Monika Woźniak

This article examines the post-Stalinist return to Kant in state-socialist Marxism through the work of Jindřich Zelený, a central figure in Czechoslovak philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s. While Kant had often been associated with revisionist tendencies, Zelený reclaims him as both a precursor of Marx’s practical concept of knowledge and as a philosophical ally in legitimizing non-dialectical, formalizing approaches to science. The article reconstructs Zelený’s notion of onto-praxeology and his critique of both Stalinist dogmatism and Hegelian Marxism. It shows how Zelený’s interpretation of Kant serves two purposes: to secure the anti-metaphysical core of Marx’s materialism and to accommodate the epistemic demands of the scientific-technological revolution.

The paper is devoted is to the problem of philosophical method in the late writings of Nikolai Berdyaev, in which he began to criticize ontology for rationalising concrete existence. Berdyaev calls his new project “phenomenology of spiritual experience”, and his works of that period betray a growing interest in Hegelian philosophy as a first philosophy of spirit and a new, more dynamic way of philosophising. Because of it, I aim to compare both philosophical projects. In the first part of the text, I reconstruct Hegel’s description of dialectics and phenomenology; in the second, I confront them with Berdyaev’s conceptualisation of new, existential philosophy, rooted in his epistemology. As I argue, Berdyaev puts emphasis on symbolical character of philosophy, and the main features of the new philosophical method he stresses are not directly inspired by Hegel, but rather by far less known phenomenological project by Henri-Frédéric Amiel.

The text introduces a translation of Ilyenkov’s famous text “On the State of Philosophy,” which was meant as a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU and expressed his exasperation with the development of Soviet philosophy. In our introduction, we describe the historical context of the emergence of the letter, including the main changes in Soviet philosophy in the 1960s (esp. rise in popularity of cybernetics), and the institutional details of Ilyenkov’s biography. We point to the contemporary relevance of the letter by emphasizing how Ilyenkov’s dialectical account of science can enrich contemporary discussions in the sociology of science and STS.

The discussion on the principle of non-contradiction (1946–1957) between Marxist and non-Marxist philosophers was one of the major philosophical discussions in Polish philosophy of this period. In my text, I carefully reconstruct this discussion and outline its relation to Soviet debates on the subject. I show that the change in Schaff’s position happened in the early 1950s under the combined influence of the Lvov–Warsaw School and the changes in the official Soviet position regarding formal logic. I discuss the aftermath following Schaff’s change in attitude towards the analytic tradition for the development of Polish philosophy, as well as the critique of this change by Jarosław Ładosz. In my reconstruction of the latter, I focus on the problem of the historical development of science. I refer to Ilyenkov’s critique of Schaff, opposing synchronic (“positivist”) and diachronic (“dialectical”) concepts of knowledge. As I argue, these opposing concepts of science can be seen as a genuine issue at stake in the Polish discussion as well, especially in the polemic between Schaff and Ładosz.

HEGELIAN MOTIVES IN THOMAS MANN’S JOSEPH AND HIS BROTHERS The article discusses relations between Thomas Mann’s Joseph and his brothers and Hegelian conception of history and time. These two names are rather rarely linked together; in spite of Susan von Rohr Scaff’s works, the issue remains unexplored. I point out the similarities between Mann’s and Hegel’s understanding of eternity, the end of history and Absolute. Comparising their writings, I also refer to their cultural and historical background, suggesting that their common experience of modernity affects the tendency to synthesis that joins them.