Necip Fikri Alican

This essay examines the conception of Forms under the two-level model of Holger Thesleff for the interpretation of Plato. The primary focus is on the classification of Forms into three different categories comprising Ideal Forms, Conceptual Forms, and Relational Forms. The corresponding coverage favors the last of these categories in terms of the attention devoted, space reserved, and time dedicated to the elucidation of each one, aiming thereby to make up for its natural propensity to be confused with either one of the other two categories. The overall effort complements previous discussions of the topic, as opposed to repeating, rescinding, or revising any of them. It consequently brings out, more clearly than attempted or accomplished before, the similarities and differences between the three categories as an extension or reflection of the organic relationship between the classification of Forms and the two-level model itself.

The Devil’s Advocate versus God’s Honest Truth: A Dialectical Inquiry into the Rationality of Religion is a scholarly monograph exploring the rationality of religion, particularly the tenability of theism, through a dialectical analysis of reasons for belief versus grounds for suspicion. The positive perspective examines traditional proofs for the existence of God, focusing specifically on the teleological, cosmological, and ontological arguments, while the negative perspective contemplates common grounds for misgivings, concentrating especially on methodological difficulties, syncretic developments, and metaethical challenges. The comprehensive yet balanced coverage of the book is designed to meet the needs of readers for critical reflection without compromising the objectivity required to help them sort out their own intuitions and formulate their own judgments in an area that is otherwise dominated by sectarian scholarship and thereby polarized beyond reconciliation.

This article is a critical appraisal of the two-level model of Holger Thesleff as an interpretive paradigm for the philosophy of Plato. The primary emphasis is on the metaphysics of the model, which revolves around the idea of a single world composed of two levels. Conceived as an alternative to the dualism of worlds traditionally attributed to Plato, the levels in question complement each other in a symbiotic relationship between intelligible phenomena and sensible matter, which jointly account for the whole of reality without the complications associated with a multiplication of worlds. The principal complication in the latter scenario is the difficulty of meaningful interaction under circumstances of radical separation, especially with a strict segregation requiring two different worlds: one for transcendent Forms, one for instantiating particulars. That difficulty does not even come up in the two-level model, which confines everything to a single world, where the possibility of interaction is not undermined by the reality of separation or the severity of segregation. The two-level model avoids that issue altogether by keeping everything together. A purported problem with this monistic alternative, on the other hand, is the inherent impediment to transcendence within a single world, where there would seem to be no room for the requisite ascension. How indeed can anything transcend the only place that exists? Promoting a solitary world as the intended framework for Plato’s metaphysics ostensibly requires retaining some semblance of transcendence, or else providing an acceptable alternative to it, while compressing everything into the same reality. The ultimate goal of the present article is to show why, given a natural challenge to both approaches, that is, despite an apparent obstacle to either perspective, the two-level model is preferable to the two-world alternative. Progress toward that end unfolds as an effort to illustrate and vindicate the way Thesleff meets the methodological challenge to his brand of monism with a philosophical vision originating with Plato himself.

This article questions the central role of the good will in the moral theory of Immanuel Kant. The good will, according to Kant, is the only thing that is good in itself, and therefore good without limitation or qualification. This is an objectionable claim in support of a controversial position. The problem is not just that the good will is not the only thing that is good in itself, which indeed it is not, but more importantly, that the good will is not so much a thing that is good in itself as it is the good kind of a thing that is otherwise neither good nor bad in itself. The goodness of a good will is no more intrinsic than the goodness of a good act. A good will, whatever else it may be, is a will that is good, much like how a good act is an act that is good, neither of which is good for any reason other than the goodness predicated of the corresponding subject. This article thus challenges Kant’s position on ontological grounds. It questions the validity of claiming intrinsic goodness for a complex construct whose goodness is, in fact, extrinsic to its substance.

Mill’s Principle of Utility: Origins, Proof, and Implications is a scholarly monograph on John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism with a particular emphasis on the proof he provides for the principle of utility. Originally published as Mill’s Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart Mill’s Notorious Proof (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), the present volume is a revised and enlarged edition with additional material, tighter arguments, and updated references. The initiative is still principally an analysis, interpretation, and defense of the controversial proof, which has yet to attract a scholarly consensus on how it works and whether it succeeds. Well over a century and a half after Mill’s initial contribution, the subject matter continues to figure prominently in classroom discussions, where the principle and its proof are presented and debated in connection with the critical baggage of logical problems and conceptual confusions wrongly attributed to Mill from the beginning. The overarching aim of the book, now supplemented with a comprehensive historical background and salient philosophical implications, remains the vindication of Mill’s reasoning in pursuit of what he promises as a proof of the principle of utility.

