Monique David-Menard

David-Ménard examines the problem of the genesis of Kant's moral philosophy. The separation between Kantian practical reason and the inclinations of sense which it regulates is shown by the author to originate in Kant's attempt to regulate his own tendency to hypochondria. Her argument links the themes from two of Kant's precritical works which attest to this tendency-"An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind" and Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime-to the final form of the critical philosophy

David-Ménard examines the problem of the genesis of Kant's moral philosophy. The separation between Kantian practical reason and the inclinations of sense which it regulates is shown by the author to originate in Kant's attempt to regulate his own tendency to hypochondria. Her argument links the themes from two of Kant's pre-critical works which attest to this tendency—“An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” and Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime—to the final form of the critical philosophy.

This paper considers Freud's 1920 text, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in light of Jacques Derrida's critical commentary on it in The Post Card. Against the deconstructive reading that highlights the performative aspects of Freud's speculative remarks, David-Ménard reads Freud's theory of the death drive as an epistemological and experimental hypothesis necessary for giving an account of the complexity and diversity of the clinical phenomenon of repetition in psychoanalysis. Though the death drive never appears locatable as such in the various examples given by Freud, it is nonetheless accessible in the constellation of differences produced by traumatic dreams, children's games, etc.

David-Ménard examines the problem of the genesis of Kant's moral philosophy. The separation between Kantian practical reason and the inclinations of sense which it regulates is shown by the author to originate in Kant's attempt to regulate his own tendency to hypochondria. Her argument links the themes from two of Kant's pre-critical works which attest to this tendency—“An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” and Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime—to the final form of the critical philosophy.

Under this title, I wish to clarify the philosophical perspective that has run through my work for the last fifteen years, in three volumes: L’hystérique entre Freud et Lacan, La folie dans la raison pure, and Les constructions de l’universel. In the first of these works, I reflected on the status of the body in psychoanalysis, on the distance that needed to be taken with regard to the two Western traditions of thought concerning the body, namely those of Aristotle and Descartes, in order to understand Freud’s conceptions of the erogenous body and the drive. I also raised the question of the divergence between the physiological- and the drive-constructions of the body. In my second book, I tried to understand to what degree a philosophical system, in this case Kant’s transcendental theory of the object, may be the meeting point between a new logic—a new logic of negation in Kant’s case—and a fantasized encounter with a mad thinker. I also considered the way in which a philosophical text weaves several active heterogeneous directions like the warp and the weft within thought, and how they may be spotted in the text. Finally, in Les constructions de l’universel, I considered the relevance of the concept of the universal for understanding how conceptual thought detaches itself from its author, and compared art, philosophy, and dream analysis from this point of view. I also tried to evaluate the pertinence of Lacan’s project of producing a logic of sexuation, and the degree of autonomy such a project has with respect to the internal ambiguities of the logical and philosophical concept of the universal. In these three books, I have practiced a philosophy of contingency—contingency of the relation between discourses and contingency of the real with respect to the thought which knows it. It is this philosophy of contingency that I would like to explain.

