In Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism (2018), David Chalmers mentions that there are idealist responses to skepticism similar to his structuralist response, but rejects them as a group in light of "well-known problems with idealism". In this thesis, I investigate one such idealist response, in order to shed some further light on the potential of idealism as a response to skepticism. The argument which I test is veridicalist, like Chalmers' argument, in the sense that its conclusion is tha…
Read moreIn Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism (2018), David Chalmers mentions that there are idealist responses to skepticism similar to his structuralist response, but rejects them as a group in light of "well-known problems with idealism". In this thesis, I investigate one such idealist response, in order to shed some further light on the potential of idealism as a response to skepticism. The argument which I test is veridicalist, like Chalmers' argument, in the sense that its conclusion is that there is nothing particularly bad, as concerns our epistemic position, about the possibility that we are dreaming, are living in an illusion created by an Evil Demon, or are a brain-in-a-vat. In making the argument, I find myself pushed to using some highly nonstandard claims, most notably (1) the premise that objects are partially constituted by their appearances, (2) the Russellian idea that knowledge-by-acquaintance is fundamental, as well as (3) first-personal modal realism. Given the controversiality of these premises, I conclude that the argument as it stands is too weak to be accepted. However, by going through it, I hope to have shed some further light on the potential merits and drawbacks of idealist responses to skepticism in general.
