Mitchell Roberts

Abstract“The Gamer’s Dilemma” consists of three claims: (1) Virtual murder is permissible; (2) There are no morally relevant differences between virtual murder and virtual child molestation with regard to permissibility; (3) Virtual child molestation is impermissible. Solutions to the dilemma typically include various attempts to deny one or more of the above claims. Notably, however, it is often unclear in past responses to The Gamer’s Dilemma whose actions are deemed impermissible. On one reading, it is impermissible to play games where the player commits virtual murder. On another reading, it is impermissible to create games that enable the player to commit virtual murder. In this paper, I defend a bifurcation of the Gamer’s Dilemma that draws this distinction out. I call these new dilemmas “The Game-Player’s Dilemma” and “The Game-Developer’s Dilemma.”

“The Gamer’s Dilemma” consists of three claims: (1) Virtual murder is permissible; (2) There are no morally relevant differences between virtual murder and virtual child molestation with regard to permissibility; (3) Virtual child molestation is impermissible. Solutions to the dilemma typically include various attempts to deny one or more of the above claims. Notably, however, it is often unclear in past responses to The Gamer’s Dilemma whose actions are deemed impermissible. On one reading, it is impermissible to play games where the player commits virtual murder. On another reading, it is impermissible to create games that enable the player to commit virtual murder. In this paper, I defend a bifurcation of the Gamer’s Dilemma that draws this distinction out. I call these new dilemmas “The Game-Player’s Dilemma” and “The Game-Developer’s Dilemma.”

It is commonly held that technical artifacts have a “dual nature.” On the one hand, technical artifacts are material objects–they are constituted by their physical components and structures. On the other hand, technical artifacts are intentional objects in virtue of their teleological nature—they are _for_ some purpose that is contingent on the intentional states of agents. I argue that this view is false when properly understood. To do this, I develop a theory of technical functions that reduces functions to physical dispositions (Dispositional Account of Technical Functions, DAF). First, I argue that the different notions of technical functions are best understood with reference to dispositions. Then, I argue that technical functions, like dispositions, are modal properties that manifest under appropriate circumstances. Further, I argue that the seemingly teleological nature of technical functions can be accounted for with reference to user expectations. Phrases like “proper use,” “malfunctioning,” and “accidental use” are intentional concepts that agents ascribe to relevant dispositions. Hence, an artifact is a physical object with dispositions, and subcategories of technical functions are ultimately socio-cultural facts about what we expect from the use of artifacts.