•  34
    Peptide drugs accelerate BMP‐2‐induced calvarial bone regeneration and stimulate osteoblast differentiation through mTORC1 signaling (review)
    with Yasutaka Sugamori, Setsuko Mise-Omata, Chizuko Maeda, Shigeki Aoki, Yasuhiko Tabata, Hisataka Yasuda, Nobuyuki Udagawa, Hiroshi Suzuki, Masashi Honma, and Kazuhiro Aoki
    Bioessays 38 (8): 717-725. 2016.
    Both W9 and OP3‐4 were known to bind the receptor activator of NF‐κB ligand (RANKL), inhibiting osteoclastogenesis. Recently, both peptides were shown to stimulate osteoblast differentiation; however, the mechanism underlying the activity of these peptides remains to be clarified. A primary osteoblast culture showed that rapamycin, an mTORC1 inhibitor, which was recently demonstrated to be an important serine/threonine kinase for bone formation, inhibited the peptide‐induced alkaline phosphatase…Read more
  •  24
    [full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian] Fred Dretske motivates his denial of epistemic closure by way of the thought that the warrant for the premises of a valid argument need not transfer to the argument’s conclusion. The failure-of-transfer-of-warrant strategy has also been used by advocates of epistemic closure as a foil to Michael McKinsey’s argument against the compatibility of first person authority and semantic externalism, and also to illuminate, more generally, why c…Read more
  •  24
    The Rigidity of Proper Names
    Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 33 189-200. 1991.
  •  216
    Williamson’s Argument Against the KK-Principle 157
    The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1. 2005.
    Timothy Williamson (2000 ch. 5) presents a reductio against the luminosity of knowing, against, that is, the so-called KK-principle: if one knows p, then one knows (or is at least in a position to know) that one knows p.1 I do not endorse the principle, but I do not think Williamson’s argument succeeds in refuting it. My aim here is to show that the KK-principle is not the most obvious culprit behind the contradiction Williamson derives.
  •  18
    V*—Methodological Reflections on Two Kripkean Strategies
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1): 67-82. 1995.
    Murali Ramachandran; V*—Methodological Reflections on Two Kripkean Strategies, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 6.
  •  36
    The Impossibility of Inverted Reasoners
    Acta Analytica 25 (4): 499-502. 2010.
    An ‘inverted’ reasoner is someone who finds the inferences we find easy, inversely difficult, and those that we find difficult, inversely easy. The notion was initially introduced by Christopher Cherniak in his book, Minimal Rationality, and appealed to by Stephen Stich in The Fragmentation of Reason. While a number of difficulties have been noted about what reasoning would amount to for such a reasoner, what has not been brought out in the literature is that such a reasoner is in fact logic…Read more
  •  67
    Unsuccessful Revisions of CCT
    Analysis 50 (3). 1990.
  •  145
    The KK-Principle, Margins for Error, and Safety
    Erkenntnis 76 (1): 121-136. 2012.
    This paper considers, and rejects, three strategies aimed at showing that the KK-principle fails even in most favourable circumstances (all emerging from Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits ). The case against the final strategy provides positive grounds for thinking that the principle should hold good in such situations
  •  20
    The Rigidity of Proper Names
    Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 33 189-200. 1991.
  •  54
    Sortal modal logic and counterpart theory
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4). 1998.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  559
    The Ambiguity Thesis vs. Kripke's Defence of Russell: Further Developments
    with Nadja Rosental
    Philosophical Writings 14 49-57. 2000.
    Kripke (1977) presents an argument designed to show that the considerations in Donnellan (1966) concerning attributive and referential uses of (definite) descriptions do not, by themselves, refute Russell’s (1905) unitary theory of description sentences (RTD), which takes (utterances of) them to express purely general, quantificational, propositions. Against Kripke, Marga Reimer (1998) argues that the two uses do indeed reflect a semantic ambiguity (an ambiguity at the level of literal truth con…Read more
  •  54
    The Rigidity of Proper Names
    Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 33 189-200. 1991.
  •  60
    Methodological Reflections on Two Kripkean Strategies
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95. 1995.
    Aims. Saul Kripke’s (1977) argument defending Russell’s theory of (definite) descriptions (RTD) against the possible objection that Donnellan’s (1966) distinction between attributive and referential uses of descriptions marks a semantic ambiguity has been highly influential.1 Yet, as I hope you’ll be persuaded, Kripke’s line of reasoning— in particular, the ‘thought-experiment’ it involves—has not been duly explored. In section II, I argue that while Kripke’s argument does ward off a fairly ill-…Read more
  •  45
    Sense and schmidentity
    Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157): 463-471. 1989.
  •  110
    Noordhof on probabilistic causation
    Mind 109 (434): 309-313. 2000.
