Mohammadreza Esmkhani

The objective of this paper is to critically assess Markus Seidel’s perspective on reasonable disagreement, particularly focusing on his notion of “meta-evidence.” Seidel posits two primary assertions: first, he contends that his explanation of disagreement is compatible with the uniqueness thesis (UT), in contrast to Kuhn’s interpretation, which he claims is not; second, he asserts that he has formulated an absolutist framework for explaining reasonable disagreement that excludes the influence of social factors. In response to the first assertion, we argue that Seidel’s claim is unjustified, as it relies on an unsubstantiated differentiation between weighing values (as proposed by Kuhn) and the assessment of meta-evidence (as suggested by Seidel), thus creating an unnecessary dichotomy. Discarding this distinction reveals that both Seidel’s and Kuhn’s accounts of reasonable disagreement are equally compatible with UT. Furthermore, in our critique of the absolutism claim, we address it on two levels. At a minimal level, we show that Seidel’s absolutist framework is insufficient. At a maximal level, by highlighting the constructive role of social factors, we contend that his explanation is not absolutist but rather embodies a relativist stance.

This essay scrutinizes Kitcher’s pragmatic pragmatism and the prospects for its reconciliation with the correspondence truth. After describing Kitcher’s view, it puts forward three considerations. The first section argues that there is a severe tension in Kitcher’s reconciling stance, which is related to his twofold conception of “world.” Tracing back the root of the problem to two ideas underlying his work (i.e., the map metaphor and the objectivistic-atomistic account of reference), the second section discusses two alternative ideas that seem to be more consistent with pragmatic pluralism, namely, the tool metaphor and the intersubjective-holistic account of reference. Based on these considerations, the final section reflects on the prospects of two options for the reconciliation project: either, in line with Rortyian pragmatism, to abandon representationalism and to squeeze such semantic concepts as “truth” as much as possible or, in agreement with truth pluralism, to present a pluralistic account at the level of such semantic notions as truth, which, it is claimed, seems to be a more promising and less revisionary strategy for Kitcher.

This article has three purposes. First, it illustrates the strengths of social constructivism (SC) as a major thesis and its two interrelated corollaries: the “social dependency” thesis, the “communitarian” theory of meaning, and the “contingency” view of knowledge. Second, by underscoring these strengths, it will show how one can counter the anti-social critique of the kind Boghossian espouses, highlighting some genuine disagreements that cannot be resolved by appealing to the assumptions and resources that are at the heart of the matter in the first place. To this end, the following points will be discussed: (1) Boghossian misses the mark primarily by focusing his main critique not on “social dependency” but on a conceptually different doctrine, namely “relativism” (defined as the “social relativity” thesis); (2) he criticizes SC by presupposing the very “non-social” view of meaning that SC was originally proposed to attack; and (3) the logic of SC “debunks” the very epistemic system on which Boghossian relies by claiming that it is as dependent on “(historical) contingencies” as any other. Finally, some responses are offered to “rationalist” concerns, which are mainly concerned with the application of SC’s logic to its own arguments.

This paper scrutinizes the dialogical character of knowledge from the perspectives of Hegel’s and Davidson’s philosophies. First, it outlines their analogous trains of thought, particularly their “anti-representational” and “intersubjective” accounts of knowledge. Second, it draws a parallel between the two by discussing their contrasting views of the structure and goal of knowledge, showing that while Davidson advocates an open-ended, scheme-less empirical knowledge, Hegel maintains the notion of a (universal-rational) scheme and a goal-oriented dialectical process in which “the true is the whole.” This section then critically traces their underlying disagreement to their divergent views on the nature of meaning, language, and thought. Finally, it argues that their views can be seen as complementary to two versions of dialectic, showing that while Hegel’s approach, akin to Platonic dialectic, focuses on the self-contained and “Truth”-oriented “negotiational” movement of ideas, Davidson’s, reminiscent of Socratic elenchus, emphasizes the truth-oriented ‘conversational’ interaction of subjects exchanging concepts.

This essay examines the different fates of philosophy in Bloor’s and Rorty’s post-epistemological inquiries, tracing their sharp disagreement to their distinct conceptions of ‘naturalism’ and ‘language.’ To this end, the first section outlines their main reasons for overcoming the epistemologically-centered philosophy, as well as theirreassessments of key concepts such as objectivity. The second section draws a comparison between their proposed post-epistemological inquiries, i.e., Bloor’s empirically-informed ‘sociologism’ and Rorty’s pragmatist ‘conversationalism,’ emphasizing that while the former implies the ‘end’ of philosophy in a scientific culture, the latter proposes a ‘new role’ for philosophy in a conversational culture. The third section shows how, in contrast to Bloor’s dismissive attitude toward philosophy and the potential of intervocabulary discourse, which can chiefly be attributed to his scientific naturalism and his Wittgensteinian rule-governed view of language, Rorty’s conception of philosophy as a cross-cultural, conversational practice is enabled and sustained by his non-scientific naturalism coupled with his Davidsonian communicative view of language. Finally, as opposed to Rorty’s attempt to completely dismantle the ‘epistemology industry,’ the fourth section briefly explores the extent to which Bloor’s ‘theory’-oriented viewpoint is still affected by it.