Many epistemologists defend the so-called Uniqueness Thesis, according to which no body of evidence permits more than one doxastic attitude. I present two counterexamples to Uniqueness and defend them against objections. The first example involves a case where you know that what you believe determines what is the case, the second a case where you know that the credence you assign to a proposition P determines the objective chance that P. Together with a bridge principle connecting knowledge of w…
Read moreMany epistemologists defend the so-called Uniqueness Thesis, according to which no body of evidence permits more than one doxastic attitude. I present two counterexamples to Uniqueness and defend them against objections. The first example involves a case where you know that what you believe determines what is the case, the second a case where you know that the credence you assign to a proposition P determines the objective chance that P. Together with a bridge principle connecting knowledge of whether your doxastic attitudes will be correct and the permissibility of having those attitudes, these cases imply that Uniqueness is false.
