Nancy Frankenberry

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Religion within the Limits of History Alone: Pragmatic Historicism and the Future of Theology by Demian WheelerNancy FrankenberryReligion within the Limits of History Alone: Pragmatic Historicism and the Future of Theology. Demian Wheeler. Albany: SUNY Press, 2020. ix+511pp. $95.00 hardcover.The history of Christian theology since the Enlightenment has been a series of unsuccessful attempts to evade a stark dilemma: either fundamentalism or atheism. Contemporary liberal theologians have argued that this dilemma is [End Page 97] entirely too stark, too eliminative of the creative possibilities of revisionism. Liberal theology has wanted to revise and reinterpret Christian faith in conformity with history, reason, a scientific worldview, and a sophisticated grasp of the significance of symbol, analogy, and metaphor in the lives of religious practitioners. Eliminating both supernaturalism and anthropomorphism, liberal theology would make Christianity more intellectually tenable, rescuing it from the literalist hands of fundamentalists, without collapsing it into the equally literalist arms of atheism.The extreme difficulty of evading the either-or dilemma of choosing either fundamentalism or atheism landed liberal theology in a catch-22: either it rejected the intellectually untenable elements of belief, in which case it eliminated just those beliefs that constituted its appeal to popular piety, or it retained certain supernaturalistic and anthropomorphic beliefs, understood as “symbolic,” in which case it forfeited intellectual intelligibility and any appeal to sophisticated moderns. The first version is far too weakened for ordinary American Christians, and the second is still too religious for the masters of suspicion and their followers.It is for this reason that the history of American religious thought reveals a grave irony that complicates the hopes of pragmatic historicists, the protagonists of this superbly clear and rich, deep dive into authors that most readers of this journal will have read, but perhaps not have synthesized as thoroughly as has Demian Wheeler. That irony, as Wheeler knows, is that the more intellectual changes pragmatic historicists make to traditional Christian belief, the more they help to make unbelief viable. The question then arises as to whether pragmatic historicism is simply a half-way house on the road to an atheistic destination. Or, if the word “atheism” sounds too old-fashioned, like something that went out with steamships and girdles, then “agnosticism.” Or, if “agnosticism” still smacks too much of stale debates, why not “pantheism,” as recently revived by Mary-Jane Rubenstein?The detailed development, the verbal bravura, and the measured knowledge in this book are astonishingly impressive. Wheeler’s initial thesis is that liberal theology, particularly of the early Chicago School, and American pragmatism, particularly C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, provide important resources for meeting the challenges posed by the rise of historical consciousness. Sheila Davaney has designated this tradition “pragmatic historicism,” and Wheeler aims to show its compelling import for the future of theology itself. A good deal of the book is devoted to exposition and defense of the views of: Ernst Troeltsch, James, Dewey, George Burman Foster, Shirley Jackson Case, Shailer Matthews, and Gerald Birney Smith, down to Delwin Brown, Sheila Davaney, and William Dean (Wheeler’s teachers at Iliff), along with Gordon [End Page 98] Kaufman and Sallie McFague. In the last chapter, Wheeler draws expertly on the theological views of Bernard Loomer, Michael Hogue, Donald Crosby, and Wesley Wildman. Such an all-star cast deserves to receive all the attention they can get. Wheeler’s occasional emendations come as glittering nuggets of constructive engagement. He does not simply call for a pragmatic historicist approach to theology, but he executes one as well, showing in more detail than his predecessors what it means for such topics as religious diversity (chapters 3 and 4), the nature of authority (chapter 5), the meaning of critical realism, fallibilism, and an altered correspondence theory of truth (chapters 6 and 7), and the doctrine of God (chapter 8). With the same exhaustive treatment that his doktorvater Gary Dorrien has devoted to liberal theology’s history and contemporary expressions, Wheeler carefully saves pragmatic historicism from relativism, expertly critiques all the leading theologians of the “inclusivist,” “exclusivist,” and “pluralist” theologies of religions, while arguing the superiority of his own “particularist” corrective to pluralistic...

One could not ask for two more rigorous readers than Robert Neville and Terry Godlove, both brilliant scholars in their own right. I am very honored by the attention they have given to my work, and challenged by their various proposals to relieve me of my errors. My reply to their searching questions will consider seven topics, which I will take up in the form of further questions. Each topic has proven to be fairly enduring in the modern philosophy of religion. In conclusion, I will briefly consider the topic of the future of philosophy of religion. Neville thinks contingency does not go all the way down like the tortoises in the fable about what holds the world up. (There’s another version that uses..

One of the enduring questions in the study of religion is how to define the object of our study. I would like to offer a definition, as an opening move in any discussion of religion, not because I think definitions settle anything by themselves, but because very different definitions of religion are at stake in contemporary debates in the academy, particularly in the hyphenated areas such as science and religion, or religion and politics, or religion and gender studies, and I think it is important to see how they are related. I will begin, then, with the definitional problem, which I will take as twofold and as susceptible to analysis along the lines of what we know from semantic holism. I will then turn to the ..

Robert Cummings Neville1 first came to my attention when I was a senior in college. "Ah, but I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now," as Bob Dylan crooned at the time. Serious and studious, I was reading scholarly journals in the stacks one Saturday night. Among them was the journal Theological Studies, and in the March 1969 issue was the most effusive book review I had ever read. It was of Neville's very first book, God the Creator: On the Transcendence and Presence of God. The Dominican reviewer was suitably impressed by the "brilliant" argument, but more than that, he was astonished to think that "Neville, at the time of publication, was twenty-eight."2 Curious about a brilliant author who was still...

This landmark interdisciplinary volume presents methodological options for the study of religion in the twenty-first century. Ten distinguished scholars offer radical interpretations of religious belief and language from a variety of perspectives: anthropology of religion, ritual studies, cognitive psychology, semantics, post-analytic philosophy, history of religions, and philosophy of religion. For the first time, a collection of original essays explores the significance of Donald Davidson's 'radical interpretation', Robert Brandom's 'inferentialism', and Richard Rorty's pragmatism for issues in the study of religion. Related topics include cultural variations in belief from Madagascar to China, experimental research from cognitive science, and the semantics of myth, metaphor, mana and manna. Radical Interpretation in Religion will be of interest to both general readers and specialists seeking a deeper understanding of new directions in the study of religion.

The philosophical question Nunez raises is whether we can have, as he thinks we need, a theoretical grounding for appeal to the intrinsic value of nature. This article examines the neopragmatist reasons for repudiating metaphysical realism's notions of intrinsicality and subject-independent reality. Following the holism of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty rather than the epistemological premises of Holmes Rolston and Bernard Lonergan, the author concludes that coping with the ecological crisis does not require conjuring an epistemic crisis. Environmental ethics in neopragmatist hands would seek procedures for bringing about agreement in improving our practices, not our epistemology