Monica Gerrek

Background The experiences of clinical ethicists have recently begun to garner some attention, but very little is known about the emotional impact of clinical ethics work on clinical ethicists. The purpose of our study was to explore the experiences of clinical ethicists in the United States in order to better understand the impact that their professional responsibilities have on them as people, as well as to learn about the ways in which organizational structures and coping mechanisms help them navigate the emotional impact of their work.Methods This was a primary analysis of 34 semi-structured interviews with clinical ethicists across the United States. The interviews were conducted from May-September 2023 and were recorded, transcribed, and de-identified. The qualitative themes explored in this paper are part of a larger study informed by principles derived from grounded theory.Results Four major themes emerged: particular features of clinical ethics work seem to significantly impact the emotional state of clinical ethicists, lack of clarity about the role of clinical ethicists appears to significantly impact their emotional experience, organizational structures appear to shape clinical ethicists’ professional and emotional experiences, and clinical ethicists employ a variety of professional and personal coping mechanisms when experiencing adverse emotions because of their professional responsibilities.Conclusion Our findings suggest that clinical ethicists are profoundly impacted by their work and that their emotional experience is shaped by a wide range of factors both at the individual and systemic level.

This paper is concerned with the bias in favor of the interests of the members of some species of non- human animals and against the interests of the members of other species of non-human animals. This view, which I call modified speciesism, is perhaps related to Singer’s speciesism, but neither entails nor is entailed by it. The argument takes the following form: given that exploited animals are morally equivalent to non-exploited animals and given that non-exploited animals are morally entitled to the way that we treat them, exploited animals are entitled to such treatment as well. I will give a descriptive account of how modified speciesism is prevalent in our world today which serves as at least a partial defense of the first premise. I will then give a Humean defense of the second premise based on the notion that it is wrong to inflict unnecessary pain and suffering on animals

The purpose of this dissertation is to present what I think is a particularly compelling normative version of sentimentalism. The moral principle which is the foundation of this ethic is: An act, or a failure to act, is morally wrong if and only if it is committed by, contributed to by, or allowed by a moral agent, and both the motive is disapproved of by the impartial spectator and any consequence is disliked by the impartial spectator. I begin this dissertation by explaining and defending the moral principle noted above. I then show how this normative sentimentalist ethic handles the issues raised by factory farming and using animals for research. Next, I present the two most well-known arguments regarding the treatment of animals, Peter Singer's preference utilitarianism and Tom Regan's rights theory, as well as key objections to these theories. I follow this by showing how the version of sentimentalism presented in this dissertation overcomes the objections to the animal ethics of Singer and Regan. To conclude, I address and respond to possible criticisms of the normative sentimentalist theory itself.