Nassim Noroozi

Fallacies are often treated either as simple logical errors or as tactical tools to win debates and legitimize indefensible political positions. Curiously, despite their real-world impact, they are usuallytaught in an apolitical, stylized light. Historically, however, the study of fallacies has been driven by a pursuit of justice. It stems from concerns over paid deceptive narratives used to maintain power,foreign interference in political sovereignty, and unethical reasoning that causes human suffering. Our exchange unpacks myths in this exact spirit: to disrupt the moral guise of a logic that sustains ongoing colonialism in the Palestinian territories. Approaching Ilan Pappe’s Ten Myths about Israel as an effort to debunk the sophistical premises of Israel’s settler-colonial project, this discussion extracts nine key themes from Pappe’s critique of Zionist discourse. Finally, it expands upon a phenomenon termed "live colonialism."

In this commentary, I will examine temporal arbitrarity as a manifestation of whiteness in our theorizing of the world and its relation to the notion of justice in academia. I define temporal arbitrarity as a willful identification of two pasts for others and a discretionary accounting of one of them as tangential and the other as central. In academia, this selection is done by a person/group with the authority or wherewithal to determine others' pasts as tangential or cardinal. As a result, this arbitrary selection of different pasts determines these others' presents. Temporal arbitrarity as whiteness is not an anthropological observation. It is rather a concern and an inquiry about (1) whether its presence in our everyday theorizing has a substantial role in maintaining the systemicity of injustice, (2) whether we are responsible to tackle this arbitrariness when thinking about manifold aspects of struggle, and (3) whether lack of vigilance about it can entail far-reaching consequences. I explore the implications of attending to temporal arbitrarity for academia through a series of examples.

Nassim Noroozi proposes a juxtaposition of pedagogy with and a characterization of it as justice. The term pedagogical here is not limited to “the educational,” nor is pedagogy limited to the methods of teaching. At the same time, the term justice will not be framed in terms of liberal conceptual grounds. Noroozi defines pedagogy as an arrangement of meaning so that it becomes impossible not to see injustice. Noroozi argues that “pedagogy-as-justice” concerns itself with exposing injustice in transformative ways, and as such it is an ethical undertaking. She explores how philosophizing for struggle is inherently pedagogical and, because of our perception of “the pedagogical,” how it is inherently transformative. Furthermore, she argues that seeing pedagogy as justice will consequentially deem “the arrangements of meanings to engage others in the issues pertaining to injustice” as equally important to writing or thinking about those struggles. To illustrate the above points, Noroozi analyzes a case of public philosophical engagement against war. By expanding on this case, she proposes some central attributes of pedagogy-as-justice, namely its preoccupation with grounding abstract and anonymous concepts in their contested historical realities; its commitment to wrestling with an “opacity of concepts” or with “dishonest reasonings” that end up promoting suffering and injustice; and its recognition of the precarities inherent in undertaking pedagogy-as-justice. Noroozi traces a genealogy of the concept of pedagogy-as-justice going back to Socratic public philosophical engagements.

Nassim Noroozi proposes a juxtaposition of pedagogy with and a characterization of it as justice. The term pedagogical here is not limited to “the educational,” nor is pedagogy limited to the methods of teaching. At the same time, the term justice will not be framed in terms of liberal conceptual grounds. Noroozi defines pedagogy as an arrangement of meaning so that it becomes impossible not to see injustice. Noroozi argues that “pedagogy-as-justice” concerns itself with exposing injustice in transformative ways, and as such it is an ethical undertaking. She explores how philosophizing for struggle is inherently pedagogical and, because of our perception of “the pedagogical,” how it is inherently transformative. Furthermore, she argues that seeing pedagogy as justice will consequentially deem “the arrangements of meanings to engage others in the issues pertaining to injustice” as equally important to writing or thinking about those struggles. To illustrate the above points, Noroozi analyzes a case of public philosophical engagement against war. By expanding on this case, she proposes some central attributes of pedagogy-as-justice, namely its preoccupation with grounding abstract and anonymous concepts in their contested historical realities; its commitment to wrestling with an “opacity of concepts” or with “dishonest reasonings” that end up promoting suffering and injustice; and its recognition of the precarities inherent in undertaking pedagogy-as-justice. Noroozi traces a genealogy of the concept of pedagogy-as-justice going back to Socratic public philosophical engagements.