Quine on Ethics: The Gavagai of Moral Discourse is a comprehensive treatment of Quine’s brief yet memorable foray into ethics. It defends him against his most formidable critics, corrects misconceptions in the present reception of his outlook on morality as a social institution and ethics as a philosophical enterprise, and restores emphasis on observationality as the impetus behind his momentous intervention in ethical theory. The central focus is on Quine’s infamous challenge to ethical theory: his thesis of the methodological infirmity of ethics as compared with science. The ultimate aim is to demonstrate that the challenge is not only valid but also valuable insofar as it identifies opportunities for reformation in moral justification.

One over Many: The Unitary Pluralism of Plato’s World is a tightly integrated collection of essays by the author, some newly drafted for the present work, some previously published as journal articles, all conceived and developed in pursuit of corrective intervention in Plato’s metaphysics. The book replaces the standard view of Plato as a metaphysical dualist with an alternative interpretation providing greater explanatory power through the paradigm of unitary pluralism in a single reality built on ontological diversity.

This article is a defense of John Rawls against recent criticism, ironically my own, though it is also a critique insofar as it addresses a problem that Rawls never does. The original charges were that Rawls’s decision procedure for ethics does not justify his own moral principles, especially those making up his liberal conception of justice, and that the underlying problem may well keep the decision procedure from justifying any moral principles whatsoever, or at least any normatively useful ones. These difficulties are manifested in the work of Rawls as the dogmatism of championing a distinctive conception of justice, a liberal one as he himself calls it, through a justification model that comes across as too objective to permit such a bias and too universal to support any substantive conclusions at all. The solution contemplated here is to position the decision procedure as a justification model responsive to moral progress, and thereby equally open to all moral input, thus removing the inconsistency between the inherent universalism of the design and the distinctive character of the outcome, including the moral principles Rawls himself recommends, so long as they are consistent with moral progress.

This article examines the social contract of Thomas Hobbes in the critical context of the prisoner’s dilemma, with the aim of demonstrating that the tenability of the former is not undermined by the gravity of the latter. The urgency of the problem is that Hobbes postulates a social contract to formalize our collective transition from the state of nature to civil society, while the prisoner’s dilemma challenges both the mechanics and the outcome of that thought experiment. The source of the connection is that the incentives for reneging are presumably strong enough to keep rational persons from cooperating. This article argues that the prisoner’s dilemma undermines a position that Hobbes does not hold. It shows, in contrast, that the context and parameters of the social contract, particularly as envisaged by Hobbes, steer it safely between the horns of the dilemma. The main consideration toward that end is the central role of self-interest in the worldview of Hobbes, who thereby leaves plenty of room for progressive concessions toward peaceful coexistence, thus transforming the relevant model of rationality from utility maximization to utility satisficing, where contractors quickly learn to pursue a mutually satisfactory outcome instead of the best personal outcome.

This article is a critical analysis of the decisive mission of Michael H. Mitias to attract attention to a neglected relationship between friendship and morality. The evaluation revolves around the position of Mitias on friendship as a central moral value constituting an integral part of the good life and therefore deserving a prominent place in ethical theory. The corresponding vision is not a whimsical intervention in our standard conception of morality but a unifying initiative to recapture the right way of doing ethics. What sets the present article apart from other reactions to Mitias is a holistic approach drawing on literary considerations as well as philosophical ones. The combined aim is to demonstrate that Mitias is not seeking simply to restore friendship to its rightful place in normative ethical theory, which is indeed the full extent of his express objective, but that he is seeking to do so specifically within virtue ethics. This interpretation rests on a broad engagement with Mitias’s publications beyond the treatise (Friendship: A Central Moral Value) often taken understandably yet erroneously to be his only work on the subject.

This article is a critique of the ethical justification model that John Rawls employs in his defense of a liberal conception of justice. Rawls is famous for two things: his attempt to ground morality in rationality and his conception of justice as fairness. His work has been resounding on both fronts, the first constituting the justificatory framework for the second. Yet from the beginning, the outcome has been more doctrinaire than the method should have allowed with design details promising objectivity. This article goes to that beginning, or to a reasonable proxy for it anyway, in the “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (1951), with the aim of exposing and examining the discrepancy where it originates. The goal is not to prey on the earliest version of an initiative later undergoing revision but to identify and investigate the inception of a systematic bias that is retained rather than revised in subsequent iterations. The conclusion is that the decision procedure comes across as too objective to favor a liberal conception of justice over competing alternatives and too universal to identify, produce, or support specific moral principles informing a normative ethical system.

