Mohamad Reza Vaez Shahrestani

The “scheme-content distinction” distinguishes between two components of our thought: on the one hand, a conceptual system or scheme, and on the other, that which we think about, namely, content. According to Donald Davidson, once it is accepted that a distinction can be drawn between content (experience, sense data, the world, nature) and conceptual schemes employed to organise and/or represent that content, it becomes possible to speak of “alternative conceptual schemes.” In his well-known and seminal essay, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” Davidson rejects the “scheme-content distinction,” calling it the third dogma of empiricism. The principal target of the essay is “conceptual relativism,” that is, the idea that there are different conceptual schemes that organise or represent experience in different ways. On Davidson’s view, “conceptual relativism” rests on the assumption that conceptual schemes, or the moral or linguistic systems associated with them, can differ radically, to the point of being mutually unintelligible or incommensurable, or of remaining beyond rational resolution. Indeed, according to Davidson, the doctrine of “conceptual relativism” presupposes the idea of “alternative conceptual schemes,” and therefore, if Davidson can reject this presupposition, he has thereby rejected the doctrine of “conceptual relativism” as well. On the other hand, defenders of “conceptual schemes,” as well as proponents of “conceptual relativism,” have mounted several counterattacks against Davidson’s assault on “conceptual schemes” and “conceptual relativism.” These counterattacks focus, in two corresponding directions, on two fundamental aspects of the idea of conceptual schemes: the form of the schemes and the kind of content involved. This book will examine the analyses and criticisms advanced in this connection by contemporary philosophers such as McDowell, Maria Baghramian, and Nathaniel Goldberg. In this context, it will be explained how, on the basis of the views and arguments of McDowell, Baghramian, and the author, Davidson’s claim that neither conceptual schemes nor experiential content exist is open to criticism. To this end, after explaining the various possible interpretations of the “content” component of the “scheme-content distinction,” it will be argued that a harmless version of the “scheme-content distinction” can be identified, one that does not lead to the pernicious and dogmatic form of dualism rejected by Davidson. Furthermore, the final part of the book will consider how Davidson, by developing a universal theory of interpretation within his philosophical system, ultimately seeks, like Kant, to secure universal rationality and thereby to reject the “conceptual relativism” of post-Kantian philosophy. Finally, on the basis of the doctrines considered in the chapters that follow, this text will attempt to answer three questions that bear directly on the principal aim of the book.

About Art in the Community of Inquiry The authors begin with foundational questions: What is art? What makes something a work of art? What is the relationship between emotion and artistic creation? By what criteria can we examine an artist or an artistic style? They then move toward the analysis of several well-known works of art, using them as a basis for exploring themes such as betrayal, anger, surprise, war, death, fear, violence, and self-sacrifice. In this approach, art education becomes an opportunity not only to engage with artworks, but also to cultivate questioning, reasoning, empathy, and more attentive ways of seeing and understanding the world. Why Read Art in the Community of Inquiry? The main reasons for reading Art in the Community of Inquiry can be summarized as follows: The book provides educators and teachers with ten ready-to-use lesson plans, each including an introduction, activities, and exercises. It connects art education with inquiry and classroom dialogue rather than limiting learning to fixed definitions or predetermined interpretations. Readers are introduced to ways of using a range of stimuli in the classroom, including animation, paintings, photographs, and personal experience. The book also demonstrates how concepts such as art, artwork, emotion, artist, and artistic style can be explored collectively through discussion and inquiry. The final sections offer concrete examples of analysing works of art, making the structure and practical implementation of an inquiry session easier to understand. Who Is This Book For? Art in the Community of Inquiry is particularly recommended for: Philosophy for Children and Adolescents facilitators who wish to design art-based sessions around dialogue and inquiry. Art teachers looking for participatory ways of exploring artistic concepts in the classroom. Kindergarten, preschool, and educational-centre educators working with learners aged ten and above. Students and researchers interested in the relationship between art education and Philosophy for Children. Anyone interested in developing capacities such as reasoning, comparison, interpretation, and empathy through art education.

