•  10
    Reflections on Human Inquiry: Science, Philosophy, and Common Life
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1-1. forthcoming.
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  •  8
    No-Selves and Persons
    Philosophy East and West 69 (4): 1120-1125. 2019.
    Jonardon Ganeri has written an impressive book that is a must-read for anyone interested in cross-cultural philosophy. Attention, Not Self moves Buddhist philosophy further into the center of contemporary philosophical debates about self, personhood, agency, action, perception, attention, and the kinds of mental content. The book is focused on work attributed to a single philosopher, the fifth-century Theravāda monk Buddhaghosa. However, this book is much more than an exegesis of Buddhaghosa's w…Read more
  •  42
    Self-Conscious Emotions Without a Self
    Philosophers' Imprint 19. 2019.
    Recent discussions of emotions in Buddhism suggest that one of the canonical self-conscious emotions, shame, is an emotion to be endorsed and indeed cultivated. The canonical texts in the Abhidharma Buddhist tradition, endorse hiri as one of the wholesome factors “always found in all good minds” and as one of “the guardians of the world”. Shame is widely taken to be a self-conscious emotion, and so if hiri counts as shame, this seems to be in tension with the central Buddhist claim that we shoul…Read more
  •  26
    Attention, Not Self
    Philosophical Review 128 (3): 352-356. 2019.
  •  8
    How to Strawson a Buddhist-Buddhaghosa
    Journal of World Philosophies 4 (1): 173-176. 2019.
    This review details Jonardon Ganeri’s laudable attempt to move Buddhist philosophy further into the center of contemporary philosophical debates about self, personhood, agency, action, perception, attention, and kinds of mental content. This book is a must read for any contemporary philosopher interested in these debates. My only concern is that Ganeri is reading too much of P.F. Strawson into Buddhghosa’s philosophy.
  • Two Tables, Images, and Truth
    In Jay Garfield (ed.), Wilfrid Sellars and Buddhist Philosophy, Routledge. pp. 32-47. 2019.
    The relations between Sellars' two 'images' of man-in-the-world and the Ahidharma doctrine of two truths
  •  9
    No-Self and Episodic Memory
    Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4): 347-352. 2017.
  •  27
    Reconstructing memories, deconstructing the self
    Mind and Language 34 (1): 121-138. 2019.
  •  73
    Inner Awareness is Essential to Consciousness: A Buddhist-Abhidharma Perspective
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1): 83-101. 2017.
    This paper defends the realist representationalist version of the Buddhist-Abhidharma account of consciousness. The account explains the intentionality and the phenomenality of conscious experiences by appealing to the doctrine of self-awareness. Concerns raised by Buddhist Mādhyamika philosophers about the compatibility of reflexive awareness and externality of the objects of perception are addressed. Similarly, the Hindu critiques on the incoherence of the Buddhist doctrine of reflexive awaren…Read more
  •  256
  •  19
    Selfless Agents
    with Judson Brewer
    This presentation was delivered at the Self, Motivation & Virtue Project's 2015 Interdisciplinary Moral Forum, held at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
  •  78
    No-Self and the Phenomenology of Ownership
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1): 14-27. 2018.
    The Abhidharma Buddhist revisionary metaphysics aims to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world that lacks a self. The first part of the paper claims that the Abhidharma ‘no-self’ view can be plausibly interpreted as a no-ownership view, according to which there is no locus or subject of experience and thus no owner of mental or bodily awarenesses. On this interpretation of the no-self view, the Abhidharma Buddhist metaphysicians are committed to denying the ownershi…Read more
  •  68
    Time-series of ephemeral impressions: the Abhidharma-Buddhist view of conscious experience
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3): 543-560. 2015.
    In the absence of continuing selves or persons, Buddhist philosophers are under pressure to provide a systematic account of phenomenological and other features of conscious experience. Any such Buddhist account of experience, however, faces further problems because of another cardinal tenet of Buddhist revisionary metaphysics: the doctrine of impermanence, which during the Abhidharma period is transformed into the doctrine of momentariness. Setting aside the problems that plague the Buddhist Abh…Read more
  •  65
    Perceptual cognition: A nyaya-Kantian approach
    Philosophy East and West 51 (2): 197-209. 2001.
    It is commonly believed that the given consists of particulars cognized as such in perceptual experiences. Against this belief it is argued that perceptual cognition must be restricted to universal features. A Nyāya-Kantian argument is presented to reveal the incoherence in the very idea of a conception-free awareness of particulars. For the Naiyāyika philosophers and Kant, conceptualization is a necessary ingredient of perceptual experience, since perceptual cognition requires the possibility o…Read more
  •  107
    Karma and the problem of evil: A response to Kaufman
    Philosophy East and West 57 (4): 533-556. 2007.