    In a recent article, Paul Noordhof (1999) has put forward an intriguing account of causation intended to work under the assumption of indeterminism. I am going to present four problems for the account, three which challenge the necessity of the conditions he specifies, and one which challenges their joint-sufficiency.
  •  189
    Kripkean Counterpart Theory
    Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2): 89-106. 2008.
    David Lewis’s counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic is motivated originally by worries about identifying objects across possible worlds; the counterpart relation is grounded more cautiously on comparative similarity. The possibility of contingent identity is an unsought -- and in some eyes, unwelcome -- consequence of this approach. In this paper I motivate a Kripkean counterpart theory by way of defending the prior, pre-theoretical, coherence of contingent directness. Conti…Read more
  •  97
    On restricting rigidity
    Mind 101 (401): 141-144. 1992.
    In this note I revive a lingering (albeit dormant) account of rigid designation from the pages of Mind with the aim of laying it to rest. Why let a sleeping dog lie when you can put it down? André Gallois (1986) has proposed an account of rigid designators that allegedly squares with Saul Kripke’s (1980) characterisation of them as terms which designate the same object in all possible worlds, but on which, contra Kripke, identity sentences involving rigid designators may be merely contingently t…Read more
  •  26
    McDermott on causation: A counter-example
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2). 1996.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  81
    Restricted rigidity: The deeper problem
    Mind 102 (405): 157-158. 1993.
    André Gallois’ (1993) modified account of restrictedly rigid designators (RRDs) does indeed block the objection I made to his original account (Gallois 1986; Ramachandran 1992). But, as I shall now show, there is a deeper problem with his approach which his modification does not shake off. The problem stems from the truth of the following compatibility claim: (CC) A term’s restrictedly rigidly designating (RR-designating) an object x is compatible with it designating an object y in a world W whe…Read more
  •  65
    Knowing by way of tracking and epistemic closure
    Analysis 75 (2): 217-223. 2015.
    Tracking accounts of knowledge were originally motivated by putative counter-examples to epistemic closure. But, as is now well known, these early accounts have many highly counterintuitive consequences. In this note, I motivate a tracking-based account which respects closure but which resolves many of the familiar problems for earlier tracking account along the way.
  •  11
    How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing
    Theoria 21 (2): 185-194. 2010.
    This paper puts forward necessary and suffficient conditions for knowing, and addresses Timothy Williamson's claims that knowledge is an un-analyzable mental state, and that any such analysis is futile. It is argued that such an account has explanatory motivation: it explains when belief fails to be knowledge.
  •  150
    The leading idea of this article is that one cannot acquire knowledge of any non-epistemic fact by virtue of knowing that one that knows something. The lines of reasoning involved in the surprise exam paradox and in Williamson’s _reductio_ of the KK-principle, which demand that one can, are thereby undermined, and new type of counter-example to epistemic closure emerges.
  •  104
    How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (2): 185-194. 2006.
    This paper defends a simple, externalist account of knowledge, incorporating familiar conditions mentioned in the literature, and responds to Timothy Williamson’s charge that any such analysis is futile because knowledge is semantically un-analyzable. The response, in short, is that even though such an account may not offer a reductive analysis of knowledge-by way of more basic, non-circular concepts-it still has an explanatory advantage over Williamson’s own position: it explains how belief can…Read more
  • (1) The table is covered with books. (2) There is exactly one table and it is covered with books.
  •  75
    Descriptions with an attitude problem
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237): 721-723. 2009.
    It is well known that Russell's theory of descriptions has difficulties with descriptions occurring within desire reports. I consider a flawed argument from such a case to the conclusion that descriptions have a referring use, some responses to this argument on behalf of the Russellian, and finally rejoinders to these responses which press the point home.
  •  237
    Descriptions and pressupositions: Strawson vs. Russell
    South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3): 242-257. 2008.
    A Russellian theory of (definite) descriptions takes an utterance of the form ‘The F is G' to express a purely general proposition that affirms the existence of a (contextually) unique F: there is exactly one F [which is C] and it is G. Strawson, by contrast, takes the utterer to presuppose in some sense that there is exactly one salient F, but this is not part of what is asserted; rather, when the presupposition is not met the utterance simply fails to express a (true or false) proposition. A d…Read more
  •  156
    Contingent Identity in Counterpart Theory
    Analysis 50 (3): 163-166. 1990.
    A slight modification to the translation scheme for David Lewis's counterpart theory I put forward in 'An Alternative Translation Scheme for Counterpart Theory' (Analysis 49.3 (1989)) is proposed. The motivation for this change is that it makes for a more plausible account of contingent identity. In particular, contingent identity is accommodated without admitting the contingency of self-identity.