Nedim Nomer

This collection of papers is intended to provide a survey of the history of political ideas in the Ottoman world from its dawn around 1300 to its downfall in the early 20th century. It features fourteen original papers by some of the most prominent and innovative scholars of Ottoman history. The book sheds light on the complex role that ideas have played in all aspects of Ottoman social and political life throughout the history of the Ottoman world, across time, space, social class, and ethnic and religious identity. Histories of Political Thought in the Ottoman World takes exception to a common tendency, both among Ottoman historians and in the broader academic world, that considers Ottoman political life exclusively in terms of the political ideas of the Sunni Muslim governing elite. It makes clear that the non-elite, non-Sunni Muslim, non-Muslim, non-Turkish, and female members of the Ottoman society have also significantly contributed to the making of Ottoman political culture throughout its history.

This chapter is an attempt to resolve two sets of disagreements on Fichte’s theory of right. One disagreement concerns the content of Fichtean property rights, and the other is about the role of coercion in the formation of the Fichtean social order. With respect to the first disagreement I argue that it stems from the mistaken assumption that Fichte is committed to a particular universally applicable right to property. Once this assumption is dropped, it is possible to appreciate the variety of such rights that his theory can support. With respect to the second disagreement I argue that Fichte does not see a necessary conflict between coercion and freedom; in fact, he believes coercion is conducive to the formation of rightful relations among free persons.

The dissertation examines of Fichte's theory of rights as it is presented in his Foundations of Natural Right of 1796/7. The general claim of the dissertation is that Fichte's theory is designed to answer three questions about rights: Why must there be rights? How are they possible? and What rights do persons have? To answer the first, Fichte explains what it means for a person to exercise free will. He establishes that true freedom can be exercised only in a society that is structured around the rights of persons. Fichte answers the second question in terms of his doctrine of "recognition." Accordingly, a person's interest in a liberty can become a "right" only if it is recognized by others. As a response to the third question, Fichte discusses the circumstances of actual societies and inquires into the feasibility of a regime of mutual rights. He then proposes a list of rights that would enable persons to coexist in harmony. ;The dissertation differs from the existing literature in several ways. First, it does not treat his theory as if it were merely part of a philosophical movement, such as Romanticism or Idealism. Rather, it focuses on the distinctive aspects of this theory and identifies its place in the history of ideas in general. Also, it casts doubt on the tendency to think of Fichte's political theory as a mere blend of ideas that were introduced by social contract theorists from Hobbes to Kant. This claim is contested on two grounds. First, Fichte did not believe that the disappearance of conflict is necessary for harmony in society; he subscribed to the idea of civil society as a device for managing conflict: persons can coexist when they find a "balance" between their competing right-claims. Second, Fichte did not suppose that political society consists only of individuals who are equally strong and competent. For example, he regarded children as members of society even though they cannot stand up for themselves or their rights

In this paper1 i intend to elucidate a thesis that lies at the heart of Fichte’s theory of rights. This thesis states that rights are the essential foundation of rational political order not only because they govern relations among human beings but also because they help them to realize themselves as free agents. In Fichte’s words, rights are the “conditions” under which human beings can become aware of themselves as “self-positing subjects.”2 This thesis calls for the rejection of the claim central to natural rights theories that the main task of rights is to protect liberties that human beings have by virtue of their “natural” or “God-given” qualities.3 This is because Fichte’s thesis implies that ..