Muriel Leuenberger

Self-conceptions provide a framework through which we can make sense of ourselves, interpret and navigate the world, plan our lives, and relate to others. Relational influences can greatly shape them, for instance, when others react to us or offer advice. What if this ‘other’ is not a human being, but an AI? AI companions (AICs) are dialogue systems that offer highly agreeable, low-risk, and personalized ‘friendships’ or ‘romantic partnerships’ which can influence users' identities. This article identifies risks and opportunities AICs pose to users' practical interests regarding their self-conceptions. Risks arise from overly positive or missing feedback, incoherence between belief and experience, lack of relational depth and empathy, third-party dependence, and social stigma. At the same time, AICs may support identity interests by fostering self-reflection, providing affirmation and enabling safe identity exploration. Based on this analysis, the article offers design recommendations to help align AIC development with users' identity needs.

Recent advances in generative AI have made voice cloning widely accessible, raising pressing legal and ethical concerns. Besides economic harm and misuse in fraud or blackmail, the voice’s intricate connection to identity highlights a further dimension of risk, as argued in a recent article by Berkowitz and Sweeney. The following explores how different dimensions of identity intersect with the voice and how voice cloning technology can impact them. The extensive connections between voice and identity should be taken into account when legislating and regulating voice cloning.

In a recent article, Queloz (Philosophy & Technology, 38(1), 2025) proposed that AI cannot rely on the systematicity of truth in normative domains to build comprehensive models. Beyond challenging AI development, the asystematicity of truth in normative domains underscores the essential role of individual human agency in practical deliberation. When faced with difficult choices between conflicting and incommensurable values, individuals must make judgements of importance that cannot be delegated to an algorithm. This commentary expands on the fundamentally personal nature of practical deliberation to argue in favor of generalist AI moral advisors over personalized systems.

Your phone and its apps know a lot about you. Who you are talking to and spending time with, where you go, what music, games, and movies you like, how you look, which news articles you read, who you find attractive, what you buy with your credit card and how many steps you take. Personal information about individual preferences, characteristics, and actions has turned digital. Nearly everything you might want to know about a person is available or can be inferred from stored 1s and 0s. This information is already being exploited to sell us products, services, or politicians. Online traces allow companies like Google or Facebook to infer your political opinions, consumer preferences, whether you are a thrill-seeker, a pet lover, or a small employer, how probable it is that you will soon become a parent, or even whether you are likely to suffer from depression or insomnia. With the use of artificial intelligence and the further digitalization of human lives, it is no longer unthinkable that AI might come to know you better than you know yourself. Since knowing yourself and improving your life choices is advantageous in many ways, it might seem that an AI that lets you know who you are and what you should do would be great. I want to raise two reasons why it is not.

Duties to self are commonly considered as incoherent. If I owed a duty to myself, I could release myself from it at will which would be incoherent with it being a duty. Recent years have seen various attempts at defending duties to self against this argument. A common strategy entails that the self is divided. One part of the self owes a duty to another. I argue that understanding duties to self as being owed to a part of the self leads to problems because a person has interests that go beyond those of the single parts. Instead, I suggest that duties to self are owed by a local self (or rather, a local perspective) to an extended or unified self.

Authenticity has been recognized as a central concept in the ethics of human enhancement. In the last decade, a plethora of novel distinctions, specifications, and definitions of authenticity have been added to the debate. This chapter takes a step back and maps the different accounts of authenticity to provide a nuanced taxonomy of authenticity and reveal the emerging underlying structures of this concept. This chapter identifies three kinds of conditions for authentic creation and change of the true self (coherence, endorsement, and relations) as well as ways how the true self should be expressed (in one's self-conception, self-presentation, and one's body, emotions, and actions). Based on this analysis, this chapter discusses the hopes and concerns human enhancement raises for authenticity. Enhancement technologies do not threaten or foster authenticity across the board but affect different dimensions of authenticity individually. Finally, this chapter turns to the value of authenticity and argues that the debate on authenticity in the ethics of human enhancement would profit from a more extended discussion on the comparative value of the individual dimensions of authenticity.

Novel technological devices, applications, and algorithms can provide us with a vast amount of personal information about ourselves. Given that we have ethical and practical reasons to pursue self-knowledge, should we use technology to increase our self-knowledge? And which ethical issues arise from the pursuit of technologically sourced self-knowledge? In this paper, I explore these questions in relation to bioinformation technologies (health and activity trackers, DTC genetic testing, and DTC neurotechnologies) and algorithmic profiling used for recommender systems, targeted advertising, and technologically supported decision-making. First, I distinguish between impersonal, critical, and relational self-knowledge. Relational self-knowledge is a so far neglected dimension of self-knowledge which is introduced in this paper. Next, I investigate the contribution of these technologies to the three types of self-knowledge and uncover the connected ethical concerns. Technology can provide a lot of impersonal self-knowledge, but we should focus on the quality of the information which tends to be particularly insufficient for marginalized groups. In terms of critical self-knowledge, the nature of technologically sourced personal information typically impedes critical engagement. The value of relational self-knowledge speaks in favour of transparency of information technology, notably for algorithms that are involved in decision-making about individuals. Moreover, bioinformation technologies and digital profiling shape the concepts and norms that define us. We should ensure they not only serve commercial interests but our identity and self-knowledge interests.

