Natalie Depraz

In what follows, I will focus on the opposite of the top-down, “transcendent” politics of surprise, institutional and instituted, in short, remote-controlled. I’m more interested in the immanent dynamic of the “we” (first person plural) that “makes” the political surprise, and how the social forces of the human collective, of the political community in the deepest sense of civil, civic and citizen society, not only produce and construct, but also feed off such a dynamic.I will first draw on Gilles Deleuze’s approach and show how political surprise can be understood as a process characterized by intensification, with the reaching of a critical threshold, followed by a period of saturation (my three phases in the model of surprise). The presentation of this first model will lead me to explore its limits, particularly in view of the quantified, objectifying negative vision of surprise that it illustrates. I will then propose another alternative model, characterized by its dynamic of openness and the creation of new possibilities. This dynamic, as we shall see, places the individual at the service of the collective intersubjective interactions, without absorbing them, as long as the individual keeps the ability for a renewed examination of his or her assumed mode of alignment with collective creation. The creation of a new collective results then the creation of a “we” co-acted by and within each individual.

Rompant avec la conception traditionnelle du corps comme pure et simple res extensa en interaction avec une âme seule à même de sentir et de vouloir, laphénoménologie (E. Husserl, M. Merleau-Ponty, J. Patoèka, M. Henry, R. Barbaras,...) en déploie une approche vécue, faisant de la chair (Leib, en allemand) le site même de notre rapport sensible et pratique aux étants. Une telle perspective court cependant le risque de ne voir en l'incarnation qu'une condition de possibilité de la manifestation du monde - et donc de passer sous silence la phénoménalké de cette chair vivante elle-même. C'est dans ce contexte qu'une phénoménologie du corps en émoi s'avère indispensable : au contraire du corps percevant et du corps agissant, simples mediums transparents d'une conscience tout entière auprès des choses, le corps ému, en vertu des bouleversements mêmes qui le caractérisent (larmes, rougissements, sudation,...), recouvre une prégnance certaine, et s'impose comme instance propre. En bref : seule l'émotion est somatophanie, c'est-à-dire manifestation du corps en tant que corps. Le présent volume se donne pour dessein d'étudier les différents versants de cette manifestation. La première partie, comprenant les contributions de Thomas Fuchs, Natalie Depraz, et Gabriel Mahéo, développe une réinterprétation incarnée des émotions intersubjectives - et en particulier de leur dimension politique. Au cours de la seconde partie, Charles Bobant, Grégori Jean, et Gilles A. Tiberghien s'interrogent sur la fonction-du corps ému au sein des multiples artistiques et de leurs réceptions esthétiques. Enfin, la troisième partie, composée des travaux d'Alexis Delamare, d'Aurélien Deudon, et de Daniel Vespermann, propose une série d'explorations phénoménologiques particulières - étude de la joie et de la tristesse, de lajouimance amoureuse, et des affects atmosphériques"--Page 4 of cover.

Is pleasure universal? What is the meaning of the gendered nature of pleasure? Is there an obvious chronological teleological relationship between desire and pleasure? First desire, then pleasure. You may indeed wonder why and how it is even possible to think differently. Unless, having read my subtitle, a suspicion has already crept into some limbic corner of your brain. In what follows, I would like to situate my remarks by re-examining what, in the relationship between desire and pleasure, is “proper” to men's experience. Equally, I will explore what, in this desire-pleasure relationship, is “proper” to women's experience. To do so, I will follow the now well-established interpretative schema inspired by Simone de Beauvoir's critical philosophy, which deconstructs the supposedly universality of a conceptuality by showing its situated and gendered de facto expectations.

