Nastasia Mueller

ABSTRACT: What distinguishes virtue reliabilism from virtue responsibilism is that the latter requires that epistemic virtues involve epistemically virtuous motivation, whereas the former denies that motivation is needed for virtue. But although epistemically virtuous motivation is what distinguishes virtue responsibilism not only from virtue reliabilism but also from other types of virtue, such as aesthetic, athletic, and moral virtue, it is far from clear how this motivation is to be understood. One of the most promising accounts of epistemically virtuous motivation is put forward by Linda Zagzebski (1996). She states that two motivational components are involved: the motivation for truth and the motivation to act in accordance with the epistemic end of the virtue in question. This paper aims, first, to clarify the relationship between the two motivational components. I argue that the two motivational components are distinct and can come apart. The motivation for truth should be understood as the fundamental motivation and the motivation to act in accordance with the epistemic end of the virtue in question should be understood as a distinct, proximate motivation. Second, the paper seeks to refine the notion of epistemically virtuous motivation in such a way that it is not only viable and resilient to objections raised against it, but also psychologically plausible. Akin to John Greco (2006), I argue that the motivation for truth should be understood as our default state of trying to believe what is true and that one can, but need not, be consciously aware of either the motivation for truth or the motivation to act in accordance with the epistemic end of the virtue in question.

The question of whether it is a necessary feature of intellectual virtues that they lead to a higher ratio of true to false beliefs has been a continuous controversy. The aim of this paper is to clarify what the instrumental value of intellectual responsibilist virtues amounts to. By spelling out what makes virtues epistemically good in terms of inquiry, a view can be offered that not only elucidates the theoretical and practical demands of intellectual virtues, but that also provides a plausible account of what comprises the instrumental value of responsibilist virtues.

According to the traditional view of responsibilist virtue, virtuous traits are evaluatively and conceptually primary, such that virtuous acts are derived or proceed from virtue. Responsibilist virtues are characterized by five features: (1) virtues require good epistemic motives, (2) responsibilist virtues not only require good epistemic motives but also acts that are in accordance with the epistemic end of the virtue in question, (3) they are acquired, (4) proponents disagree about whether they necessarily need to lead to attaining more true than false beliefs, and (5) virtue is a success term. In this paper, I offer a novel account of epistemic responsibilist virtues that, in contrast to the traditional view, states that virtuous acts, and not virtuous traits, are evaluatively and conceptually primary. By incorporating the five characteristic features of a responsibilist theory, the view I develop is equally deserving of the responsibilist label and thus presents a promising alternative to the traditional view.

According to the traditional conception of epistemic responsibilist virtue, virtuous traits are evaluatively and conceptually primary. Virtuous acts are derived from, or proceed from, virtue. If an agent performs an act based on good epistemic motives but does not possess the virtue, it is merely an act that a virtuous agent would perform, but is not itself virtuous. In contrast, according to the view I propose and call Act First Responsibilism (AFR), virtuous acts are evaluatively and conceptually primary. Acts based on good motives are virtuous regardless of whether they issue from a virtuous trait. The possession of a virtuous trait is defined derivatively in terms of the performance of virtuous acts. With the new dispositional model of virtues I propose, AFR provides the metaphysical foundation for taking virtuous acts as evaluatively and conceptually primary. I argue that AFR is not normatively slight, meets the demands of an exemplarist virtue theory, and fares better than the traditional view in explaining, predicting, understanding, and evaluating an agent, as well as considering someone worthy of imitation.