Mill’s Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart Mill’s Notorious Proof is a defense of John Stuart Mill’s proof of the principle of utility in the fourth chapter of his Utilitarianism. The proof is notorious as an allegedly fallacious attempt by a prominent philosopher who ought not to have made the elementary mistakes he is supposed to have made. This book shows that he did not. The aim is neither to glorify utilitarianism as a normative ethical theory nor to vindicate Mill’s universalistic ethical hedonism as the best form of utilitarianism. The book is devoted primarily to demonstrating that Mill successfully defends what he sets out to establish in his proof of the principle of utility. Much of the discussion is geared toward absolving Mill of the various fallacies with which he has been saddled.

This article is a defense of Immanuel Kant against the allegedly neglected alternative in his formulation of transcendental idealism. What sets it apart from other contributions toward the same end is the grounding construction of an interpretive framework — a faithful reconstruction of the one Kant himself provides for transcendental idealism — as opposed to the ad hoc development of a defensive strategy for refuting the charges. The promise, then, is comprehensive clarification instead of pointed rebuttal. The difference is between focusing on the text and focusing on the problem. Doing both may admittedly be not just possible but also required, as the problem is supposed to be in the text, but the point is that it is not there, and furthermore, that we need not go anywhere else to show that it is not there. Thus, the approach is constructive rather than defensive, or more accurately, constructive as well as defensive. And the construction rests on what Kant actually said rather than on what he might have meant or on what he should have said instead.

In my dissertation, I analyze, interpret, and defend John Stuart Mill's proof of the principle of utility in the fourth chapter of his Utilitarianism. My purpose is not to glorify utilitarianism, in a full sweep, as the best normative ethical theory, or even to vindicate, on a more specific level, Mill's universalistic ethical hedonism as the best form of utilitarianism. I am concerned only with Mill's utilitarianism, and primarily with his proof of the principle of utility. My overarching purpose guiding the entire work is to show that Mill proceeds intelligibly and systematically in pursuing a well-defined project in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism, and that he successfully defends what he sets out to establish in his proof of the principle of utility. To this end, I devote the bulk of my efforts to studying and responding to traditionally popular and persistently enduring objections to the proof that are handed down from one generation to the next in the philosophical community as a standard companion to Utilitarianism. The primary objections to which I respond at length are the charges that Mill commits the naturalistic fallacy, the fallacy of equivocation, and the fallacy of composition in his proof. Secondary literature on the subject consists of journal articles and book chapters that treat one or another but not all of these problems. My research has convinced me that, although these commentaries are generally quite good, they are mutually incompatible, and they are neither severally nor jointly sufficient to produce the kind of comprehensive defense that would do justice to Mill's proof of the principle of utility. This kind of comprehensive defense is what I intend to contribute to secondary literature on the subject. Specifically, my ultimate contribution to secondary literature is an interpretation of Mill's proof of the principle of utility in its entirety, absolved of the three fallacies commonly attributed to the proof, yet faithful to the text at all points.

Rethinking Plato: A Cartesian Quest for the Real Plato is a quest for the real Plato, forever hiding behind the veil of drama. The quest, as the subtitle indicates, is Cartesian in that it looks for Plato independently of the prevailing paradigms on where we are supposed to find him. The result of the quest is a complete pedagogical platform on Plato. This does not mean that the book leaves nothing out, covering all the dialogues and all the themes, but that it provides the full intellectual apparatus for doing just that. It consists of two parts. The first is a general orientation in three chapters, one each pertaining to the life, thought, and works of Plato. The second is a dialogic companion covering the four dialogues built around the last days of Socrates, with a separate chapter devoted to each: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo.

This article explores the philosophical implications of the transition from polytheism to monotheism in our development as a rational species. The methodological vehicle employed in the critical analysis conducted is a survey of Hesiodic theogony for insight into the nature and purpose of the monotheistic platforms we have erected in its place. The aim is not so much to dispute the validity of any belief system, past or present, as it is to expose and examine the prevailing paradigms as extensions of abandoned arrangements originally embraced with the same passion exhibited today. The approach is indeed critical, but the claim is not that the demonstration constitutes a refutation of religious principles or theological doctrines, just that it provides a partial identification and preliminary confirmation of the rational grounds for secular concerns and skeptical suspicions. The latter two are manifested as the correlative conviction that religious orientation and theological explanation are reciprocal parts of a collective work in progress mapping out our common initiative as human beings to make sense of the world at large.

