Recently, Kenneth Himma (2010) argued that salvific exclusivism, some common beliefs about Hell, and a plausible moral principle entailed anti-natalism. Himma is on to something. But given the dialectic between Himma and a staunch critic, Shawn Bawulski (2013), I’ll provide a stronger version of Himma’s argument that allows us to discard a commitment to salvific exclusivism and satisfactorily respond to some of Bawulski’s strongest objections. In this paper, I’ll argue that some common beliefs a…
Read moreRecently, Kenneth Himma (2010) argued that salvific exclusivism, some common beliefs about Hell, and a plausible moral principle entailed anti-natalism. Himma is on to something. But given the dialectic between Himma and a staunch critic, Shawn Bawulski (2013), I’ll provide a stronger version of Himma’s argument that allows us to discard a commitment to salvific exclusivism and satisfactorily respond to some of Bawulski’s strongest objections. In this paper, I’ll argue that some common beliefs about Hell, a risk-averse decision principle, and Himma’s moral principle—reworked in light of the risk-averse decision principle—entail anti-natalism.