This article questions the widespread assumption that schizophrenia is an incurable condition to be managed primarily through medication and institutional containment. Drawing on the clinical practice of Henri Grivois and on insights from phenomenological psychiatry, I reconsider what it means to speak of “cure.” A comparative reading of two contrasting films—Shutter Island and A Beautiful Mind—shows how different narrative frames influence the way psychosis is understood and judged. These representations are placed alongside autobiographical accounts by persons diagnosed with schizophrenia, in which writing and relational support alter the experience of hallucination and crisis. The disappearance of symptoms cannot serve as the sole measure of recovery. In chronic forms of schizophrenia, what often changes is the person’s relation to what happens to them: the way voices are interpreted, the way episodes are anticipated, and the way one remains connected to others. Healing, in this sense, concerns the possibility of living with the disorder without being reduced to it.

We endorse policymakers’ efforts to address the negative consequences of the attention economy’s technology but add that these approaches are often limited in their criticism of the systemic context of human attention. Starting from Buddhist philosophy, we advocate a broader approach: an ‘ecology of attending’ that centers on conceptualizing, designing, and using attention (1) in an embedded way and (2) focused on the alleviating of suffering. With ‘embedded’ we mean that attention is not a neutral, isolated mechanism but a meaning-engendering part of an ‘ecology’ of bodily, sociotechnical and moral frameworks. With ‘focused on the alleviation of suffering’ we mean that we explicitly move away from the (often implicit) conception of attention as a tool for gratifying desires. We analyze existing inquiries in these directions and urge them to be intensified and integrated. As to the design and function of our technological environment, we propose three questions for further research: How can technology help to acknowledge us as ‘ecological’ beings, rather than as self-sufficient individuals? How can technology help to raise awareness of our moral framework? And how can technology increase the conditions for ‘attending’ to the alleviation of suffering, by substituting our covert self-driven moral framework with an ecologically attending one? We believe in the urgency of transforming the inhumane attention economy sociotechnical system into a humane ecology of attending, and in our ability to contribute to it.

Husserl’s genetic phenomenology is relied on to make sense of the emergence of attention such as it arises, on the one hand, from bodily gestures and, on the other hand, according to the hypothesis of attentionality as a modulation such as it has begun to be developed through the historical and contemporary contributions of psychology and neurobiology. We attempt to show how the static framework initially advanced is in continuity with the genetic logic that allows us to deepen the hypothesis in questions by confronting the empirical analyses of Stumpf, James, Kulpe, and Tichner.

Parole coupée, bouche bée, yeux grands ouverts, sourcils levés... Plutôt que langagière, l'expression de la surprise serait d'abord le fait du corps. On se propose dans cet ouvrage d'interroger de manière critique, voire de contrebalancer cette tendance habituelle à ranger l'expérience de la surprise du côté du silence et de l'indicible : au lieu de faire signe vers les éventuelles limites du langage et des différentes langues naturelles, la surprise ne fait-elle pas plutôt ressortir la richesse des ressources du langage et la plasticité du fonctionnement des langues? Comment se dit donc la surprise? Dans quelle mesure son expression varie-t-elle d'une langue à l'autre? Le dire de la surprise est-il en lui-même un agir, à son tour producteur d'effets? Ces interrogations nous ont invités à réfléchir tant au lexique de la surprise qu'aux formes d'expression au moyen desquelles la surprise peut être non seulement exprimée mais aussi décrite, racontée, ou bien encore rationalisée, dans la langue courante, dans la logique comme dans la littérature.

We endorse policymakers’ efforts to address the negative consequences of the attention economy’s technology but add that these approaches are often limited in their criticism of the systemic context of human attention. Starting from Buddhist philosophy, we advocate a broader approach: an ‘ecology of attending’ that centers on conceptualizing, designing, and using attention (1) in an embedded way and (2) focused on the alleviating of suffering. With ‘embedded’ we mean that attention is not a neutral, isolated mechanism but a meaning-engendering part of an ‘ecology’ of bodily, sociotechnical and moral frameworks. With ‘focused on the alleviation of suffering’ we mean that we explicitly move away from the (often implicit) conception of attention as a tool for gratifying desires. We analyze existing inquiries in these directions and urge them to be intensified and integrated. As to the design and function of our technological environment, we propose three questions for further research: How can technology help to acknowledge us as ‘ecological’ beings, rather than as self-sufficient individuals? How can technology help to raise awareness of our moral framework? And how can technology increase the conditions for ‘attending’ to the alleviation of suffering, by substituting our covert self-driven moral framework with an ecologically attending one? We believe in the urgency of transforming the inhumane attention economy sociotechnical system into a humane ecology of attending, and in our ability to contribute to it.

