This study examines, from a philosophical perspective, why the concept of life has become the subject of a persistent definitional crisis in contemporary biology and philosophy of biology. The central claim of the article is that attempts to define life are not merely descriptive or technical efforts; rather, they are products of regimes of knowledge grounded in specific ontological, epistemic, and methodological assumptions. In this sense, definitions of life are approached not as neutral scien…
Read moreThis study examines, from a philosophical perspective, why the concept of life has become the subject of a persistent definitional crisis in contemporary biology and philosophy of biology. The central claim of the article is that attempts to define life are not merely descriptive or technical efforts; rather, they are products of regimes of knowledge grounded in specific ontological, epistemic, and methodological assumptions. In this sense, definitions of life are approached not as neutral scientific statements, but as boundary-setting interventions that determine which phenomena are included within the scope of “life” and which are excluded. Focusing primarily on definitions of life and explicitly anti-definitional positions published since 2011, the study offers a systematic examination of conceptual pluralism in the recent literature. Beginning with Edward Trifonov’s lexical meta-definition, the analysis encompasses informational, systemic, process-oriented, phenomenological, teleological, and meaning-centered approaches, as well as views that argue for the indefinability of life. The aim is not to assess the truth or falsity of particular definitions, but to render visible the scientific contexts in which they are produced, the epistemic needs they address, and the metaphysical assumptions they presuppose. The article argues that the incompatibilities among definitions of life should not be regarded as a sign of theoretical failure, but as a necessary consequence of the multi-layered, context-dependent, and irreducible nature of life as a phenomenon. Accordingly, instead of reducing life to a single definition, the study critically interrogates the practice of definition itself. In conclusion, it suggests that in philosophy of biology, approaches centered on the search for definitive definitions are increasingly giving way to perspectives that are pluralistic, process-oriented, and explicitly attentive to epistemic limits.