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27Mind Your Own Business: Reflective Aretaic ResponsibilityEthical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3): 699-715. 2021.The distinctive depth and seriousness of moral responsibility is often thought to stem from the seriousness of violating moral obligations. But this raises questions about being morally responsible for normative failure that does not belong to the deontic realm. This paper focuses on actions that we might, in the Aristotelian tradition, call ethical, and which concern how we order relations with ourselves; they concern certain fundamental conditions for agency. The paper provides a novel defense…Read more
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21Kevin DeLapp, Partial Values: A Comparative Study in the Limits of ObjectivityEthics 129 (3): 469-474. 2019.
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10Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal‐ by Sean Mckeever and michael ridge (review)Philosophical Books 49 (2): 181-182. 2008.
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7Perception, Particularity and Principles: The Moral Vision of Iris MurdochCogito 13 (2): 121-126. 1999.
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22Murdoch's morality: Vision, will, and rules (review)Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (4): 477-491. 2001.
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19Review of John Deigh, An Introduction to Ethics (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (10). 2010.
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82How Bad Can Good People Be?Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4): 731-745. 2014.Can a virtuous person act contrary to the virtue she possesses? Can virtues have “holes”—or blindspots—and nonetheless count as virtues? Gopal Sreenivasan defends a notion of a blindspot that is, in my view, an unstable moral category. I will argue that no trait possessing such a “hole” can qualify as a virtue. My strategy for showing this appeals to the importance of motivation to virtue, a feature of virtue to which Sreenivasan does not adequately attend. Sreenivasan’s account allows performan…Read more
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34Hume on Moral Motivation: It's Almost like Being in LoveHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 16 (3). 1999.
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68Principled ethics: Generalism as a regulative ideal - by Sean McKeever and Michael RidgePhilosophical Books 49 (2): 181-182. 2008.
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90Complexities of Character: Hume on Love and ResponsibilityHume Studies 35 (1-2): 29-55. 2009.Hume claims that moral assessments refer to character; it is character of which we morally approve and disapprove. This essay explores what Hume means by “character.” Is it true that moral assessments refer to character, and should Hume think this given his other commitments in moral philosophy and moral psychology? I discuss two prominent themes—namely, Hume’s views on moral responsibility; and Hume’s comparison of moral feelings with feelings of love—to see what light these themes can shed on …Read more
Richmond, Virginia, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |