Neil O'Hara

This paper aims to show that the experience of ‘primary recognition’ (O’Hara in Moral certainty and the foundations of morality, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018) can be extended to human AI interactions. That is, I argue that human beings can (and do) experience non-rational, reflex moral responses to AI and social robots that fit O’Hara’s description of primary recognition. I give two plausible examples, one involving a military mine-sweeping robot and the other, a toy dinosaur called a ‘Pleo’. These experiences of primary recognition do not, however, settle the question of whether any particular AI can be considered a true moral patient or a ‘person’.

Moral certainty refers to those aspects of morality- moral acting, feeling, and thinking-that are beyond doubt, explanation, and justification. The essays in this book explore the concept of moral certainty and its application and usefulness in contemporary moral debates. The notion of moral certainty, which is inspired by the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, is emerging as a key reference point in contemporary moral philosophy. An investigation of the implications of moral certainty is called for, given that so many discussions in moral philosophy concern the possibility of justifying our moral beliefs. The concept of moral certainty also feeds directly into the emerging field of hinge epistemolo,gy. The chapters in this volume tackle the following issues: meta-questions around whether and how we can make sense of the concept of moral certainty; the role of moral certainty in contemporary debates on gender, racism, bias and historically unjust practices; ways in which radical change in society engendered by new technologies might affect moral certainties; the role of the notion of moral certainty in the debates on free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives on Moral Certainty will appeal to researchers and advanced students working on ethics and moral philosophy, epistemology, philosophy of technology, and Wittgenstein.

What lies at the foundation of our moral beliefs? If we dig down far enough do we find that our moral values have no ground at all to stand on, and so are apt to collapse upon serious philosophical investigation? This book seeks to answer these and related questions by positing an indubitable foundation for our moral beliefs – they arise from the phenomenon of ‘primary recognition’, and are fundamentally shaped by ‘basic moral certainties’. Drawing on philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Knud Ejler Løgstrup, this book draws together insights from both Analytic and Continental philosophy to provide a convincing new picture of our moral foundations. And it does so in a way that eschews moral conservativism and opens the way for a rich understanding of the variety and particularity of our human moral systems, while also keeping a significant place for those moral beliefs that occur universally, across cultures.