Monika Zalewska

(META)ETHICS AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY In this paper I have focused on methodological problems of ethics and legal philosophy. My main goal was to determine relation between meta-ethics and legal philosophy. In the first part I tried to describe historical context, how jurisprudence become independent form ethics. Then in second part I examined relations between main disciplines of ethics and legal philosophy pointing out that although there are some similarities, there is even more differences. Finally in the third part I explored relation between meta-ethics and legal philosophy. My conclusion was that the problems of meta-ethics also exists in legal philosophy but the level of significance is lower. The reason for it lays in the specific character of legal norms which existence depends on the will of competent authority in contrast to moral norms which need other, meta-ethical justification.

When a gunman enters a bank, points a gun and issues the command give me the money, then he will probably get what he wants: if not, he will shoot. Such a situation sounds very similar to the description of law provided by John Austin, which consists of such elements as command and threat of force , both of which can be found in the armed robbery described above. However, taking such an approach makes it difficult to identify a difference between law and the coercive factors involved in the situation given above (Dworkin 1978, p. 19). It also might lead to the conclusion that it is unclear whether more sophisticated legal theories based on positivistic paradigms such a s Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of l aw are valid in this context. On the other hand, Herbert L.A Hart, successfully tries to determine how law can be distinguished from the kind of command delivered by the gunman (Hart 1961, p. 18-20). Does his solution apply to Kelsen’s pure theory of law? Or does it really fail in the example of the gunman given above?