This chapter discusses Kit Fine’s Relationist solution to Frege’s puzzle concerning reference. Fine’s key insight is that versions of the puzzle that do not seem to involve coreference implicitly appeal to that notion, and hence can be handled making use of Relationist techniques. Although I endorse Relationism, I disagree with Fine’s proposed solution. Fine thinks that two types of semantic relations are needed to solve the puzzle: intra- and inter-discourse relations. The chapter argues that (…
Read moreThis chapter discusses Kit Fine’s Relationist solution to Frege’s puzzle concerning reference. Fine’s key insight is that versions of the puzzle that do not seem to involve coreference implicitly appeal to that notion, and hence can be handled making use of Relationist techniques. Although I endorse Relationism, I disagree with Fine’s proposed solution. Fine thinks that two types of semantic relations are needed to solve the puzzle: intra- and inter-discourse relations. The chapter argues that (a) appealing to inter-discourse relations in the way Fine proposes leads to severe and perhaps insoluble problems; and (b) contrary to what Fine holds, it is plausible that appealing to intra-discourse semantic relations is enough to make headway into Frege’s puzzle. In addition, the chapter discusses and responds to a criticism of Relationism raised by Scott Soames.
