Mohamad Hadi Safaei

Disjunctivism about responding to reasons maintains that responding to normative reasons and responding to motivating reasons are fundamentally different conditions neither of which can be analyzed in terms of the other. This paper argues against disjunctivism and defends the factoring account of responding to normative reasons according to which the fact that an agent responds to a normative reason is grounded upon the facts that (i) there is a true consideration that provides that normative reason, (ii) she possesses that consideration as a normative reason, and (iii) she is rationally motivated by that consideration (as a motivating reason) to do what it supports. As I argue, recent arguments against the factoring account rest on impoverished conceptions of what it is to possess a normative reason. Accordingly, by defending the factoring account the paper helps deepen our understanding of the notion of possessing normative reasons.

Epistemicism about reason possession holds that one possesses a fact as a normative reason just in case one has appropriate epistemic access to that fact. This paper argues that (i) the purely epistemic view of reason possession is untenable, as it fails to account for the role of reasoning abilities in possessing normative reasons; (ii) possessing a normative reason requires both the general and specific ability to respond to that reason; (iii) these abilities consist of four particular components—the deliberative ability, the enkratic ability, the instrumental ability, and the executive ability; and (iv) they should be analyzed in terms of dispositions to respond correctly to one’s normative reasons when one tries to do so. By way of defense and further elaboration, I respond to a series of objections to this new ability-based account of reason possession.

My aim in this paper is to show that the reasons-responsiveness theory of rationality fails to explain the intuitive irrationality of practical akrasia. First, I argue that the best explanation for the distinction between acting in accordance with a normative reason and responding to that reason involves appealing to one’s competence or knowledge about how to respond to that reason. Second, one might possess practical competence to respond to her decisive practical reasons to act, without having the parallel theoretical competence to believe rationally, through deliberation, that she has decisive reasons to perform that action. Third, if possessing a normative reason is a matter of having the ability to respond to that reason, and responding to a reason is grounded in facts about one’s competence about how to respond to that reason, then the mismatch between one’s practical and theoretical competences may give rise to a normative mismatch between one’s possessed reasons for action and one’s possessed reasons for one's normative beliefs. There would be possible situations in which one possesses decisive reasons to perform an action ⱷ but lacks sufficient reasons to believe that she has decisive reasons to ⱷ. In those situations, the reasons-responsiveness theory requires one to act against her normative judgment about what she ought to do. I conclude by considering whether it could be rationally permissible to act against one’s own normative judgment about what one ought to do if one’s reasons for action diverge from one’s reasons for a certain judgment about what one ought to do.