Moran Godess-Riccitelli

This paper aims to explore a potential avenue for applying ‘aesthetic methodology’ through an examination of Kant’s distinction between method (modus logicus) and aesthetic manner (modus aestheticus). In the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant refers to this distinction explicitly in two contexts: regarding the creation of the genius artist and the possibility of teaching this creation. I will discuss these two contexts as two dimensions of aesthetic judgement, arguing that the genius artist’s creative process provides valuable insights into the aesthetic judgement process for the viewer. I conclude by asserting a direct link between the idea of humanity and our aesthetic commitment: the way we practise our humanity is through ‘aesthetic methodology’, as manifested in concrete judgements of beauty.

What is it that we encountered with in our aesthetic experience of natural beauty? Does nature “figuratively speaks to us in its beautiful forms”, 2 to use Kant’s phrasing in the third Critique, or is it merely our way of interpreting nature whether this be its purpose or not? Kant does not answer these questions directly. Rather, he leaves the ambiguity around them by his repeated use of terminology of ciphers when it comes to our aesthetic experience in nature. This paper examines Kant’s terminology of ciphers in the Critique of Judgment and demonstrate through it the intimate link aesthetic experience in natural beauty has with human morality. A link whose culmination point is embodied in the representation of beauty as a symbol of morality.

One of the most challenging themes in Kant’s moral theology is the necessary connection he makes between the realizability of the highest good and the moral proof for the existence of God. The vast majority of scholarly work on this link relies on Kant’s discussion of the postulates in his Critique of Practical Reason. In this paper, I argue that this line of interpretation is insufficient because it does not address the question of our moral motivation to strive to realize the highest good in nature. I propose a reexamination of this connection from the aesthetic standpoint as it is presented in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. In particular, I focus on the notion of ‘moral faith’ and ‘God’ in the aesthetic nexus. My purpose is to demonstrate the significance of our aesthetic experience in nature for the ability to present the highest good as realizable; thus, to provide moral faith a practical meaning within nature.

One main quandary that emerges in the context of Immanuel Kant’s moral ideal, The Highest Good, is that on the one hand Kant sets it as a moral demand, that is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attainable end for man in practice while, on the other hand, it is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the empirical world. The main goal of this paper is to argue for the realizability of the moral ideal by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation. I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the possibility for hope in that ideal, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only way that the moral ideal can be concretized. I examine man’s recognition of self-limitation as a response to the moral demand to realize the moral ideal and the necessity of the power of imagination for this, used reflectively. Keywords: culture, final end, Highest Good, hope, imagination, Kant, moral ideal reflective judgment, ultimate end.