Mohammad Mahdi Hatef

Appealing to science is a popular suggestion for separating projectible predicates. According to this suggestion, we can expect science, eventually, to separate such predicates for us, rendering it unnecessary to make further attempts to explicate the criteria for projectibility. In this essay, I address three theoretical challenges to this suggestion. The first stems from the inductive character of science, which casts doubts on its efficacy in separating projectible predicates, since induction itself requires this separation. The second is the inferential externalism implied by this suggestion, whereas the problems of induction have bite only if inferential internalism is presumed. The third challenge appears when a strong relationship between projectibility and kindhood, on the one hand, and kindhood and similarity, on the other, is posited, such that a more projectible predicate is believed to be a predicate which tracks better similarities in nature. Now the question appears: whether and how science enables us to track better similarities? I distinguish two conceptions of similarity, one intuitive, the other theoretical, and I argue that the theoretical one is to be preferred, showing that how scientific practice involves shifting from an intuitive idea of similarity to a theoretical one. Through answering these three challenges, I attempt to support the appeal to natural science as far as Goodman’s problem of induction is concerned.

The understanding of disease in the dominant biomedical model involves two components, internalism and individualism, which jointly give rise to an ontological approach towards patients that can be referred to as atomism. I argue against such an approach in philosophy of medicine. I focus on internalism, showing that the inevitable presence of the notions of biological function and statistical normality in the biomedical model renders internalism about diseases untenable. Additionally, I argue that the new externalist individualism offers an alternative ontological approach that escapes the challenges to which the atomistic approach is exposed regarding both the concept of disease and medical practice. Subsequently, I focus on an implication of this new approach which relates to the idea of diseases as natural kinds, demonstrating that it proposes a concept of diseases as natural kinds that is conceptually consistent.

This essay is about a dark side of the Enlightenment, uncovering the contributions of notable thinkers from that era to the formation of racial ideologies. I address this dark side especially when it comes to moral philosophy in the Enlightenment. My focus will be on Immanuel Kant, to see how an iconic figure of radical thinking in the Enlightenment was at the same time a creative mind in developing the raciology of white supremacy. I argue that his notion of race, drawn from natural history, not only influenced his anthropology, but also posed an unnoticed challenge for his moral and political philosophy. Furthermore, by delving into the conversation between Kant, on the one side, and Johann Herder and George Forster, on the other side, I hope to dismiss the objection of anachronism in so far as racial thinking is concerned in the eighteenth century.

Appealing to science is a popular suggestion for separating projectible predicates. According to this suggestion, we can expect science, eventually, to separate such predicatesfor us, rendering it unnecessary to make further attempts to explicate the criteria for pro-jectibility. In this essay, I address three theoretical challenges to this suggestion. The firststems from the inductive character of science, which casts doubts on its efficacy in separat-ing projectible predicates, since induction itself requires this separation. The second is theinferential externalism implied by this suggestion, whereas the problems of induction havebite only if inferential internalism is presumed. The third challenge appears when a strongrelationship between projectibility and kindhood, on the one hand, and kindhood and sim-ilarity, on the other, is posited, such that a more projectible predicate is believed to be apredicate which tracks better similarities in nature. Now the question appears: whether andhow science enables us to track better similarities? I distinguish two conceptions of similarity,one intuitive, the other theoretical, and I argue that the theoretical one is to be preferred,showing that how scientific practice involves shifting from an intuitive idea of similarity to atheoretical one. Through answering these three challenges, I attempt to support the appealto natural science as far as Goodman’s problem of induction is concerned.

The explanation made by Freud for the institution of morality and its relation with human psyche proceeded in two separate projects. At the first, it is described the establishment of moral sense in individual’s psyche, and at the second an explanation for its generation and continuity in human species is presented. This essay deals with the relation between these two. First, two description related to these projects are presented in which the possibility of comparison and criticizing them have been provided. The main claim of this essay which is itself an admitted Freud’s idea involved in an equivalence between two projects. It means that it is possible to establish a one-to-one equivalence between the foundational concepts and general mechanisms of moral institution. The place of this principle have not been determined in Freud’s thought; if it is a result of his discussion in that he presented separate arguments, or concerns with that as n axiom. Next, it is explained that this equivalence could be reduced into an equivalence between their two central concepts; The notion of moral judgment in its Aristotelian-Kantian sense, and the notion of Taboo in which anthropologists are concerned with. At the end, the similar and distinct aspects of these two concepts are discussed by which some critical considerations on Freud’s attitude toward moral institution have beed presented.

The idea of the uniformity of nature, as a solution to the problem of induction, has at least two contemporary versions: natural kinds and natural necessity. Then there are at least three alternative ontological ideas addressing the problem of induction. In this paper, I articulate how these ideas are used to justify the practice of inductive inference, and compare them, in terms of their applicability, to see whether each of them is preferred in addressing the problem of induction. Given the variety of contexts in which inductive inferences are made, from natural science to social science and to everyday thinking, I suggest that no singular idea is absolutely preferred, and a proper strategy is probably to welcome the plurality of ideas helpful to induction, and to take pragmatic considerations into account, in order to judge in every single case.

Evolutionary models for scientific change are generally based on an analogy between scientific changes and biological evolution. Some dissimilarity cases, however, challenge this analogy. An issue discussed in this essay is that despite natural evolution, which is currently considered to be non-globally progressive, science is a phenomenon that we understand as globally progressive. David Hull's solution to this disanalogy is to trace the difference back to their environments, in which processes of natural selection and conceptual selection occur. I will provide two arguments against this solution, showing that Hull's formulation of natural selection prohibits him from removing the environment from the selection process. Then I point to a related tension in his theory, between realism and externalism in science, and give some suggestions to solve these tensions.

The controversial idea of incommensurability in Kuhn’s works was gradually replaced by the translatability thesis, for which two distinct arguments could be formulated. The first is extracted from his theoretical contextual approach to meaning, and the second forms his taxonomic conception of natural kind terms. According to each one, it could be given an untranslatability condition, in terms of which we can talk about untranslatability of theories with different vocabularies. I will formulate these untranslatability conditions in this essay, confessing that accepting these conditions will terribly limit the possibility of translation. On the other hand, the maxims critics of Kuhn suggested for translation involve a potential tension and fail to play the role a reliable maxim plays in a translation. In fact, within various versions of these maxims, there is a potential tension between maximizing rationality and maximizing truth in the original text that makes us suspect to follow them systematically.