•  33
    New Essays in Socratic Studies (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 19 (2): 407-411. 1999.
  •  7
    Opining beauty itself: the ordinary person and Plato's forms
    State University of New York Press. 2022.
  •  12
    At Tm. 47e, Timaeus steps back from his discussion of what came about through noûs and turns toward an account of what came about through anankê. Broadie, 2012, Nature and Divinity in Plato’s Timaeus, sketches out two routes for the interpretation of this ‘new beginning.’ The ‘metaphysical’ approach uses perceptibles qua imitations of intelligibles in order to glimpse the intelligibles (just as we look at our reflection in a mirror in order to view ourselves). The ‘cosmological’ reading assumes …Read more
  •  26
    Opining Beauty Itself in Republic V
    International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 14 (1): 5-22. 2020.
    In consoling the lover of sights and sounds at Republic 475e4-479d5, Socrates describes a tripartite distinction among knowledge, doxa, and ignorance. Socrates claims that knowledge is ‘over’ what-is, doxa is over what is and is-not, and ignorance is over nothing at all. I argue that Plato shows that doxa and ignorance are also related to what-is. While knowledge, doxa, and ignorance interact with different first-degree objects, these three capacities have a common second-degree object: what-is.…Read more
  • I compare two theories of motivation: The Socratic Theory of Motivation and Fred Dretske's attempt to vindicate the use of desires in folk-psychological explanations. I find that, although Socrates ' theory is, at first glance, counterintuitive, while Dretske's provides persuasive analyses of beliefs and desires, there is a way of developing Dretske's theory which produces a theory that is parallel to the Socratic Theory of Motivation. In fact, if we substitute "all desire is for homeostasis" fo…Read more
  •  1
    Socratic eudaimonism
    In John Bussanich & Nicholas D. Smith (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates, Continuum. 2013.
  • Gregory Vlastos, ed., Myles Burnyeat, Socratic Studies (review)
    Philosophy in Review 16 24-27. 1996.
  •  3
  •  24
    Plato on the Ordinary Person and the Forms
    Apeiron 47 (2): 266-292. 2014.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Apeiron Jahrgang: 47 Heft: 2 Seiten: 266-292
  •  28
    Many philosophers assert that psychological verbs generate opaque contexts and that the object of a psychological verb cannot be replaced with a co‐referring expression salva veritate as the objects of non‐psychological verbs can be. I argue that the logical and linguistic concerns which govern this assertion do not transfer to observational and experimental situations because the criteria that we use in order to verify that an observed subject has one hypothesized desire rather than another pro…Read more
  •  14
    Socratic Eudaimonism and Natural Value
    Journal of Ancient Philosophy 6 (1). 2012.
  •  53
    Heracleitean Flux in Plato's "Theaetetus"
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 11 (2). 1994.
  • Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, The Foundations of Socratic Ethics (review)
    Philosophy in Review 16 24-27. 1996.
  •  28
    The Third Way (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 17 (2): 442-447. 1997.
  • Desire, Identity and Existence (edited book)
    Academic Printing and Publishing. 2003.
  •  33
    Socrates was not a moral philosopher. Instead he was a theorist who showed how human desire and human knowledge complement one another in the pursuit of human happiness. His theory allowed him to demonstrate that actions and objects have no value other than that which they derive from their employment by individuals who, inevitably, desire their own happiness and have the knowledge to use actions and objects as a means for its attainment. The result is a naturalised, practical, and demystified a…Read more
  •  12
    Plato’s Anti-Hedonism and the Protagoras by J. Clerk Shaw
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 54 (2): 334-335. 2016.
    Shaw introduces an important and compelling line of argumentation concerning the relationship between pleasure and the good into the literature on Plato’s dialogues with ramifications beyond any commitment that Plato has Socrates make to hedonism at Protagoras 351b–357e. To appreciate Shaw’s argument, the term ‘hedonism’ must be understood to indicate that the good is identical to bodily pleasure—not to both sensate and modal pleasure understood as a dichotomy, and not to all pleasures of the so…Read more
  •  19
  •  2
    The Third Way (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 17 (2): 442-447. 1997.
  •  1