•  15
    Presentism and Consciousness
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3): 305-323. 2003.
    The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced.
  •  120
    A new problem of the many
    Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230): 80-97. 2008.
    Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' has elicited many responses over the past quarter of a century. Here I present a new problem of the many. This new problem, I claim, is resistant to the solutions cunently on offer for Unger's problem
  •  34
    Passage, Persistence and Precision
    Dissertation, Monash University. 2002.
    Time passes, and the inexorability of its passing has deep emotional significance. One of the main themes of this thesis involves an investigation into the metaphysical nature of the passage of time. What sort of metaphysical account of passage should be given? And do our emotional responses to temporal passage have metaphysical implications? The other main theme of the thesis is the issue of the metaphysics of persistence. When a thing is present at more than one time, what is the metaphysical …Read more
  •  133
    The hybrid theory of time
    Philosophical Papers 28 (1): 37-53. 1999.
    Time passes; sometimes swiftly, sometimes interminably, but always it passes. We see the world change as events emerge from the shroud of the future, clandestinely slinking into the past almost immediately as though they are reluctant to meet our gaze: children are born, old friends and relatives die, governments once full of youthful enthusiasm wane. If the Earth were sentient, it might feel itself being torn apart as tectonic plates diverge, and chuckle as it outlived species upon species of t…Read more
  •  108
    The principal aim of this paper is to defend a certain view about temporary properties from an important objection to that view. More specifically, I will be defending the view that ostensible temporary intrinsic properties are really relations between the things that have those properties and times. The objection is, roughly speaking, that by construing ostensible temporary intrinsics as relations to times, persisting things are impoverished, being clothed only by their essential (and perhaps al…Read more
  •  286
    Supervaluations and the problem of the many
    Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208): 320-339. 2002.
    Supervaluational treatments of vagueness are currently quite popular among those who regard vagueness as a thoroughly semantic phenomenon. Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' may be regarded as arising from the vagueness of our ordinary physical-object terms, so it is not surprising that supervaluational solutions to Unger's problem have been offered. I argue that supervaluations do not afford an adequate solution to the problem of the many. Moreover, the considerations I raise against the super…Read more
  •  67
    Vague simples
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4). 2003.
  •  91
    (1) Certain of our intentional attitudes appear to have time-asymmetric manifestation conditions. For instance, we dread a certain painful episode only if (we believe) it is future and feel relief about that episode only when (we believe) it is past. We eagerly anticipate events only when they are future and regard them with nostalgia only when they are past
  • Characterizing Presentism
    In Roberto Ciuni, Kristie Miller & Giuliano Torrengo (eds.), New Papers on the Present: Focus on Presentism, Philosophia Verlag. pp. 13-30. 2013.
  •  176
    Presentism and consciousness
    Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3): 305-323. 2003.
    The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced
  •  216
    The endurance/perdurance distinction
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3). 2002.
    This Article does not have an abstract