In his Symphony n. 94 (1792), Haydn has a movement entitled “mit einem Paukenschlag,” which surprises the audience with a fortissimo timpani strike. This symphony, thus nicknamed “Die Überraschung,” offers a nice artistic example of fulguration against the background of imminence. Works of art offer a snapshot that unites beauty and novelty and evoke in us - in the artist as much as in the lover of music - the feeling of losing all control in a fraction of a second: I call it the art of release [_déprise_]. The aim of my paper is to show the complexity of the emotional dynamic while identifying under the expression of “antinomic emotion,” and to dismantle thereby the current and naive understanding of emotions as being merely “uni-valent” (love is positive, hate is negative) or even as being “ambiguous” or “ambivalent” (e.g., the pleasure I have to see somebody suffer). With “antinomic emotions,” of which I will give and describe three main exemplary situations, there remains an open tension between opposed moves, like in the case of a painful joy (Diadochos of Photicea), of a dreadful beauty (Plato) or in the case of a drunken soberness (Gregorius of Nyssa). Such expressions have the particularity not to be immediately and obviously understandable, which is the heart of their interest and complexity and will precisely require the analysis that follows in the article. In order to reach the threshold of experiential emotional complexity, I will benefit from useful philosophical and phenomenological resources in Kant and his binary distinctive analysis of the feelings of beauty and sublime, in Max Scheler in his fine experiential distinctions between positive and negative empathy and his descriptions of pathological ambiguous emotions (e.g., the pleasure to see someone suffer), but also in some less well-known Husserl’s about intense emotional movements combining for example in multifarious microphase-time taste, disgust, and euphoria. We will show how such analyses are at the same time useful as thresholds of understanding and limited in their descriptive potentiality. To open up the discussion, I will state that the structure of open tension inherent in antinomic emotions is complemented by a specific dynamic of reversal of the opposed emotional polarities, which can take the form either of inversion or of annulment.

Husserl's phenomenology has often been criticized for its Cartesian, fundamentalistic, idealistic and solipsistic nature. Today, this widespread interpretation must be regarded as being outdated, since it gives but a very partial and limited picture of Husserl's thinking. The continuing publication of Husserl's research manuscripts has disclosed analyses which have made it necessary to revise and modify a number of standard readings. This anthology documents the recent development in Husserl research. It contains contributions from a number of young phenomenologists, who have all defended their dissertation on Husserl in the nineties, and it presents a new type of interpretation which emphasizes the dimensions of facticity, passivity, alterity and ethics in Husserl's thinking.

With this phenomenological contribution to Diadocus of Photicea’s anthropological theology, my main goal is to show how this saint, according to John Meyedorff’s nice words, has been “one of the main popularizers of the desert spirituality in the Byzantine world”. The spiritual experience of the taste of God is then in no way the privilege of the circle of initiates nor is it reserved for monks, who are sometimes idealized as athletes of God. What is at stake is the whole spiritual life, the whole daily journey of life, not only a provisional illuminated prayer-state. Diadochus therefore is still of interest for us today. We understand then how this experimental and experiential way does not include in the end a distinction between divine grace and human effort. Not that the parts played by human beings and God end up in a confusion, but, as we will see, since grace is given to the human being from baptism onward, it keeps on being more and more effective, as the human being practices, exercises (askesis), makes efforts (epimeleia), that is, namely, enters more and more into the invocation of the name of Jesus. So divine grace and human effort literally co-operate, work together, and spontaneously enter into a kind of danse in which they gradually become two in one.