This article questions the place of negative Forms in Plato’s ontology. And it does so against appearances to the contrary, given that Plato himself seems to acknowledge both positive Forms and negative Forms, that is to say, both good ones and bad ones. He may not say so outright, but he invokes both and rejects neither. The apparent finality of this impression is so strong that it creates a lack of direct interest in the subject: Plato scholars do not give negative Forms much thought except where the prospect relates to something else they happen to be doing. Yet when they do give the matter any thought at all, typically for the sake of a prior concern, they try either to support the textual evidence or to contradict it, indicating that the evidence does not stand on its own. The aim of this article is to determine why they tend to affirm or deny the obvious, how they try to confirm or dispute it, and what this says about Plato’s position. The strategic vehicle is a comparative case study. The confirmation comes from Debra Nails (2013), who needs to embrace negative Forms to demonstrate that the unhypothetical first principle of everything is not identical to the Form of the Good, something she cannot do unless Plato recognizes negative Forms. The contradiction comes from Holger Thesleff (2013), who needs to reject negative (Ideal) Forms because the defining feature of his (Ideal) Forms is the possession of positive intrinsic value, which cannot be predicated of anything negative. Despite defending opposite views, or perhaps because of this, they jointly make up for any lack of interest in the scholarly community. I appreciate both yet side with Thesleff.

This essay is a meditation on the philosophical preconceptions shaping the reception of Plato’s metaphysics. The central focus is on the dualism of a world of Forms existing separately from the world we know. The overarching aim is to explore the motivation for postulating that second world instead of making do with the one we have. While the approach is indeed exploratory, the underlying suspicion is that everything, Forms and all, belongs in the same world. The goal is not to prove that the Forms exist, nor to evaluate the proofs and objections on record, but to consider why and how they are supposed to exist, and what follows if they actually do. Dialogue toward a mutual understanding of why we think the Forms exist, and why we think they do not, might encourage a “second sailing” in waters where we have been unable to agree whether they do, and where they would if they did.

This article is a defense of skepticism, specifically Pyrrhonian skepticism, against a potential complication ostensibly threatening its methodological consistency. The conflict contemplated is that the suspension of judgment based on the discovery of equipollence, which is the central highlight of skeptical investigation, is vitiated by the assent given to the equipollence discovered. The apparent difficulty has a conceptual side as well as a practical side, examined here as separate challenges with a section devoted to each. The conceptual challenge is that the skeptical transition from an equipollence of arguments to a suspension of judgment is undermined either by a logical contradiction or by an epistemic inconsistency, perhaps by both, because the determination and affirmation of equipollence is itself a judgment of sorts, one that is never suspended. The practical challenge is that, independently of any conceptual confusion, suspending judgment in reaction to equipollence evinces doxastic commitment to equipollence, if only because human beings are not capable of making assessments requiring rational determination without believing the premises examined to be true and the conclusions drawn to be compelling. The aim of the present article is to demonstrate that the skeptical position is not vulnerable to such objections.

This article is a critical evaluation of Holger Thesleff’s thinking on Plato’s Forms. The emphasis is, more specifically, on his “rethinking” of the matter, as he puts it in the title of his most recent contribution (Alican and Thesleff 2013: “Rethinking Plato’s Forms”). The general aim is to launch the academic reception of that bold intervention in Plato scholarship, which Thesleff cautiously positions a modest proposal — his trademark teaser to elicit a reaction, positive or negative. Representing a sympathetic perspective, coverage here proceeds in the manner of dialectical engagement with the main lines of his interpretation and reconstruction of Plato’s world. The exegetical focus is on tracing the inspiration and reasoning behind his “two-level” model of Plato’s metaphysics, which, in turn, supports his tripartite classification of Forms. The critical focus is on identifying potential areas of misunderstanding and supplying any explanations, analyses, and arguments that may enhance the clarity of the respective positions.

This article is a study of the correspondence between Forms and particulars in Plato. Its primary purpose is to determine whether they exhibit an ontological symmetry, in other words, whether there is always one where there is the other. This points to two questions, one on the existence of things that do not have correlative Forms, the other on the existence of Forms that do not have correlative things. Both questions have come up before in the scholarly literature on Plato, but the answers have not been sufficiently sensitive to the intricacies of the questions. Nor have they been adequately resourceful with what little evidence there is in the original sources. The intention here is to make up for that deficiency, not just with better answers, but also with better insight into the questions.

This article is a proposal for retracing the main lines of Plato’s thought, doubling as a roadmap for reconsidering the formative features of his world, including the proprietary stock of conceptual tools he uses for building and maintaining it. Developing an alternative interpretation of his philosophical vision, the central focus is on what he does with the Forms. The guiding paradigm is the unitary pluralism of a hierarchically structured universe comprising interdependent levels of reality as a substitute for the traditional dualism of a world of Forms separated from the world of particulars. An integral part of the model proposed, representing a sharp departure from tradition, is a reorganization of Forms in three distinct categories: Ideal Forms, Conceptual Forms, and Relational Forms. The result is a recalibration of Plato’s insights, tools, and methods toward a better understanding of his overall philosophy, especially his distinctive conception of reality and his unique perspective of the world. The initiative promises, in addition, to restore Plato’s methodological trademark of systematic emphasis on that which is good, a dialectical predilection in articulation of a cosmological constant that cannot be accommodated through a separation of worlds.