    The doctrine of karma, as elaborated in the Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain religious traditions, offers a powerful explanatory account of the human predicament, and in particular of seemingly undeserved human suffering. Whitley R. P. Kaufman is right to point out that on some points, such as the suffering of children, the occurrence of natural disasters, and the possibility of universal salvation, the karma theory appears, initially at least, much more satisfactory than the attempts made to solve the…Read more
  •  44
    A Buddhist Explanation of Episodic Memory: From Self to Mind
    Asian Philosophy 24 (1): 14-27. 2014.
    In this paper, I argue that some of the work to be done by the concept of self is done by the concept of mind in Buddhist philosophy. For the purposes of this paper, I shall focus on an account of memory and its ownership. The task of this paper is to analyse Vasubandhu’s heroic effort to defend the no-self doctrine against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in order to bring to the fore the Buddhist model of mind. For this, I will discuss Vasubandhu’s theory of mind in the early Abhidharma as well as post-Ab…Read more
  •  160
    Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge
    European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2): 184-223. 2011.
    In this paper we (i) identify the notion of ‘essentially non-conceptual content’ by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a ‘minimalist’ solution to the prob…Read more
  •  76
    Self-awareness: Eliminating the myth of the “invisible subject”
    Philosophy East and West 61 (3): 453-467. 2011.
    In the sixth century a.d., in a debate with the Buddhists about the nature of Self, the well-known Naiyāyika Uddyotakara declared that there is no need prove that the Self or what is referred to by the pronoun “I” exists, for on that score there cannot be any significant disagreement.1 It is only this or that specific metaphysical nature of the self that is the subject of controversy. To limit the scope of the debate at issue here, we employ the same strategy. It is beyond doubt that many cognit…Read more
  •  108
    No speech, never mind!
    Philosophical Psychology 20 (5). 2007.
    In a series of classic papers, Donald Davidson put forward an ingenious argument to challenge the ascription of minds to nonlinguistic animals. Davidson's conclusions have been mercilessly demolished in the literature by cognitive ethologists, but none of them have directly addressed Davidson's argument. First, this paper is an attempt to elucidate and evaluate Davidson's central argument for denying minds to nonlinguistic animals. Davidson's central argument puts forth a challenge to those of u…Read more
  •  8
    Contents of Experience
    Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion 10 27-53. 2005.
  •  28
    The Problem of the Unity of Consciousness: A Buddhist Solution
    Philosophy East and West 65 (3): 746-764. 2015.
    In the last decade, the research into the sciences of the mind has witnessed what some aptly call a “consciousness boom”. This boom has resulted in a new willingness to include the earlier frowned-upon discussions of dimensions, traditions, and practices into these sciences. Nowadays it is commonplace to find philosophers and scientists engaging in discussions of Conscious Presence, Subjectivity, Out-of-Body Experiences, Meditation, Phenomenology, and, more recently, Asian—particularly Indian—th…Read more
  •  135
    Meditation and unity of consciousness: a perspective from Buddhist epistemology (review)
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1): 111-127. 2015.
    The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the sear…Read more
  •  63
    A Buddhist Epistemological Framework for Mindfulness Meditation
    Asian Philosophy 25 (1): 65-80. 2015.
    One of the major aims of this article is to provide the theoretical account of mindfulness provided by the systematic Abhidharma epistemology of conscious states. I do not claim to present the one true version of mindfulness, because there is not one version of it in Buddhism; in addition to the Abhidharma model, there is, for example, the nondual Mahāmudrā tradition. A better understanding of a Buddhist philosophical framework will not only help situate meditation practice in its originating tr…Read more
  •  53
    An independent, empirical route to nonconceptual content
    Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2): 439-448. 2009.
    The overall goal of this paper is to offer an independent, empirical route to characterize the content on nonconceptual content. I pursue a recent move by Pylyshyn, a leading cognitive scientist and philosopher of mental representation, who focuses on empirical considerations in favor of nonconceptual representations. Pylyshyn proposes a minimalist view of nonconceptual representations. I offer empirical reasons that force us to go beyond minimalist account and reinstate empirically defensible r…Read more
  •  25
    On Knowing Universals: The Nyāya Way
    Philosophy East and West 64 (2): 287-302. 2014.