Neetika Singh

This paper re-examines John Searle’s notion of status function and argues that his theory underestimates the role of dynamicity and deliberation within social institutions. While Searle’s deontological model of collective intentionality rests upon rule-governed recognition of functions, this paper highlights a crucial limitation, namely, his assumption of stability within institutional structures. Drawing upon Aristotle’s concept of ergon (function) and aretē (virtue), the study argues that social collectives are inherently dynamic, shaped by reflective deliberation and evolving intentions. The analysis identifies two missing links in Searle’s framework: the absence of a mechanism explaining conflicts between individuals’ “I” intentions and collective “We” intentions, and the lack of attention to the transformative processes within institutions. The comparative reading with Aristotle reveals that functional reasoning must involve critical reflection and teleological evaluation to sustain the integrity of the collective. Hence, Searle’s model, though insightful, remains overly static when compared to the dynamic and virtue-oriented Aristotelian approach.

John Searle argues for a notion of ‘collective intentionality’ that produces social actions with the attributed deontic status function on an external reason, simultaneously recognized by all the members. Social actions depend on the acceptance of a propositional attitude in the light of a constitutive rule and the ‘we intention’ of each member. However, Searle’s intentional theory of actions argues that human beings are rational in nature and freely choose to act as per a desire independent of reason; hence, offering a possibility of unreflective obedience towards social rules. What implications and considerations may emerge while explicating relationships between intentionality, intentional action, the notion of power, and coerced life? This paper assesses the scope of such collective participation (in the Searlean sense) that boils down to a coerced life. The viewpoint of a coerced life is examined along with the notion of intentionality and background, and how these notions translate into a concept of power.

Ian Shapiro proposes a representative government that bases its understanding of truth on mature enlightenment philosophy. He examines various enlightenment and anti-enlightenment theories to substantiate his arguments in favour of verifiability as the criterion for defining truth. Contending such a concept of truth he specifies that it is possible only within a representative democracy as it can systematically undermine socially built readymade systems. To examine Shapiro’s fallibilist approach to truth, this paper critically analyses his concept of truth-telling for legitimizing a government and contrasts it with Plato’s explanation of truth-telling. It argues that Shapiro’s procedural mechanisms that override social background presuppose uniform rationality backed by power systems.