Narges Fathalian

"Darwinian Theology and Evolution" is a collection of essays examining the relationship between Darwinian evolutionary theory and religious belief, particularly theism and atheism. Bringing together contributions by several prominent thinkers, the volume explores whether biological evolution is compatible with belief in God and divine providence, and considers the philosophical and theological implications of natural selection. Its discussions address topics such as intelligent design, irreducible complexity, teleological arguments, methodological and metaphysical naturalism, and the roles of chance and necessity in evolutionary processes. By presenting different perspectives and arguments, the collection provides a forum for critical engagement with the relationship between evolutionary biology, philosophy, and theology.

This article examines the relationship between the mind and the brain, with particular emphasis on the nature of consciousness and the limitations of materialist and reductionist accounts of mental phenomena. In this translated essay, John Hick critically discusses the views of philosophers and neuroscientists who defend the materiality of mind or the identity of mind and brain. Drawing on arguments and observations by figures such as Paul Churchland, Susan Greenfield, Benjamin Libet, V. S. Ramachandran, Roger Penrose, Steven Rose, and Antonio Damasio, the text highlights the persistent explanatory gap between physical and mental phenomena. It questions whether neural activity and its associated biological processes can fully account for subjective consciousness, emphasizing that correlations between brain activity and conscious experience do not necessarily establish their identity. The discussion also considers the possibility of a new physical framework involving quantum phenomena, while maintaining a skeptical attitude toward speculative explanations. Ultimately, it challenges the claim that the mind-brain identity thesis is an established scientific fact.

The term "multiverse" was first introduced in a scientific paper in 1998. Since then, multiverse theories—which posit the existence of a vast number of other universes that we have no causal contact with and never will—have become a widespread subject of debate among physicists and cosmologists. In physics, these theories generally originate from string theory (in particle physics), chaotic inflation, Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics, and quantum gravity (the Wheeler-DeWitt equation). This paper aims to introduce these multiverse theories and review Max Tegmark's classification of universes (Levels I to IV). Furthermore, it investigates and categorizes the multiverses generated by each of the aforementioned physical theories within the framework of Tegmark's classification system.

This article provides a critical review of the book Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics by Dr. Alireza Mansouri. The book is recognized as one of the few and most comprehensive Persian-language works addressing the philosophical debates surrounding quantum mechanics, particularly the measurement problem. The review outlines the book's structure, which begins by exploring the historical and philosophical relationship between physics and philosophy. It highlights how philosophical thought has historically driven the formation of quantum theory and discusses the necessity of philosophical frameworks in determining the ontology of scientific theories. The book then moves to the EPR paradox, non-locality, and the differing interpretations of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. The core of the book (Chapters 3 to 10) is dedicated to the measurement problem. The review discusses the various models and interpretations proposed to resolve this issue, including: • The Standard/Copenhagen interpretation and the macroscopic/microscopic divide. • Schrödinger's cat thought experiment. • Dynamic reduction models (such as the GRW theory). • The decoherence program (interaction with the environment). • Everett’s relative state (Many-Worlds) interpretation. • Bohmian mechanics (hidden variables theory). The article explains how these approaches differ based on whether one considers quantum mechanics to be a complete or incomplete theory. Ultimately, the review concludes that the book is a valuable and accessible introduction to foundational issues in quantum mechanics, such as non-locality and measurement. It is recommended as a solid starting point for Persian-speaking students and researchers, with the hope that it encourages further studies in related areas like quantum decoherence, the arrow of time, and quantum gravity.

The book Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time is the first volume of a two-volume series on the philosophy of physics, with the second volume forthcoming. This volume examines the structure of space and time in physical theories, including Newton's theory and the special and general theories of relativity. In this work, Maudlin endeavors to provide a clear ontological understanding of the structure of space and time in various theories. The author's goal is to draw the reader's attention to the dependence of the application of coordinate systems on the underlying ontological structure, and to explain the conceptual foundations of the aforementioned theories on this basis. The book's intended audience includes students and enthusiasts of the philosophy of physics, as well as physics students and graduates who wish to go beyond the formalism of physical laws. Maudlin is a professor of philosophy at New York University, and his book has been designated as a course reference for the philosophy of physics at various universities, such as UC Berkeley and Stanford. In this piece, along with an introduction and a review of the book's structure and various chapters, we attempt to explain the significance of this work. The Persian translation of the work is also quite fluent and largely flawless.

Multiverse theories have been controversial in contemporary physics. According to these theories, a vast number of other universes exist with which we have no contact and never will have. However, the idea of the plurality of worlds, which is philosophical in nature, is not exclusive to contemporary physics but has a long historical background. It is often claimed that contemporary multiverse theories are scientific and therefore fundamentally different from their predecessors. Through a historical examination of these theories, we show that at every historical period, certain fundamental elements derived from the accepted physical principles of that period's conceptual framework have shaped the idea of the plurality of worlds. In this respect, contemporary multiverse theories share important similarities with earlier conceptions. The particular form of the plurality of worlds depends on the conceptual horizon of the theorists. The aim of this study is to examine contemporary multiverse theories within their historical context and to demonstrate the epistemological dimensions of these theories and their dependence on the conceptual horizons and perspectives of their proponents.

Based on everyday experience and conventional understanding, there seems to be a difference between the past and the future, which we call the "arrow of time." There are different explanations for the time arrow, one of them is the thermodynamic arrow. However, the fundamental laws of physics, in particular Newton's laws and statistical mechanics, which we expect to explain the phenomenological laws of thermodynamics, do not show the asymmetry. Boltzmann tried to explain the thermodynamic asymmetry by proposing a "past hypothesis" for the early universe. According to this hypothesis, the early universe was in very special initial conditions. But this proposal encountered with many criticisms. While presenting the philosophical dimensions of the "arrow of time" problem and the critiques of the "past hypothesis", we argue that the assumption of a fundamental "time arrow" assumes that the past hypothesis alone is not sufficient to explain it. And there is a need for a more fundamental explanation that may change our view of space-time structure.

The problem of time's arrow has sparked two distinct metaphysical approaches, each stemming from opposing Humean and non-Humean perspectives on laws of nature. This paper contends that these approaches, despite their differences and inherent challenges, ultimately converge on a common goal: to explain time's arrow, we must comprehend the structure of spacetime during the universe's early stages. The problem of time's arrow has sparked two distinct metaphysical approaches, each stemming from opposing Humean and non-Humean perspectives on laws of nature. This paper contends that these approaches, despite their differences and inherent challenges, ultimately converge on a common goal: to explain time's arrow, we must comprehend the structure of spacetime during the universe's early stages.