Building on the account of a pattern-theory of self introduced by Shaun Gallagher, this article investigates the unique role of the narrative dimension of the self within the self-pattern. According to a pattern-theory, the self is constituted by a cluster of dimensions that interact with each other. A particular variation of this pattern constitutes a self. This article advances the argument that for selves who narrate, the narrative dimension of the self takes a special role that cuts across the other dimensions. First, the pattern-theory of self is introduced and a conceptual and ethical argument for employing a pattern-theory is developed. Second, the distinct role of the narrative dimension of the self is analysed. Through the narrative dimension of the self, we engage in self-definition, integrate and connect the other dimensions of the self, make them intelligible, and ascribe personal meaning to them. And third, the narrator type of self is characterized. Organizing one’s experiences through a self-narrative changes the self. Narrators constitute a unified self, they can actively plan and lead a life and engage in forensic practices, and they integrate the subjective and objective nature of the self.

Novel and emerging technologies can provide users with new kinds and unprecedented amounts of information about themselves, such as autobiographical information, neurodata, health information, or characteristics inferred from online behavior. Technology providing extensive personal information (PI technology) can impact who we take ourselves to be, how we constitute ourselves, and indeed who we are. This paper analyzes how the external, quantified perspective on us offered by PI technology affects identity based on a narrative identity theory. Disclosing the intimate relationship between PI technology and identity sheds light on a whole new range of ethical issues that have so far not received sufficient attention. Personal information provided by technology is not just information that belongs to individuals but that changes them.

Authenticity has been recognized as a central concept in the ethics of human enhancement. In the last decade, a plethora of novel distinctions, specifications, and definitions of authenticity have been added to the debate. This chapter takes a step back and maps the different accounts of authenticity to provide a nuanced taxonomy of authenticity and reveal the emerging underlying structures of this concept. I identify three kinds of conditions for authentic creation and change of the true self (coherence, endorsement, and relations) as well as ways how the true self should be expressed (in one’s self-conception, self-presentation, and one’s body, emotions, and actions). Based on this analysis, I discuss the hopes and concerns human enhancement raises for authenticity. Enhancement technologies do not threaten or foster authenticity across the board but affect different dimensions of authenticity individually. Finally, I turn to the value of authenticity and argue that the debate on authenticity in the ethics of human enhancement would profit from a more extended discussion on the comparative value of the individual dimensions of authenticity.

The potential of memory modification techniques (MMTs) has raised concerns and sparked a debate in neuroethics, particularly in the context of identity and authenticity. This paper addresses the question whether and how MMTs influence authenticity. I proceed by drawing two distinctions within the received views on authenticity. From this, I conclude that an analysis of MMTs based on a dual-basis, process view of authenticity is warranted, which implies that the influence of MMTs on authenticity crucially depends on the specifics of how memory modification would eventually work. Therefore, I continue with a systematic analysis of possible properties of MMTs in which I distinguish between the dimensions of memories and the kinds of experiences that can be modified as well as the properties of the process of memory modification. The impact of MMTs on authenticity is analyzed regarding the possible properties of MMTs and based on a narrative approach to authenticity which fulfills the requirements of a dual-basis, process view of authenticity. Lastly, I explore the potential of MMTs to shift the balance between self-discovery and self-creation within authenticity and thereby alter the concept itself as well as the value of authenticity.

The profound changes in personality, mood, and other features of the self that neural interventions can induce can be disconcerting to patients, their families, and caregivers. In the neuroethical debate, these concerns are often addressed in the context of possible threats to the narrative self. In this paper, I argue that it is necessary to consider a dimension of impacts on the narrative self which has so far been neglected: neural interventions can lead to a loss of meaning of actions, feelings, beliefs, and other intentional elements of our self-narratives. To uphold the coherence of the self-narrative, the changes induced by neural interventions need to be accounted for through explanations in intentional or biochemical terms. However, only an explanation including intentional states delivers the content to directly ascribe personal meaning, i.e., subjective value to events. Neural interventions can deprive events of meaning because they may favor a predominantly biochemical account. A loss of meaning is not inherently negative but it can be problematic, particularly if events are affected one was not prepared or willing to have stripped of meaning. The paper further examines what it is about neural interventions that impacts meaning by analyzing different methods. To which degree the pull towards a biochemical view occurs depends on the characteristics of the neural intervention. By comparing Deep Brain Stimulation, Prozac, Ritalin, psychedelics, and psychotherapy, the paper identifies some main factors: the rate of change, the transparency of the causal chain, the involvement of the patient, and the presence of an acute phenomenological experience.

This paper presents a functional genealogy of essentialist authenticity. The essentialist account maintains that authenticity is the result of discovering and realizing one’s ‘true self’. The genealogy shows that essentialist authenticity can serve the function of supporting continuity in one’s individual characteristics. A genealogy of essentialist authenticity is not only methodologically interesting as the first functional genealogy of a contingent concept. It can also deepen the functional understanding of authenticity used in neuroethics, provide a possible explanation for the prevalence of the idea of an essentialist true self and justify the use of the ideal of authenticity. First, essentialist authenticity is defined and explained through the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Second, a general need to have steady characteristics is derived from basic human practices. Third, circumstances that make it more challenging to steady oneself are identified and shown to have become more prevalent in the age of modernity when the ideal of authenticity emerged. Finally, it is shown how essentialist authenticity helps to steady the self.