Da bi se izognili lažni dilemi utopičnega idealizma in konzervativnega empiricizma, ko gre za transformacijo realnega, pričujoči članek obravnava disjunktivno sintezo dveh ločenih, a povezanih področij delovanja in mišljenja: področje spolnega nezavednega in področje političnih sprememb. Kritični pretres tradicionalne heglovske in/ali marksovske teze, da lahko spremenimo realno zgolj, če izhajamo iz resnične in koherentne teorije, je izhodišče za analizo treh primerov naddoločenosti, ki je značilna za sodobne emancipatorne boje: »politiko ulice«, »revolucijo« in »reorganizirajočo dinamiko spolnega nezavednega«. S poudarjanjem kontingentne artikulacije emancipacije in »resnične želje« članek analizira realne, vendar nepredvidljive posledice, kot izhajajo iz kontigentnosti lastne situacijske naddoločenosti. Ker producirajo neutopični »onkraj«, so ti trije primeri naddoločenosti sodobnih bojev obravnavani kot lokalizirane antiutopije, ki predstavljajo neverjetno, a resnično »topio« za emancipacijo, namesto da bi postali normativni model.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Objects, Exchanges, DiscourseMonique David-MénardPhilosophy is a reflection for which all unknown material is good, and we would gladly say, for which all good material must be unknown.—George Canguilhem, The Normal and the PathologicalThis paper may be presented in two ways: it is a matter of understanding, locally, how legal institutions or economic discourses, which propose models of exchange between agents in society, can take into account sexuality in the way that it has been explored by psychoanalysis. It is thus a matter of following and transforming the efforts of Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents and of Lacan in his seminar, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, in order to consider how the field of unconscious sexuality manages or doesn’t manage to develop thanks to these institutions. Inversely, it is a matter of specifying how institutional creations such as the rituals of the gift, the juridical system, or economic laws put “values” into play that implicate sexual desires. But before developing this question, I will first give some clarification about the method I will employ, or rather, offer some remarks concerning the philosophical background that this apparently “local” question presupposes.Philosophical BackgroundThis project could perhaps be said to share the same philosophical approach as that of Michel Foucault: it is not a question of constructing a system in [End Page 88] the name of an idea of truth which would be the unifying foundation (in this case, sexual and political), but rather of intervening at a neurological point in “our” situation, which demands that one determine how this “our” comes into being. The point of departure for any theoretical project is always entangled in a situation that it subsequently problematizes. Instead of masking the situation that forces us to think by the means that are proper to the system’s own constitution, the strategy that I have called “local” allows for the concepts to take into account the very situation from out of which they are produced as a theoretical framework. Deleuze wrote that an event forces us to think that which, at first, can only be felt and, more precisely, felt as a fact impossible to integrate into a ready-made set of concepts. Foucault redefined critique as the diagnosis of a present: the thinker experiences a situation in a way that puts her at a distance and displaces her. This experience is transformed into an occasion to produce knowledge as well as a practice that allows it to be “thought,” not as a subjective experience, but rather as new objects for knowledge of which this experience of distance was not merely the occasion.It has already been a long time (1990) since I showed, using Kant as an example, that the invention of a philosophy is connected to an event at once present in the texts and concealed by its very systematicity; critical and transcendental philosophy was only possible by the ingenious articulation of heterogenous factors. Deleuze called this “a contingent reason” because of the heterogeneity among the concepts that construct a philosophical problematic. For example, here, the critique of the formalism of logic is the conceptual means with which Kant transformed the event, which was for him his fascination-repulsion for a “delirious” [délirant] thinker, namely, Swedenborg, into a new concept of metaphysics, the “science of the limits of human reason” and a transcendental logic of objectivity.Conceptually, the link he would forge was that of the confrontation between the mad system of Swedenborg and the philosophical idealism of Leibniz. The logical instrument of Leibnizian criticism defined a new kind of negation, the “real conflict,” which bears this name since it introduces the determination of a real object (realer Widerstreit), in contrast to three other kinds of negation: contradiction, which, in negating that which forms within thought, negates at the same time that to which it could refer (nihil negativum); “the being of reason” like the Leibnizian god or the spirits of Swedenborg, which are not contradictory concepts, but instead concepts for which one could not find any correlate in spatiotemporal experience, such that one cannot “count them among the possible things” (ens rationis). Finally, there...

Du sommaire: I -- Clinique et philosophie: Le probleme -- La polemique. II -- Eloge du masochisme, critique de la notion de plaisir. III -- Philosophie de la repetition: Les trois repetitions -- Comment une philosophie du temps revient a Masoch et a Sade -- L'inconscient et les problemes. IV -- Le corps sans organes, critique ou abandon de la psychanalyse?: Artaud et Van Gogh -- La distance prise par rapport a l'organisme -- Les devenirs et leur fin immanente. V -- Les devenirs et les syntheses disjonctives: Les syntheses disjonctives et l'invention de la vie et de la pensee -- Repeter et inventer selon Deleuze et selon Freud -- Ambiguite de la repetition en psychanalyse. VI -- Philosophie de l'infini, creer des concepts est-ce circuler a vitesse infinie sur le chaos?: L'affinite de la philosophie avec l'infini -- L'infini et la raison contingente -- Sur la lecture de Deleuze par Alain Badiou -- Une invention conceptuelle met-elle en jeu l'infini?"