Nalini Elisa Ramlakhan

This paper explores the relationship between the ontology of self and normative ethical theorizing in Sartrean Existentialism and in Mahāyāna Buddhism. We begin by pointing out several important similarities between, on the one hand, Jean-Paul Sartre’s thesis of the impersonality of consciousness as developed in The Transcendence of the Ego and Being and Nothingness, and on the other, the central Buddhist doctrine of anātman, or no-self, as interpreted by Mahāyāna authors like Śāntideva and Candrakīrti. We then try to draw out the ethical implications of both ontological frameworks. Our thesis is that, in both Sartrean Existentialism and Mahāyāna Buddhism, the doctrine of the non-existence of the self leads to a principle of equal consideration of interests that, while not strictly speaking entailing consequentialism, nonetheless presents enough similarities with consequentialist theories for the comparison to be instructive.

This volume of essays offers direct comparisons of historic Western and Buddhist perspectives on ethics and metaphysics, tracing parallels and contrasts all the way from Plato to the Stoics, Spinoza to Hume, and Schopenhauer through to contemporary ethicists such as Arne Naess, Charles Taylor and Derek Parfit. It compares and contrasts each Western philosopher with a particular strand in the Buddhist tradition, in some chapters represented by individual writers such as Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Santideva or Tsong Khapa. It does so in light of both analytic concerns and themes from the existentialist and phenomenological traditions, and often in an ecumenical spirit that bridges both analytic and continentalist approaches. Some of the deepest questions in ethics, dealing with the scope of agency, value-laden notions of personhood and the nature of value in general, are intertwined with questions in metaphysics. One set of questions addresses how varying conceptions of selfhood relate to moral values ; another set of questions addresses how a conception of oneself or one’s selves should or should not affect how one thinks of happiness, or eudaimonia, or – in classical Indian terms – artha, sukha or nirvana. Western philosophy has featured discussion of both, but some would argue that certain traditions of Asian philosophy have offered a more sustained and even treatment of both sets of questions. The Buddhist tradition in particular has not only featured much discussion on both fronts, but has attracted many contemporary philosophers to its distinctive spectrum of approaches, and to what is – from many ‘Western’ points of view – a seemingly subversive analysis of ego, selfhood and personhood, whether in metaphysical, phenomenological or other incarnations.

Surprising parallels can be found between the philosophical psychologies of William James, Bertrand Russell and Early Buddhist thought. James, a philosopher and psychologist who was influential in the early twentieth century, puts forth a view of selfhood that resembles the Buddhist doctrine of no-self (anattā). I suggest that James holds a reductionist view of the self that is very similar to the Early Buddhist conception of selfhood. The idea of relinquishing the notion of selfhood is then discussed in relation to philosophy of religion as well as ethics. I show how a no-self perspective, whether that of James or that of Buddhists, tends to support a form of impartial consequentialism in ethics. In fact, the endorsement of impartial consequentialism is evident in James’s own discussions of moral philosophy. Parallels can also be drawn with some of James’s ideas in The Varieties of Religious Experience, where various Asian notions of self-transcendence are treated sympathetically. The chapter ends with a consideration of various points of contact between James, Russell, and Buddhism. Russell, a friend and interlocutor of James, was impressed by aspects of Buddhism from an early age, and I discuss and examine the parallels between his early ideas and those of Buddhist philosophy. James’s exposure to Buddhist ideas may likewise have played an important role in his development. Though Russell and James did not agree on much else, they were both drawn to one or another version of the no-self claim and also both drawn to consequentialism. In the history of twentieth-century metaphysics and ethics – and especially the areas where they overlap – we thus find a hitherto unexplored triangular relationship between these two major figures of Western philosophy and a system of Buddhist ideas that was just beginning to make an impact in their milieu.