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13Clarifying the Virtue Profile of the Good Thinker: An Interdisciplinary ApproachTopoi 1-10. forthcoming.What does it mean to be a good thinker? Which virtues work together in someone who possesses good intellectual character? Although recent research on virtues has highlighted the benefits of individual intellectual virtues, being an excellent thinker is likely a function of possessing multiple intellectual virtues. Specifically, a good thinker would both recognize one’s intellectual shortcomings and possess an eagerness to learn driven by virtues such as love of knowledge, curiosity, and open-min…Read more
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21Is Goodness Without God Good Enough?: A Debate on Faith, Secularism, and Ethics (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2008.Morality and religion: intimately wed, violently opposed, or something else? Discussion of this issue appears in pop culture, the academy, and the media―often generating radically opposed views. At one end of the spectrum are those who think that unless God exists, ethics is unfounded and the moral life is unmotivated. At the other end are those who think that religious belief is unnecessary for―and even a threat to―ethical knowledge and the moral life. This volume provides an accessible, charit…Read more
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67Is Goodness Without God Good Enough?: A Debate on Faith, Secularism, and Ethics (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield. 2008.Morality and religion: intimately wed, violently opposed, or something else? Discussion of this issue appears in pop culture, the academy, and the media—often generating radically opposed views. At one end of the spectrum are those who think that unless God exists, ethics is unfounded and the moral life is unmotivated. At the other end are those who think that religious belief is unnecessary for—and even a threat to—ethical knowledge and the moral life. -/- This volume provides an accessible, ch…Read more
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810Toward Intellectually Virtuous Discourse: Two Vicious Fallacies and the Virtues that Inhibit ThemIn Jason S. Baehr (ed.), Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology, Routledge. 2015.We have witnessed the athleticization of political discourse, whereby debate is treated like an athletic contest in which the aim is to vanquish one's opponents. When political discourse becomes a zero-sum game, it is characterized by suspicions, accusations, belief polarization, and ideological entrenchment. Unfortunately, athleticization is ailing the classroom as well, making it difficult for educators to prepare students to make valuable contributions to healthy civic discourse. Such prep…Read more
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20Intellectual Creativity, the Arts, and the UniversityScientia et Fides 10 (2): 99-119. 2022.As virtues of intellectual character are commonly discussed, they aim at _propositional _intellectual goods. But some creative works—especially those in music and the visual arts—are not primarily intended to gain, keep, or share propositional goods such as truth, knowledge, and understanding. They aim at something else. Thus, to conceive of intellectual creativity in a way that accords with standard discussions of intellectual virtue is to exclude paradigmatic works of the creative intellect. T…Read more
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26The excellent mind: intellectual virtues for everyday lifeOxford University Press. 2021.What makes for a good education? What does one need to count as well-educated? Knowledge, to be sure. But knowledge is easily forgotten, and today's knowledge may be obsolete tomorrow. Skills, particularly in critical thinking, are crucial as well. But absent the right motivation, graduates may fail to put their skills to good use. In this book, Nathan King argues that intellectual virtues-traits like curiosity, intellectual humility, honesty, intellectual courage, and open-mindedness-are centra…Read more
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59The Apologist's DilemmaIn Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism, Oxford University Press. pp. 142-179. 2021.
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581Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer is Hard to FindPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2): 249-272. 2012.
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209Religious diversity and its challenges to religious beliefPhilosophy Compass 3 (4): 830-853. 2008.Contemporary Western culture is experiencing a heightened awareness of religious diversity. This article surveys a range of possible responses to such diversity, and distinguishes between responses that concern the salvation or moral transformation of persons (soteriological views) and those that concern the alethic or epistemic status of religious beliefs (doctrinal views). After providing a brief taxonomy of these positions and their possible relations to one another, the article focuses prima…Read more
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The Dead Sea Scrolls and Christian Origins (Joseph A. Fitzmyer)Heythrop Journal 43 (3): 362-362. 2002.
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14Rejoinder to McGrathJournal of Philosophical Research 36 243-246. 2011.In “Reply to King,” Sarah McGrath defends her argument for moral skepticism against my criticisms. Here I sketch some remaining reservations about the argument.
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51Rejoinder to McGrathJournal of Philosophical Research 36 243-246. 2011.In “Reply to King,” Sarah McGrath defends her argument for moral skepticism against my criticisms. Here I sketch some remaining reservations about the argument.
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13Conscientious Self-reflection to the Rescue?European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4): 155--167. 2014.
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41McGrath on Moral KnowledgeJournal of Philosophical Research 36 219-233. 2011.Sarah McGrath has recently defended a disagreement-based argument for skepticism about moral knowledge. If sound, the argument shows that our beliefs about controversial moral issues do not amount to knowledge. In this paper, I argue that McGrath fails to establish her skeptical conclusion. I defend two main claims. First, the key premise of McGrath’s argument is inadequately supported. Second, there is good reason to think that this premise is false.
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20McGrath on Moral KnowledgeJournal of Philosophical Research 36 219-233. 2011.Sarah McGrath has recently defended a disagreement-based argument for skepticism about moral knowledge. If sound, the argument shows that our beliefs about controversial moral issues do not amount to knowledge. In this paper, I argue that McGrath fails to establish her skeptical conclusion. I defend two main claims. First, the key premise of McGrath’s argument is inadequately supported. Second, there is good reason to think that this premise is false.
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72Erratum to: Perseverance as an intellectual virtueSynthese 191 (15): 3779-3801. 2014.Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused on the analysis of such intellectual virtues as responsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom. Absent from the literature is an extended examination of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. The present paper aims to fill this void. In Sect. 1, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue, and distinguish intellectual virtues from other personal traits and properties. In Sect. …Read more
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263Conscientious Self-reflection to the Rescue?European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4): 155-167. 2014.
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177Perseverance as an intellectual virtueSynthese 191 (15): 3501-3523. 2014.Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused on the analysis of such intellectual virtues as responsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom. Absent from the literature is an extended examination of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. The present paper aims to fill this void. In Sect. 1, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue, and distinguish intellectual virtues from other personal characters and properties. In Se…Read more
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100Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology: A Reply to the Situationist ChallengePhilosophical Quarterly 64 (255): 243-253. 2014.
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146McGrath on Moral KnowledgeJournal of Philosophical Research 36 219-233. 2011.Sarah McGrath has recently defended a disagreement-based argument for skepticism about moral knowledge. If sound, the argument shows that our beliefs about controversial moral issues do not amount to knowledge. In this paper, I argue that McGrath fails to establish her skeptical conclusion. I defend two main claims. First, the key premise of McGrath’s argument is inadequately supported. Second, there is good reason to think that this premise is false.
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |