Nathan Kirkwood

Virtual reality (VR) is increasingly being used as a teaching and learning tool, however scaling this technology is difficult due to technological and cost considerations. An alternative approach that helps to address these problems is VR-by-proxy, where teaching takes place within a VR environment that is controlled by one lecturer and broadcast to students online. This allows the content to be accessed without specialist equipment while still offering an immersive and interactive experience. Taking advantage of the enforced move to online learning during the COVID-19 pandemic, this study evaluates the implementation of a novel VR-by-proxy disease diagnostic laboratory VR simulation within an undergraduate life sciences course in a higher education setting. Student participants were randomly allocated into two groups: the test group, who took part in a VR-by-proxy lesson; and a control group, who worked with interactive online lab manual material. We assessed improvement in learning and enjoyment through questionnaires before and after these tasks and collected qualitative data on student attitudes towards VR through focus groups. Our results indicate that although there is no observable difference in learning outcomes between the two groups, students in the test group reported an improved learning experience, confidence and enjoyment of learning. In our focus groups, confidence was understood in two ways by participants: firstly, as ‘understanding’ of the various steps involved in conducting a quantitative polymerase chain reaction experiment and secondly as a more general ‘familiarity’ with the laboratory setting. This study adds to the growing body of research into the effectiveness of VR for learning and teaching, highlighting that VR-by-proxy may provide many of the same benefits.

There is little in Quine’s philosophy that is more significant and more puzzling than his commitment to naturalism. On the one hand, naturalism seems to play an unparalleled role in explaining the development and unorthodox nature of Quine’s views. On the other hand, however, naturalism is deeply elusive. Not only is there disagreement amongst commentators about how to understand the nature and development of naturalism, but also Quine’s own characterisations of naturalism are often thinly sketched and leave us with few clues as to how we should understand naturalism and its origins. In light of these reasons, it is a significant challenge to arrive at an accurate picture of what naturalism amounts to and how it fits into Quine’s philosophical development. The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis of Quine’s commitment to naturalism, and to highlight the ways in which this analysis illuminates the surrounding landscape of his philosophical views. Here, I endeavour to show that careful analysis into what Quine’s commitment to naturalism amounts to establishes that this commitment is not as longstanding as is often thought. More specifically, I argue that Quine is not committed to naturalism until shortly after ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, and this reveals that Quine’s philosophical work cannot be felicitously understood as revolving around a stable commitment to naturalism. Having established this, I then explain the ways in which this analysis informs a thorough interpretation of several vital aspects of his thought, such as the development of his attitude towards analyticity, and his sustained commitment to empiricism. I believe that these findings motivate and lay the foundations of a cautious and appropriately nuanced understanding of Quine.