Mustafa Polat

The divine command meta-ethics (hereafter, DCM) promote non-naturalist realism about the ontological status of moral properties while depending on this ontological status on a such-and-such divine being’s moral roles derived from some relevant divine characteristics. As DCM typically contends, our moral discourse depends on God’s commands and prohibitions to the effect that an action A is morally right if and only if God commands A. Robert M. Adams (1979, 1987a) offers a modification that explicates the dependency relation between a loving God’s commands and moral properties on metaphysical grounds to the effect that some action A is morally right if and only if it is not logically but metaphysically necessary for a loving God to command A. In this paper, I discuss whether Adams’ modification stands for a cogent account of DCM in a few respects. Firstly, Adams fails to provide robust reasons for grounding moral realism so that his commitment to the reality of moral properties merely expresses a theoretically unwarranted assumption hinging on a presumptive case in our moral discourse. Particularly, his assumption on the pervasiveness of strongly held moral beliefs is unwarranted and it inherits a vague notion of certainty. Secondly, Adams' response to the Euthyphro dilemma does not satisfactorily sort out the concerns accompanying this dilemma, mainly because his response relies on a vague notion of divine love that allegedly necessitates God commanding morally permissible acts while this notion cannot be trivially reducible into a moral aspect.

Robert M. Adams (1979, 1987a, 1987b) defends a modified variant of the divine command theory (hereafter MDCT) to the effect that he proposes a moral argument for God’s existence driven in the form of practical reasoning with respect to rational moral agents’ beliefs in the adequacy of MDCT. For Adams, one’s commitment to MDCT as the most adequate theory legitimately provides her a practical reason for why she ought to believe in God’s existence which MDCT implies. In this paper, I criticize the viability of Adams’ moral argument considering its argumentative structure and strategy. Adams’ strategy behind his moral argument, i.e. mediating theistic beliefs with deontic ones, seeks out a non-decisive medium that might be used to ubiquitously generate equally plausible arguments for/against God’s existence based on distinct sorts of allegedly adequate theories of some subject matter. Thus, his argument does not seem to distinctively ground God’s existence in comparison with a myriad of practical arguments which might follow the same argumentative strategy on the same practical grounds. More significantly, there seems to be coherent no way for Adams to disambiguate his argument on theoretical grounds.