922-2006) characterized the "program" of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union: "The authorities must respect the letter of Soviet law, fulfill the obligations they have undertaken, put an end to the persecution of those who think differently and really want to enjoy the civil liberties they proclaim. If we were to use the term "program" here, taken in a somewhat informal sense, we would have to speak of a negative program. As for a positive program (a program in the precise sense of the term), a program for reforming Soviet society that would realize the aspirations and slogans of the dissidents, the dissident movement has none". This applies not only to dissidence in the Soviet Union, as Zinoviev thought, but more generally to most human rights groups in the Soviet bloc, and in particular to Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. In its documents, from its founding manifesto of January 1, 1977 onwards, Charter 77 constantly repeats that it does not want to serve as a basis for opposition, that its aim is not to draw up a program of reforms, and that it wishes to engage in constructive dialogue with the powers that be.

One element in the choice of a constitutional design or model of democracy is the criterion of efficiency. Different political scientists, however, understand the word ‘efficiency’ in different ways. The author suggests a distinction between its two main meanings: (1) efficiency-action capacity and (2) effectiveness-socioeconomic performance. It is not just socio-economic effectiveness that is important, but also political efficiency-action capacity. Efficiency-action capacity is closely linked with the theory of democracy put forward by Schumpeter and adopted by the majority of political scientists today. Thus efficiency is essential not only for the government (in that it simplifies the operation of power) but also, and even more importantly, for the governed, for the citizens (in that it simplifies the choice and peaceful removal of the rulers, i.e. the executive).

Pourquoi les chrétiens sont-ils à tel point séduits par le marxisme? Pourquoi l'illusion qu'on peut séparer le marxisme de l'athéisme se maintient-elle? Comme l'a remarqué G. M. M. Cottier O. P., c'est l'effondrement du monolithisme doctrinal qui est sans doute à l'origine de cette idée qu'il est possible d'opérer un tri entre divers aspects du marxisme isolables les uns des autres. L'auteur de l'article analyse en particulier le soi-disant matérialisme historique en montrant sa liaison avec l'athéisme du jeune Marx. Il montre que l'argumentation de ceux qui, comme G. A. Wetter S. J., tentent de décomposer le marxisme pour pouvoir trouver un terrain d'entente permettant une coopération entre les marxistes et les chrétiens, font fausse route. L'auteur souligne également que le problème n'est pas seulement celui qui oppose l'athéisme et la foi, c'est la divergence entre deux conceptions de la nature, de l'homme, de la société et de l'histoire, selon la belle formule des évêques français.