In this paper, first of all, a short introduction of entrance of language into philosophical and subsequently philosophy of science issues is presented. Then, it will be shown that the scientific activity is a collaborative activity which is based on interpretation and communication and so it provides Davidson’s conditions. In third part, the formation of the language of science, as a social activity which provides Davidson’s conditions, in the context of a natural language will be investigated. In this paper, first of all, a short introduction of entrance of language into philosophical and subsequently philosophy of science issues is presented. Then, it will be shown that the scientific activity is a collaborative activity which is based on interpretation and communication and so it provides Davidson’s conditions. In third part, the formation of the language of science, as a social activity which provides Davidson’s conditions, in the context of a natural language will be investigated

This fieldnotes article documents the design and implementation of a Philosophy for Children (P4C) lesson aimed at introducing children aged 8–12 to the ethical dimensions of Artificial Intelligence (AI), with a particular focus on data privacy. Drawing on the Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI) methodology— specifically the “Plain Vanilla” model associated with Thomas Jackson and disseminated by the IAPC (Yarmel & Gregory, 2023)—the session employed an illustrated narrative stimulus, “Liam’s Secret Base,” followed by student-generated dialogue and a collaborative “Safe Sharing Scenario” activity. These components were designed to foster critical, creative, and caring thinking (Lipman, 2003) about digital life. This article demonstrates that engaging young learners in ethical inquiry about AI technologies is both timely—given the global call for age-appropriate AI-ethics education (UNICEF, 2021; Dabbagh et al., 2025)—and feasible, since most children already interact with AI-mediated platforms. Classroom reflections showed that the lesson supported higher-order reasoning, metacognitive awareness, and collaborative dialogue in a supportive environment, outcomes consistent with reported benefits of P4C (Adams et al., 2023; Ab Wahab et al., 2022). Rather than prescribing a list of “don’ts,” educators used open-ended questions and realistic digital-life scenarios to nurture children’s autonomy in ethical decision-making, echoing participatory design approaches from the MIT Media Lab’s AI + Ethics curriculum (Wu, 2020; Williams et al., 2022). We conclude that P4C—co-founded by Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp (Gregory & Laverty, 2017)—provides an effective pedagogical framework for integrating digital-ethics learning into childhood education, enabling students to become thoughtful, informed, and responsible digital citizens capable of navigating an increasingly data-driven world (Floridi, 2023/2024; Turner, 2019).

Este artículo examina la relación entre las máximas del entendimiento humano común de Immanuel Kant y la Comunidad de Investigación Filosófica (CPI). Las tres máximas de Kant—pensar por sí mismo, considerar las perspectivas de los demás y mantener la coherencia lógica—son fundamentales para el razonamiento filosófico y la educación. El enfoque pedagógico de CPI, desarrollado por Matthew Lipman y Ann Margaret Sharp, promueve el pensamiento crítico, creativo y colaborativo en los niños. El estudio analiza cómo CPI se alinea con los ideales kantianos al fomentar la autonomía intelectual, la toma de perspectiva y el razonamiento sistemático en la educación. Inspirado en el pragmatismo de John Dewey y la visión de Walter Benjamin sobre la imaginación infantil, el artículo destaca cómo CPI combina el pensamiento independiente con el diálogo colectivo para cultivar la reflexión crítica y la conciencia ética. Además, el artículo argumenta que la CPI puede ser un modelo educativo efectivo para abordar desafíos contemporáneos como la desinformación, la polarización política y la falta de compromiso cívico. Mediante debates abiertos, los estudiantes aprenden a evaluar críticamente la información, cuestionar supuestos y desarrollar responsabilidad social. Al aplicar los principios de CPI en la educación, los docentes pueden crear entornos de aprendizaje inclusivos que fomenten la investigación filosófica, la integridad intelectual y la participación democrática. Esta síntesis demuestra que los principios kantianos, aplicados a través de la CPI, pueden fortalecer la educación moderna, preparando ciudadanos que piensan de manera racional y actúan con responsabilidad social.

Turing does not provide an explanation for substituting the original question of his test – i.e., “Can machines think?” with “Can a machine pass the imitation game?” – resulting in an argumentative gap in his main thesis. In this article, I argue that a positive answer to the second question would mean attributing the ability of linguistic interactions to machines; while a positive answer to the original question would mean attributing the ability of thinking to machines. In such a situation, defending the Turing Test requires establishing a relationship between thought and language. In this regard, Davidson's no-priority theory is presented as an approach for defending the test.

In the article of Bueno titled “Davidson and Skepticism: How Not to Respond to the Skeptic,” he intends to demonstrate that although Davidson’s theory of Coherence holds many attractions, it does not entail a response to any kinds of skepticism including Global, Lottery, and Pyrrhonian. In this study, the goal is to criticize the work of Prof. Bueno in connection with two criticisms raised by him over Davidson’s anti-skeptical strategy. Further, by giving some reasons in favor of Davidson’s anti-skepticism argument, it will be shown that neither the above stated criticisms nor the global skepticism response could undermine the validity of anti-skepticism argument.