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What do philosophers believe?Philosophical Studies 170 (3): 465-500. 2014.What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine their views on 30 central philosophical issues. This article documents the results. It also reveals correlations among philosophical views and between these views and factors such as age, gender, and nationality. A factor analysis suggests that an individual's views on these issues factor into a few underlying components that predict much of the variat…Read more
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Outline of a theory of truthJournal of Philosophy 72 (19): 690-716. 1975.
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A puzzle about beliefIn A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use, Reidel. pp. 239--83. 1979.
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Identity and necessityIn Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and individuation, New York University Press. pp. 135-164. 1971.
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Speaker’s Reference and Semantic ReferenceMidwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1): 255-276. 1977.am going to discuss some issues inspired by a well-known paper ofKeith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions,”2 but the interest—to me—of the contrast mentioned in my title goes beyond Donnellan's paper: I think it is of considerable constructive as well as critical importance to the philosophy oflanguage. These applications, however, and even everything I might want to say relative to Donnellan’s paper, cannot be discussed in full here because of problems of length. Moreover, although…Read more
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Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical NotesTheoria 74 (3): 181-218. 2008.Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well-known 'unlearnability' argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is specified in a particular way, so that giving a ref…Read more
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Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2011.This important new book is the first of a series of volumes collecting essential work by an influential philosopher. It presents a mixture of published and unpublished works from various stages of Kripke's storied career. Included here are seminal and much discussed pieces such as “Identity and Necessity,” “Outline of a Theory of Truth,” and “A Puzzle About Belief.” More recent published work include “Russell's Notion of Scope” and “Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference” among others. Several of…Read more
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Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy ColloquiumHarvard University Press. 1980.
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The Question of LogicMind 133 (529): 1-36. 2023.
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Essential vs. Accidental PropertiesStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2013.The distinction between essential versus accidental properties has been characterized in various ways, but it is currently most commonly understood in modal terms: an essential property of an object is a property that it must have, while an accidental property of an object is one that it happens to have but that it could lack. Let’s call this the basic modal characterization, where a modal characterization of a notion is one that explains the notion in terms of necessity/possibility. In the char…Read more
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ReferenceIn Gillian Russell Delia Graff Fara (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, Routledge. pp. 189-198. 2012.
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A Puzzle About KindsPhilosophical Perspectives 32 (1): 352-364. 2018.
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Everything but the kitchen sink: how (not) to give a plenitudinarian solution to the paradox of flexible origin essentialismPhilosophical Studies 179 (1): 133-161. 2021.I explore options for a plenitudinarian solution to the Paradox of Flexible Origin Essentialism, taking as my unlikely starting point the views of Sarah-Jane Leslie, who holds that if plenitudinarianism is true, then there is in fact no paradox to be solved, only the illusion of one. The first three sections are expository: Sect. 1 on plenitudinarianism, Sect. 2 on the paradox, and Sect. 3 on Leslie’s views about how plenitudinarianism bears on the paradox. In Sect. 4, I reject the contention th…Read more
APA Western Division
Santa Barbara, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
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Philosophy of Language, Misc |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Misc |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Logic in Philosophy |