Nathalie Bulle

This chapter takes the form of a discussion between the editors of this volume and Joseph Agassi, regarding the relationship between methodological individualism and institutional individualism. The focus is on Agassi’s interpretation of traditional methodological individualism in terms of psychologism; the role of institutions and structural factors in social explanation; Popper’s theory of World 3; the application of Weber’s interpretative approach—Verstehen—to typical ways of thinking and acting; and the Austrian School of economics.

While methodological individualism is a fundamental approach within the social sciences, it is often misunderstood. This highlights the need for a discursive and up-to-date reference work analyzing this approach’s classic arguments and assumptions in the light of contemporary issues in sociology, economics and philosophy. This two-volume handbook presents the first comprehensive overview of methodological individualism. Chapters discuss historical and contemporary debates surrounding this central approach within the social sciences, as well as cutting edge developments related to the individualist tradition with philosophical and scientific implications. Bringing together multiple contributions from the world’s leading experts on this important tradition of theorizing, this collective endeavor provides teachers, researchers and students in sociology, economics, and philosophy with a reliable and critical understanding of the founding principles, key thinkers and intellectual development of MI since the late 19th century.

While methodological individualism is a fundamental approach within the social sciences, it is often misunderstood. This highlights the need for a discursive and up-to-date reference work analyzing this approach’s classic arguments and assumptions in the light of contemporary issues in sociology, economics and philosophy. This two-volume handbook presents the first comprehensive overview of methodological individualism. Chapters discuss historical and contemporary debates surrounding this central approach within the social sciences, as well as cutting edge developments related to the individualist tradition with philosophical and scientific implications. Bringing together multiple contributions from the world’s leading experts on this important tradition of theorizing, this collective endeavor provides teachers, researchers and students in sociology, economics, and philosophy with a reliable and critical understanding of the founding principles, key thinkers and intellectual development of MI since the late 19th century. ​

Manzo (2023/2020, this volume) objects to Nathalie Bulle's article with Denis Phan “Can Analytical Sociology Do Without Methodological Individualism?” (Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 2018) that the rationality associated with the understanding interpretation of MI cannot be taken to be trans-situational. This reply argues that either (1) this is a misunderstanding resulting from a confusion between the general rational capacity of human beings, to which Bulle and Phan refer, and the specific behavioral patterns associated with given situations and models or (2) this objection supports a structural reductionism in which the structural level tends to “reduce” the individual level, so that the behavioral patterns are directly implied by the structures.

It is argued that methodological individualism entails a holism of the parts, as originally proposed by Jan Smuts (1926/1927), where (1) the properties of entities involved in explanation are inherent to their participation in the whole they constitute, and (2) the whole does not act as a separate cause, distinct from its parts. This holism of parts involves a non-positivist and non-reductionist epistemology that is consistent with the analytical decomposition of wholes into basic units as advocated by methodological individualism (MI) for the social sciences. According to MI, social actors are the basic units of analysis, and their rational capacity (understood in a broad sense as a general—trans-situational—capacity of understanding) is an explanatory principle inherent in their social being. The epistemological and ontological incompatibilities between methodological individualism's holism of the parts and mainstream reductionist or non-reductionist physicalist approaches, as well as emergentist approaches of critical realism, may explain the misunderstanding of methodological individualism within Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy.

The explanatory power of structures in analytical sociologists’ agent-based models brings into question methodological individualism. We defend that from an explanatory point of view, the syntactic properties of models require semantic conditions of interpretation drawn from a conceptual research framework; in such a framework, social/relational structures have only partial, explanatory power ; and taking the explanation further through generative mechanism modeling necessitates calling upon methodological individualism’s generic framework of interpretation that relies on social actors’ rational capacity. According to this interpretive framework, forces in action in society are governed by the subjective meaning of/the reasons for individual actions.

In contrast to dominant approaches to human reason involving essentially a logical and instrumental conception of rationality easily modeled by artificial intelligence mechanisms, I argue that the specific capacities of the human mind are meta-analytic in nature, understood as irreducible to the analytic or the logical, or else the computational. Firstly, the assumption of a meta-analytical level of rationality is derived from key insights developed in various branches of the social sciences. This meta-analytical level is then inferred from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. On these bases, and with the help of psychological approaches to consciousness, I argue that human rationality may be characterized as the capacity to make meaningful use of signs.

There exists a fundamental convergence between some major trends of modern epistemology—as outlined, for instance, by Filmer Northrop and Henry Margenau—and the theories actually developed within sciences of the human mind where two types of thought—one implicit and, the other, explicit—tend to refer to two different lines of development. Moreover, these theories can find in the psychology of Lev Vygotsky some seminal hypotheses of a major importance. In order to highlight this convergence, we parallel the role played by structured conceptual systems in Vygotsky’s conception of intellectual development and Northrop’s epistemology. We show how these conceptual systems account for the notion of causality and can explain the success of scientific thought, i.e. its possible match with the real world, while this match falsely justified an overall biological model of intellectual development in Jean Piaget’s work. We conclude that dual process theorists should no longer neglect cognitive tools, and especially conceptual systems, which underpin the awareness and mastery of thought that are characteristic of type 2 processes. This whole analysis leads us to maintain that human psychology is not characterized in the first instance by a need to act, but a quest for meaning.

This paper's purpose is to set forth the conditions of explanation in the domain of formal modelling of social action. Explanation is defined as an adequate account of the underlying factors bringing about a phenomenon. The modelling of a social phenomenon can claim explanatory value in this sense if the following two conditions are fulfilled. (1) The generative mechanisms involved translate the effects of real factors abstracted from their phenomenal context, not those of purely ideal ones. (2) The explanatory hypotheses, which account for the effects of explanatory factors, and the purely descriptive hypotheses, which introduce conceptual simplifications and summarise complex secondary mechanisms, are relatively independent from each other with regard to the phenomenon represented. This condition subjects the model to testing by alternatives through the development of purely descriptive hypotheses in the sense of explanatory or analytical realism