Mladjo Ivanovic

This paper tackles an old, yet persisting philosophical and cultural imaginary that justifies the political subjugation, marginalization and exclusion of distant others through claims that such people are less advanced and cognitively inferior, and therefore remain at the periphery of moral and political considerations of Western political culture. My premise here is that all knowledge is historically conditioned, and as such serves as a discursive formation that mirrors and sustains specific historical forms of social organization and practices. Thus, by considering the interrelated themes of epistemic and social inclusion of refugees and migrants from a range of critical philosophical perspectives, I argue that successfully managing the dire humanitarian circumstances involved in admitting and receiving displaced and migrant people requires the inclusion of both the bodies of knowledge and discursive interactions and also diverse social and cultural perspectives.

This paper explores the historical conditions under which the object of humanitarian discourse is conceived and organized. What is problematic about this discourse is not only the alarming reality of humanitarianism’s intertwinement with militarism and political power, but also the calculated arbitrariness of redress that brings into question which norms guide public articulations of victims’ suffering. By questioning how a specific understanding of the other is formed, this paper aims to draw attention to the inconsistencies associated with the problematic relation between witnessing atrocities and the moral responses that this should entail.

This paper explores the historical conditions under which the object of humanitarian discourse is conceived and organized. What is problematic about this discourse is not only the alarming reality of humanitarianism’s intertwinement with militarism and political power, but also the calculated arbitrariness of redress that brings into question which norms guide public articulations of victims’ suffering. By questioning how a specific understanding of the other is formed, this paper aims to draw attention to the inconsistencies associated with the problematic relation between witnessing atrocities and the moral responses that this should entail.